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“The sole reason for the learned trial judge’s dismissal of DW1’s and DW2’s evidence was that their evidence contradicted the finding of fact made by the learned HCJ in the previous suit, as quoted above. We hold that the relevancy and admissibility of judgments, orders, or decrees as evidence in any trial are subject to the limited circumstances set out under ss. 40 to 43 of the Evidence Act 1950 (“EA 1950”).”

“Turning to the facts of the present case, we found that the finding of the learned HCJ on the grounds of judgment in the previous suit relied on by the learned trial judge did not fall under any of the provisions under ss. 40 to 42 of the EA 1950 above. We are of the considered view that under s. 43 of the EA 1950, the production of a previous judgment merely establishes the existence of a prior decision of the court and nothing more. We affirm our earlier decision in Datuk S Nallakaruppan & Ors v. Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim & Other Appeals [2015] 6 CLJ 425 in which it was held as follows:

[24] Therefore, with regard to the defendants’ defence of justification, we are in agreement with the learned judicial commissioner that s. 43 of the Evidence Act would be a bar to the defendants to rely on the judgment or order or decree of another court proceeding more so it is a criminal proceeding. (emphasis added)”

– Per Hashim Hamzah JCA in Pendaftar Hakmilik, Pejabat Tanah Dan Galian Negeri Johor v. Huan Kok Sy [2025] 2 CLJ 871

“Taking the cue from the jurisprudence propounded by the Court of Appeal in Newlake Development Sdn Bhd v. Zenith Delight Sdn Bhd [2017] CLJU 527, we should revisit the common law principle that “Leave may be refused to a plaintiff to discontinue the action, if the plaintiff is not wholly dominis litis or if the defendant has by the proceedings obtained an advantage of which it does not seem just to deprive him.” This is because the starting principle must be that it is not desirable that a plaintiff should be compelled to litigate against his will.”

“If the plaintiff wishes to discontinue his action and the court finds that the plaintiff is not wholly dominis litis or if the defendant has by the proceedings obtained an advantage of which it does not seem just to deprive him, the court should not force the plaintiff to litigate against his wishes but should allow him to discontinue but without liberty to file afresh.”

“We can now do that, ie, impose a term ‘without liberty to file afresh’, contrary to the position taken by the Indian cases, because as pointed out by the Court of Appeal in Newlake Development Sdn Bhd v. Zenith Delight Sdn Bhd, Malaysian courts can now impose terms on discontinuance as ‘under the new Rules of Court 2012, the court plays a proactive role in moving the pace for litigation. The courts no longer leave it to the litigants to decide the same.’.... this way we can avoid unnecessary wastage of precious judicial time and litigants can also save on legal fees.” - Per Leong Wai Hong JC in Lee Ngan Hoo v. Insp Sarawanan Panrengam & Ors [2025] 2 CLJ 590