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CASES OF THE WEEK

CUSTOMS AND EXCISE: Customs duty - Valuation of goods - Royalties - Whether to be included as part of paid or payable price of goods - Whether considered as condition of sale for goods to be exported to Malaysia - Whether valid adjustment item - Whether to be added to transaction value of imported goods - Customs (Rules of Valuation) Regulations 1999, regs. 4, 5(1)(a)(iv)


NIKE SALES MALAYSIA SDN BHD v. JABATAN KASTAM DIRAJA MALAYSIA & ANOR
FEDERAL COURT, PUTRAJAYA
ZULKEFLI AHMAD MAKINUDIN CJ (MALAYA); SURIYADI HALIM OMAR FCJ; AHMAD MAAROP FCJ; HASAN LAH FCJ; ZALEHA ZAHARI FCJ
[CIVIL APPEAL NO: 01-3-03-2012(W)]
29 MAY 2013

Nike Sales Malaysia Sdn Bhd ('the plaintiff') imported into Malaysia footwear, apparel, sports equipment and accessories under the Nike brand ('the licensed goods'). Nike Inc (USA) ('Nike USA') was the ultimate holding company of Nike International Ltd ('the licensor') and the plaintiff. The Royal Malaysian Customs Department ('the first defendant'), after carrying out an audit exercise on the declared value of goods imported by the plaintiff, ruled out that the audit examination showed that the royalty cost was not included as part of the paid, or payable price of the goods. A letter of demand dated 15 August 2003 was therefore issued by the first defendant to the plaintiff demanding payment of RM3,292,076.91 (which was subsequently reduced to RM2,675,344.19) as customs duties and sales tax payable by the plaintiff under reg. 5(1)(a)(iv) of the Customs (Rules of Valuation) Regulations 1999 ('the Regulations'). The plaintiff lodged an appeal to the Director General of Customs Malaysia ('the second defendant') which was dismissed. Hence, the plaintiff appealed to the High Court. The plaintiff argued that the royalties were not paid as a condition of the sale of the goods for export to Malaysia because the sale contract and the royalties contract were separate agreements made between different parties and that the party to whom the royalties were payable, Nike International Ltd, did not have control of the situation in Malaysia beyond the ordinary rights of a licensor of intellectual property. The Judicial Commissioner ('JC'), after carefully considering the decisions from the Commonwealth countries on this issue, had agreed with the views expressed in the case of Deputy Minister of National Revenue v. Mattel Canada Inc ('Mattel Canada') and allowed the plaintiff's appeal. The Court of Appeal, however, had agreed with the decision in Chief Executive of New Zealand Customs Service v. Nike New Zealand Ltd ('Nike New Zealand') and in reversing the decision of the JC, held that the royalties payable by the plaintiff after the goods were sold were to be regarded as an item to be included for adjustment of the price to be paid or payable. Thus, the plaintiff appealed. The questions for which leave to appeal to this court were granted were (i) whether the royalty paid by the plaintiff to Nike International Ltd could be considered as a condition of sale for the goods to be exported to Malaysia and as an item for the adjustment in accordance with r. 4 of the Regulations read together with r. 5(1)(a)(iv) of the said Regulations; and (ii) whether the royalty was an indirect consideration by the plaintiff as a condition of sale for the entry of the goods to be exported into Malaysia.

Held (allowing appeal with costs; setting aside orders of Court of Appeal; reinstating orders of the High Court)

Per Hasan Lah FCJ delivering the judgment of the court:

(1) The royalties paid by the plaintiff should not be included for duty purposes since the plaintiff did not have to pay any royalty in order to purchase the licensed goods from the suppliers. The obligation to pay royalty only arose from a separate agreement unrelated to the sale for export of the goods to Malaysia. The test adopted by the JC was therefore correct. (para 43)

(2) The JC had not erred in holding that royalty payable by Nike Malaysia to Nike International could not properly be taken as an adjustment item under reg. 5(1)(a)(iv) of the Regulations. Clause 13.1 of the Intellectual Property License and Exclusive Distribution Agreement clearly stated that Nike International Ltd should not prevent or impede the sale of goods exported into Malaysia despite non-payment of royalty. Nike International Ltd did not have control of the situation in Malaysia beyond the ordinary rights of a licensor of intellectual property and giving it the ability to determine whether export to Malaysia could or could not occur. (para 44)

(3) The decision given in the judgment of the Canadian Supreme Court in the case of Mattel Canada was consistent with the relevant advisory opinions given by the Technical Committee on Customs Valuation. Due regard must be given to such advisory opinions because the interpretation of regs. 4 and 5 of the Regulations could not be an isolated and domestic exercise. It is pertinent to note that in other Commonwealth countries like the United Kingdom, Australia, India and Singapore, royalties paid on Nike goods have not been taken to be part of the value of imported goods for purposes of imposing duties and sales tax. As such, the decision in (Nike New Zealand) must be viewed as being inconsistent with the treatment in other Commonwealth countries. (para 45)

(4) It is the requirement of reg. 5(1)(a)(iv) of the Regulations that the royalties must be paid directly or indirectly as a condition of the sale of the goods for export to Malaysia in order for an adjustment to be made to the transaction value of the imported goods by adding the royalties. Since royalties paid by the plaintiff to Nike International Ltd were not expressed to be paid as a condition of sale for the export of the goods by the independent foreign suppliers to the plaintiff, the royalties were therefore not to be added to the transaction value of the imported goods. (para 47)

Bahasa Malaysia Translation Of Headnotes

Nike Sales Malaysia Sdn Bhd ('plaintif') telah mengimport kasut, pakaian, peralatan dan aksesori sukan ke Malaysia di bawah jenama Nike ('barang-barang berlesen'). Nike Inc (USA) ('Nike USA') adalah syarikat induk Nike International Ltd (pemberi lesen) dan plaintif. Jabatan Kastam Diraja Malaysia ('defendan pertama'), selepas menjalankan audit nilai barang yang diisytiharkan telah diimport oleh plaintif, memutuskan bahawa pemeriksaan audit menunjukkan kos royalti tidak dimasukkan sebagai sebahagian daripada yang jumlah dibayar, atau harga barang yang harus dibayar. Satu surat tuntutan bertarikh 15 Ogos 2003 telah dikeluarkan oleh defendan pertama kepada plaintif menuntut bayaran RM3,292,076.91 (yang pada kemudiannya dikurangkan ke RM2,675,344.19) sebagai duti kastam dan cukai jualan yang perlu dibayar oleh plaintif di bawah perkara 5(1)(a)(iv) Peraturan-Peraturan Kastam (Kaedah Penilaian) 1999 ('Peraturan'). Rayuan plaintif kepada Ketua Pengarah Kastam Malaysia ('defendan kedua') telah ditolak. Oleh itu, perayu membuat rayuan ke Mahkamah Tinggi. Plaintif menghujahkan bahawa royalti tidak dibayar sebagai syarat jualan barang-barang untuk eksport ke Malaysia kerana kontrak jualan dan kontrak royalti adalah perjanjian yang berasingan yang dibuat antara pihak-pihak yang berbeza dan pihak yang menerima bayaran royalti, Nike International Ltd, tidak mempunyai kawalan melebihi hak-hak biasa seorang pemberi lesen harta intelektual di Malaysia. Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman ('PK'), selepas mempertimbangkan dengan teliti keputusan-keputusan daripada negara-negara Komanwel lain berkenaan isu ini, telah bersetuju dengan pandangan-pandangan yang terdapat dalam kes Deputy Minister of National Revenue v. Mattel Canada Inc ('Mattel Canada') dan membenarkan rayuan plaintif. Mahkamah Rayuan, walau bagaimanapun, telah bersetuju dengan keputusan Chief Executive of New Zealand Customs Service v. Nike New Zealand Ltd ('Nike New Zealand') dan dalam mengakas keputusan PK, memutuskan bahawa royalti yang harus dibayar oleh plaintif selepas barang-barang dijual adalah dianggap sebagai item yang harus dimasukkan bagi pelarasan harga yang dibayar atau harus dibayar. Oleh itu, perayu merayu. Persoalan-persoalan yang timbul dalam rayuan ini adalah (i) sama ada royalti yang dibayar oleh plaintif kepada Nike International Ltd boleh dianggap sebagai syarat jualan barang-barang untuk dieksport ke Malaysia dan sebagai item untuk pelarasan menurut perkara 4 Peraturan dibaca bersama dengan perkara 5(1)(a)(iv) Peraturan tersebut; dan (ii) sama ada royalti adalah satu pertimbangan tidak langsung oleh plaintif sebagai syarat jualan kemasukan barang-barang untuk eksport ke dalam Malaysia.

Diputuskan (membenarkan rayuan dengan kos; mengenepikan perintah Mahkamah Rayuan; menghidupkan semula perintah Mahkamah Tinggi)

Oleh Hasan Lah HMP menyampaikan penghakiman mahkamah:

(1) Royalti yang dibayar oleh plaintif tidak perlu dimasukkan untuk tujuan duti kerana plaintif tidak membayar royalti untuk membeli barang-barang berlesen daripada pembekal. Kewajipan membayar royalti hanya timbul daripada perjanjian yang berasingan yang tiada kaitan dengan jualan eksport barang-barang ke Malaysia. Ujian yang diguna pakai oleh PK adalah betul.

(2) PK tidak khilaf apabila memutuskan bahawa royalti yang dibayar oleh Nike Malaysia kepada Nike International tidak boleh dianggap sebagai item pelarasan di bawah Intelek dan Perjanjian Pengedaran Eksklusif dengan jelasnya menyatakan bahawa Nike International Ltd tidak boleh mencegah atau menghalang jualan barang-barang yang dieksport ke Malaysia walaupun tiada pembayaran royalti. Nike International Ltd tidak mempunyai kawalan melebihi hak-hak biasa seorang pemberi lesen harta intelektual di Malaysia atau keupayaan untuk menentukan sama ada eksport ke Malaysia boleh atau tidak boleh berlaku.

(3) Keputusan dalam penghakiman Mahkamah Agung Kanada dalam kes Mattel Canada adalah konsisten dengan pendapat-pendapat penasihat-penasihat relevan yang diberikan oleh Jawatankuasa Teknikal Penilaian Kastam. Perhatian yang sewajarnya harus diberikan kepada pendapat-pendapat penasihat-penasihat tersebut kerana tafsiran-tafsiran perkara 4 dan 5 Peraturan tidak boleh menjadi satu usaha yang terpencil dan domestik. Adalah penting untuk ditekankan bahawa di negara-negara Komanwel yang lain seperti United Kingdom, Australia, India dan Singapura, royalti yang dibayar ke atas barang-barang Nike tidak dikira sebagai sebahagian nilai barang-barang import bagi tujuan mengenakan duti dan cukai jualan. Oleh itu, keputusan Nike New Zealand harus dilihat sebagai tidak konsisten dengan apa yang dilaksanakan di negara-negara Komanwel yang lain.

(4) Adalah keperluan perkara 5(1)(a)(iv) Peraturan bahawa royalti harus dibayar secara langsung atau tidak langsung sebagai syarat jualan barang-barang untuk eksport ke Malaysia bagi membolehkan pelarasan dibuat kepada nilai transaksi barang-barang yang diimport dengan menambah royalti. Oleh kerana royalti yang dibayar oleh plaintif kepada Nike International Ltd tidak dinyatakan akan dibayar sebagai syarat jualan eksport barang-barang oleh pembekal asing bebas kepada plaintif, royalti oleh itu tidak boleh ditambah kepada nilai urus niaga barang yang diimport.

Case(s) referred to:

Chief Executive of New Zealand Customs Service v. Nike New Zealand Ltd [2004] 1 NZLR 238 (not foll)

Deputy Minister of National Revenue v. Mattel Canada Inc [2001] 199 DLR (4th) 598 (foll)

National Land Finance Co-operative Society Ltd v. Director-General of Inland Revenue [1993] 4 CLJ 339 SC (refd)

Legislation referred to:

Customs Act 1967, ss. 2, 143A

Customs (Amendment) Act 2007, s. 10(3)

Customs (Rules of Valuation) Regulations 1999, rr. 4(1), 5(1)(a)(iv)

Canadian Customs Act 1985 [Canada], s. 48(5)

Counsel:

For the appellant - KI Goh (Foong Pui Chi with her); M/s Shearn Delamore & Co

For the respondent - Noor Hisham Ismail, SFC

[Appeal from Court of Appeal; Civil Appeal No: W-01(IM)-123-09I]

Reported by Suhainah Wahiduddin




PARTNERSHIP: Dissolution - Partnership property - Partnership name - Whether partners of dissolved legal firm could continue practice under dissolved firm's name

PARTNERSHIP: Partnership property - Legal firm - Use of partnership name - No partnership agreement - Notice of dissolution issued by one partner - Whether other partners could continue practice under dissolved partnership's name - Whether goodwill of partnership sold or assigned


TAI FOONG LAM v. HAMDI ABDULLAH & ORS
COURT OF APPEAL, PUTRAJAYA
ZAINUN ALI JCA; RAMLY ALI JCA; ZAHARAH IBRAHIM JCA
[CIVIL APPEAL NO: W-02-(NCvC)633-2011]
14 AUGUST 2012

The appellant and respondents had formed a partnership called 'Abdullah Chan & Co' ('the firm'). No agreement or deed was entered into by the parties. Subsequently, the relationship between the partners deteriorated and culminated in the appellant issuing a notice of dissolution ('notice') to dissolve the partnership with effect from 31 December 2010. After the issue of the said notice, the first and second respondents applied for leave to practice under the name and style of 'Abdullah Chan' from 2 January 2011 and obtained a court order on 7 February 2011 to this effect. The appellant appealed against the High Court's decision which held that the first and second respondents were at liberty to apply to practice under the name of Messrs "Abdullah Chan'.

Held (allowing appeal with no order as to costs)

Per Zainun Ali JCA delivering the judgment of the court:

(1) The test of whether a partner can use the name of the partnership after the dissolution of the firm depends on whether the goodwill of the partnership has been assigned and not whether the name of the dissolved firm carries the name of the partner who is objecting to the use of the name; Sukhinderjit Singh Muker v. Arumugam Deva Rajah (refd). (para 32)

(2) Generally, the goodwill of the business carried out by a partnership forms part of the assets to be realised on dissolution. Generally too, where the goodwill is not sold, each partner may use the name of the firm, if by doing so, he does not hold out the other partners as still being partners with him. (para 34)

(3) Since there was no agreement between the partners of the dissolved firm of "Abdullah Chan" as to the property in the goodwill attached to the name, the goodwill therefore belonged to all the partners of the dissolved firm of "Abdullah Chan" and not to any one individual partner. Thus, the first and second respondents were not entitled to use the name "Abdullah Chan" for themselves. (paras 37 & 46)

(4) The High Court order of 7 February 2011 which "appropriated" to the first and second respondents, an asset that belonged to all five partners of the dissolved firm of "Abdullah Chan", to the exclusion of the rights of the others, namely the appellant (as well as the third and fourth respondents), offended the principle of "the right of the other partners to have the goodwill sold for the common benefit of all". (paras 47 & 48)

(5) Until and unless the process of the winding-up of the affairs of the partnership was completed, none of the partners were entitled to use the name of their erstwhile partnership. (para 62)

Bahasa Malaysia Translation Of Headnotes

Perayu dan responden-responden membentuk suatu perkongsian yang dikenali sebagai "Abdullah Chan & Co" ('firma tersebut'). Tiada perjanjian atau surat ikatan dimeterai oleh pihak-pihak yang terlibat. Berikutan itu, hubungan antara rakan-rakan kongsi merosot dan berakhir dengan pengeluaran notis pembubaran ('notis') oleh perayu untuk membubarkan perkongsian tersebut berkuatkuasa daripada 31 Disember 2010. Selepas pengeluaran notis tersebut, responden pertama dan kedua memohon kebenaran untuk beramal di bawah nama dan gaya "Abdullah Chan" dari 2 Januari 2011 dan memperolehi perintah mahkamah pada 7 Februari 2011. Perayu merayu terhadap keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi yang memutuskan bahawa responden pertama dan kedua mempunyai kebebasan untuk memohon untuk beramal di bawah nama Tetuan "Abdullah Chan".

Diputuskan (membenarkan rayuan tanpa perintah untuk kos)

Oleh Zainun Ali HMR menyampaikan penghakiman mahkamah:

(1) Ujian sama ada seorang rakan kongsi boleh menggunakan nama perkongsian selepas pembubaran firma tersebut bergantung kepada sama ada nama baik perkongsian tersebut telah diserahhakkan dan bukan sama ada nama firma yang dibubarkan mengandungi nama rakan kongsi yang membantah penggunaan nama tersebut; Sukhinderjit Singh Muker v. Arumugam Deva Rajah (dirujuk).

(2) Secara umumnya nama baik perniagaan yang dijalankan oleh perkongsian membentuk sebahagian aset yang boleh direalisasikan selepas pembubaran. Secara umumnya juga, di mana nama baik tidak dijual, setiap rakan kongsi boleh menggunakan nama firma tersebut, jika dengan berbuat demikian, dia tidak menunjukkan bahawa rakan kongsi yang lain sebagai masih lagi mempunyai perkongsian dengannya.

(3) Oleh kerana tiada perjanjian di antara rakan-rakan kongsi firma yang telah dibubarkan "Abdullah Chan" mengenai harta dalam nama baik yang terikat pada nama tersebut, dengan itu nama baik tersebut kepunyaan kesemua rakan kongsi firma yang dibubarkan "Abdullah Chan" dan bukan kepada mana-mana seorang rakan kongsi secara individu. Oleh itu, responden pertama dan kedua tidak berhak menggunakan nama "Abdullah Chan" untuk diri mereka sendiri.

(4) Perintah Mahkamah Tinggi bertarikh 7 Februari 2011 yang "memperuntukkan" kepada responden pertama dan kedua harta kepunyaan lima rakan kongsi firma "Abdullah Chan" yang dibubarkan, dengan mengecualikan hak-hak yang lain, iaitu perayu (dan juga responden ketiga dan keempat), melanggar prinsip "the right of the other partners to have the goodwill sold for the common benefit of all".

(5) Sehingga dan kecuali proses penggulungan urusan perkongsian diselesaikan, tidak ada seorang pun rakan kongsi yang berhak menggunakan nama perkongsian terdahulu mereka.

Case(s) referred to:

Burchell v. Wilde [1900] 1 Ch 551 (refd)

Chia Foon Tau & Anor v. Lim Pey Lin [1997] 4 CLJ Supp 211 HC (refd)

Dato' Gopal Sri Ram v. Dato' C Vijaya Kumar & Ors [2006] 6 MLJ 328 (refd)

Ng Teck Sim Colin v. Teh Guek Ngor Engelin & Anor [1995] 2 SLR 380 (refd)

Morgan v. Forster [1976] 12 OR (2nd) 352 (refd)

Sukhinderjit Singh Muker v. Arumugam Deva Rajah [1998] 2 CLJ Supp 110 HC (refd)

Legislation referred to:

Legal Profession Act 1976, s. 85

Partnership Act 1961, s. 40

Counsel:

For the appellant - Ambiga Sreenevasan (Conrad Young with her); M/s Sreenevasan Young

For the 1st & 2nd respondent - Gideon Tan; M/s Gideon Tan Razali Zaini

For the 3rd respondent - Mohd Arief Emran Arifin; M/s Gideon Tan Razali Zaini

[Appeal from High Court, Kuala Lumpur; Originating Summons No: S-24 NCVC-742-2010]

Reported by Amutha Suppayah




CIVIL PROCEDURE: Case management - Pre-trial case management - Failure to comply - Unless order - Filing of trial documents - Electronic filing ('e-filing') - Whether complied - Whether court only recognised documents which are e-filed - Rules of Court 2012, O. 34 r. 2(2)(j) & (k) - Signing by defendant's counsel on physical copies of trial documents - Whether constituted official e-filing - Whether defendant precluded from defending case - Rules of Court 2012, O. 33 r. 5, O. 34 r. 1(3)

CIVIL PROCEDURE: Mode of filing - Electronic filing - Filing of trial documents through e-filing - Whether complied - Whether court only recognised documents which are e-filed - Rules of Court 2012, O. 34 r. 2(2)(j) & (k) - Whether documents filed manually constituted proper filing of documents - Rules of Court 2012, O. 33 r. 5, O. 34 r. 1(3)

CIVIL PROCEDURE: Unless order - Failure to comply - Pre-trial case management directions - Whether unless order was a peremptory order - Whether compliance mandatory - Rules of Court 2012, O. 33 r. 5, O. 34 rr. 1(3), 2(2)(j) & (k)


NUR IBRAHIM MASILAMANI & ANOR v. JOSEPH LOPEZ
HIGH COURT MALAYA, KUALA LUMPUR
YEOH WEE SIAM J
[CIVIL SUIT NO: 22 NCvC-798-07-2012]
12 APRIL 2013
[2013] CLJ JT(3)

The plaintiffs' counsel made an oral preliminary objection ('the PO') under O. 33 r. 2 of the Rules of Court 2012 ('ROC') on the first day of a full trial. She submitted that the defendant's counsel had failed to comply with the case management directions ('CM') given by the court on 17 August 2012 wherein the court had given an unless order for the trial documents to be filed, including the statement of agreed facts ('SOAF') and issues to be tried ('ITBT') by 8 October 2012. On 25 September 2012, counsel for the plaintiffs enclosed the SOAF and ITBT to counsel for the defendant and requested him to revert to them within seven days, failing which, the plaintiffs would proceed to obtain judgment against the defendant. Counsel for the defendant failed to revert to them, thus the plaintiffs' counsel filed the SOAF and ITBT on 8 October 2012 in compliance with the court order. On 18 March 2013, which was the last date of the CM, both counsel were informed by the court that witness statements of both parties and the defendant's summary of case had to be e-filed by 19 March 2013 since the court only recognised documents which were e-filed and they formed the official file of the court. Another unless order was given for such filing to ensure strict compliance by both parties. Counsel for the plaintiffs submitted that the court's unless order was justified and that the plaintiffs had filed their own version of the SOAF and ITBT and until the date of trial, counsel for the defendant did not revert to them on those documents. Counsel for the defendant, however, submitted that on the morning of the trial, the court interpreter had requested him to sign the court's physical copies of the plaintiffs' SOAF and ITBT, which he did.

Held (judgment for plaintiffs):

(1) The unless order given on 17 August 2012 for the trial documents to be filed by 8 October 2012 was a peremptory order which must be complied with promptly and strictly by both parties. This is a new civil court ie, an NCvC established for the purpose of expediting the trial of cases and completing them within nine months, if possible, from the time of registration of the case. As such, it is crucial that all orders given during CM be complied with by both parties according to the timelines given by the court. (para 22)

(2) The signing by counsel for the defendant on the physical copies of the SOAF and ITBT in the judge's personal physical file of the cause papers did not constitute official e-filing of the documents and ought to be rejected. The judge's physical file is only for the judge's own quick reference and reading and it is usually used as a back-up file should the e-system ie, the electronic Case Management System ('CMS') of the court be suddenly slow or breaks down. From the last CM on 18 March 2013, counsel for the defendant should already know, in case he pleads ignorance, that the trial documents must be e-filed and the court rejects documents filed manually, including documents signed on physical copies, but not e-filed through the CMS. (para 24)

(3) By the fact that the defendant's counsel did not sign and then e-filed afresh the SOAF and ITBT (filed previously by counsel for the plaintiffs), on record, there was no statement of agreed facts and no issues to be tried which had been agreed by both parties. Counsel for the defendant did not comply with the filing of these two documents which were required to be filed in accordance with O. 34 r. 2(2)(j) and (k) of the ROC for pre-trial case management. The defendant's counsel did not give heed to the court's order or render cooperation to the plaintiff's counsel and also to the court to ensure that, for the purpose of a just, expeditious and economical trial as intended by O. 34 of the ROC on pre-trial case management, at least there must be some agreed facts, so that not all the facts need to be disputed, and for the agreed issues for trial to be identified in order to set parameters for the trial. Thus, by the defendant's failure to revert to counsel for the plaintiffs or agree to the SOAF and ITBT filed by them, it further meant that the defendant did not agree to any fact and was therefore disputing every fact, and also did not have any issue to be tried. (para 24)

(4) Based on the considerations of established principles, and in exercise of the court's powers under O. 33 r. 5 and O. 34 r. 1(3) of the ROC, the defendant was precluded from defending the case. Since the defendant had not deemed it fit to raise any issues to be tried, the defendant's defence was further struck out. Accordingly, the plaintiffs' PO was allowed and judgment was given to the plaintiffs as prayed in the writ of summons and statement of claim. (para 30)

Case(s) referred to:

Anwar Ibrahim v. Abdul Khalid & Anor [2004] 8 CLJ 14 HC (refd)

Md Amin Md Yusof & Anor v. Cityvilla Sdn Bhd [2004] 3 CLJ 88 CA (refd)

Sunway PMI-Pile Construction Sdn Bhd v. Pembenaan Chan & Chua Sdn Bhd [2003] 5 CLJ 63 HC (refd)

Legislation referred to:

Rules of Court 2012, O. 33 rr. 2, 5, O. 34 rr. 1(1), (2), (3), 2(2)(j), (k)

Counsel:

For the plaintiffs - Harwinder Kaur; M/s A J Ariffin, Yeo & Harpal

For the defendant - Andrew Davis; M/s Andrew Davis & Co

Reported by Suhainah Wahiduddin




PROSEDUR JENAYAH: Hukuman - Mitigasi - Menerima suapan sebagai rasuah - Sama ada kepentingan OKT dipertimbangkan bersama kepentingan awam - Sama ada kedua-dua tuduhan berlaku dalam transaksi berasingan - Sama ada perintah hukuman penjara bagi kedua-dua pertuduhan wajar berjalan berturutan

UNDANG-UNDANG JENAYAH: Rasuah - Menerima suapan sebagai rasuah - Wang suapan sebagai dorongan tidak melaporkan kebocoran "compact valve" - Sama ada dibuktikan OKT menerima wang suapan - Anggapan statutori - Sama ada berjaya dipatahkan - Akta Suruhanjaya Pencegahan Rasuah Malaysia 2009, s. 50(1)


PP lwn. JASMI MOHD JEMADI [2012] 2 SMC 269
MAHKAMAH SESYEN, KUALA TERENGGANU
AZMAN MUSTAPHA HS
[KES TANGKAP NO: KT62-40-2010]
2 MEI 2012

Tertuduh ('OKT') menghadapi dua pertuduhan di bawah s. 17(a) Akta Suruhanjaya Pencegahan Rasuah Malaysia 2009 ('Akta'), kerana menerima secara rasuah wang suapan yang masing-masing berjumlah RM1,500 dan RM2,000 sebagai dorongan supaya tidak melaporkan kepada ibu pejabat Petronas Dagangan Berhad ('PDB') bahawa "compact valve" yang dibekalkan oleh syarikat Dual Metal Sdn Bhd ('Dual Metal') kepada Terminal LPG Melaka telah bocor. OKT adalah kakitangan PDB yang bertugas sebagai "superintendant" di Terminal LPG Melaka. Satu kontrak telah diberikan kepada Dual Metal oleh PDB untuk membekalkan "compact valve" baru kepada terminal LPG milikan PDB. Pengadu ('SP3') menyatakan bahawa beliau dimaklumkan oleh OKT, pada dua tarikh yang berasingan, bahawa injap yang dibekalkan oleh syarikatnya, Dual Metal, dijumpai bocor dan meminta SP3 memasukkan wang sebanyak RM1,500 dan RM2,000 ke dalam akaun OKT bagi menanggung kos pembaikan tersebut dan menangguhkan daripada membuat laporan kepada ibu pejabat PDB. SP3 telah memasukkan wang tersebut ke dalam akaun OKT. Pihak pendakwaan berjaya membuktikan kes prima facie atas kedua-dua pertuduhan tersebut dan dengan itu, OKT dipanggil untuk membela diri atas kedua-dua pertuduhan tersebut. OKT di dalam pembelaannya mengakui menerima wang sebanyak RM1,500 dan RM2,000 daripada SP3 dan menyatakan bahawa wang tersebut diberikan oleh SP3 untuk membelanja kakitangan OKT makan sebagai balasan tidak melaporkan kepada pihak pengurusan tentang kebocoran "compact valve" yang dibekalkan oleh syarikat SP3. Walau bagimanapun, OKT menafikan bahawa beliau meminta wang tersebut daripada SP3. Isu yang perlu diputuskan oleh mahkamah adalah sama ada keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh pihak pembelaan cukup bagi mematahkan anggapan yang terkandung di dalam s. 50(1) Akta.

Diputuskan (mensabitkan dan menghukum OKT):

(1) Di atas fakta, OKT telah memperoleh wang berjumlah RM1,500 dan RM2,000 dan mengakui telah membelanjakan wang tersebut untuk membeli makanan dan minuman untuk kakitangan beliau. Di bawah s. 19(1)(c) Akta, OKT adalah bersalah terhadap tuduhan di bawah s. 17(a) Akta sebaik sahaja dibuktikan bahawa beliau telah secara rasuah memperoleh wang yang diberikan oleh SP3 untuk tidak melaporkan tentang kebocoran pada "compact valve" tersebut, walaupun pada hakikatnya beliau tidak melakukan apa yang diminta oleh SP3. (perenggan 16)

(2) Tujuan OKT memaklumkan tentang kebocoran "compact valve" kepada SP3 adalah bagi menakutkan SP3 sehingga mendorong SP3 untuk membayar wang kepada OKT sebagai balasan tidak melaporkan tentang kebocoran tersebut kepada pihak pengurusan PDB. Keterangan SP3 ini gagal dipatahkan oleh pihak pembelaan. Pihak pembelaan dengan itu gagal mematahkan anggapan di bawah s. 50(1) Akta dengan membuktikan di atas imbangan kebarangkalian bahawa wang yang OKT peroleh itu bukanlah wang rasuah. Pendakwaan berjaya membuktikan bahawa kedua-dua tuduhan terhadap OKT melampaui keraguan yang munasabah. (perenggan 17 & 18)

(3) Dalam rayuan mitigasinya, OKT membangkitkan tentang kesusahan yang dialaminya akibat daripada kejadian dalam kes ini, termasuk diberhentikan kerja oleh PDB. Mengambilkira kepentingan OKT dan kepentingan awam, OKT wajar dijatuhkan hukuman penjara dua tahun dan denda RM15,000 iaitu sepuluh kali ganda jumlah suapan bagi pertuduhan pertama dan penjara dua tahun dan denda RM20,000 iaitu sepuluh kali ganda nilai suapan bagi pertuduhan kedua. Kedua-dua hukuman penjara diperintahkan berjalan secara berturutan kerana kedua-dua tuduhan telah berlaku dalam dua transaksi yang berasingan. (perenggan 19)

Kes-kes yang dirujuk:

Balachandran v. PP [2005] 1 CLJ 85 FC (dirujuk)

PP v. Datuk Haji Harun Haji Idris [1976] 1 LNS 97 HC (dirujuk)

PP v. Yap Huat Heng [1986] 1 CLJ 81; [1986] CLJ (Rep) 645 (dirujuk)

Thavanathan Balasubramaniam v. PP [1997] 3 CLJ 150 FC (dirujuk)

Perundangan yang dirujuk:

Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission Act 2009, ss. 3, 17(a), 19(1)(c), 24(1), 50(1)

Kaunsel:

Bagi pihak pendakwaan - Ahmad Sazilee Abdul Khairi; TPR

Bagi pihak tertuduh - Mohd Zaharudeen Harun (Khairul Nizam Mohd Masnan bersamanya); T/n Dzulkifli Jaafar Nizam & Co

Dilaporkan oleh S Barathi

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