Issue #34/2020
13 August 2020
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HE-CON SDN BHD v. BULYAH ISHAK & ANOR AND ANOTHER APPEAL [2020] 7 CLJ 271
FEDERAL COURT, PUTRAJAYA
TENGKU MAIMUN TUAN MAT CJ; MOHD ZAWAWI SALLEH FCJ; ABANG ISKANDAR FCJ;
IDRUS HARUN FCJ; ABDUL RAHMAN SEBLI FCJ
[CIVIL APPEALS NO: 02(f)-22-03-2019(B) & 02(f)-28-04-2019(B)]
25 JUNE 2020
A proprietor of property who has sold his property to a purchaser and received the full purchase price thereof stands as a bare trustee to the purchaser vis-a-vis the property, and to that end is prohibited from dealing with the property for the benefit of any new purchaser or holder of interest, including, as the case may be, a chargee, and further, is legally incapable of passing any proprietary or registrable interest to the latter. Where therefore a housing-developer property owner sold a property to a purchaser (deceased) who has paid the purchase price in full, and the developer, without the consent or knowledge of the deceased, proceeded to charge the property to a bank as security for a facility, the charge transaction or presentation is inescapably tainted with illegality, and is indeed void ab initio as against both the developer and the bank. The chargee bank in the obtaining circumstances cannot be considered a bona fide party, is not obtaining any indefeasible title thereto under s. 340(2) of the National Land Code, and in any case, is not entitled to avail itself to the proviso of s. 340(3) of the Code. Ownership of the property as a matter of law must revert to the deceased and/or his estate.
LAND LAW: Interest in property - Indefeasibility of title and interest - Vendor registered property in its name despite full payment made by purchaser - Whether vendor intended to divest interest in property - Whether vendor merely bare trustee - Whether incapable of any further dealings with property - Whether subsequent charge to bank valid - Whether transaction based on void instrument - Whether transaction vitiated by s. 340(2) of National Land Code - Whether title obtained by bank defeasible - National Land Code, s. 340(3)
LAND LAW: Interest in property - Indefeasibility of title and interest - Beneficial ownership - Purchase price paid in full - Vendor registered property in its name - Whether sale and purchase agreement concluded between parties - Whether vendor intended to divest interest in property - Whether purchaser was beneficial owner - Whether vendor bare trustee - Whether vendor incapable of any further dealings with property - National Land Code, s. 340(3)
CHIN WAI LEONG & ORS v. PP & OTHER APPLICATIONS [2020] 7 CLJ 322
COURT OF APPEAL, PUTRAJAYA
YAACOB MD SAM JCA; MOHAMAD ZABIDIN DIAH JCA; YEW JEN KIE JCA
[CRIMINAL APPLICATIONS NO: W-06-1-01-2018, W-06-2-01-2018, W-06-3-03-2018 & W-06-4-03-2018]
12 APRIL 2019
The Court of Appeal is endowed with a review mechanism and has jurisdiction to review its own decision or an earlier decision of its panel. Accordingly, where a panel of the court sat on a criminal appeal and in that capacity convicted the five accused herein for a total of 224 charges under the Banking and Financial Institutions Act 1989 and Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Terrorism Financing Act 2001, it is perfectly lawful for the same panel, prior to sentencing the accused, to have allowed the prosecution to withdraw 70 of the charges and have the number of convictions reduced to 154 instead on the ground that the accused ought not to be convicted of non-existent offences or defective charges. The panel, not being as yet functus officio in the circumstances, is bound to exercise its residual jurisdiction and reopen the appeal, as the process would avoid real injustice which would have ensued had it not amended the list of charges.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: Sentencing - Review - Review of Court of Appeal's decision - Review of own decision - Applicants found guilty of 224 charges under Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Terrorism Financing and Proceeds of Unlawful Activities Act 2001 ('AMLATFA') - Prosecution later withdrew 70 charges - Appeal Panel varied earlier conviction from 224 charges to 154 charges under AMLATFA and passed sentences accordingly - Whether earlier order of conviction drawn out and perfected - Whether earlier conviction final order - Whether amendment to conviction on charges could be done - Whether court functus officio - Whether conviction and sentences safe and valid
“From the cases cited above, the standard of care practiced by the defendants must be of the same standard of reasonably competent solicitors in the same area of practice. Thus, the pertinent question that needed to be asked here is, whether the acts and omission that were listed by the learned JC as amounting to negligence and breach of retainer on the part of the defendants were acts or omission which no reasonably well informed and competent member of the Bar would have made. In other words, would another lawyer who has taken up the same brief as the defendants have done or taken those actions which the defendants had failed or omitted to do?” – per Suraya Othman JCA in Nyo Nyo Aye v. Kevin Sathiaseelan Ramakrishnan & Anor And Another Appeal [2020] 5 CLJ 82
Legal Network Series
MOHD KHAIDIR AHMAD v. MOHD IQBAL ZAINAL ABIDIN In a claim for libel, the defence of fair comment and justification is unavailable if the defendant is unable to prove the truth of his postings on Facebook. The defence of qualified privilege is also inapplicable when the defendant has no legal, social and moral duty to make Facebook postings and complaints against the plaintiff. TORT: Defamation - Libel - Postings on Facebook - Disparaging allegations concerning abuse of power and corruption against public official - Negative comments posted by netizens - Defence of justification, fair comment and qualified privilege - Defendant disclaimed responsibility for negative comments by netizens - Whether defendant had proved plaintiff received bribes - Whether truth of Facebook postings were proven - Whether defendant has legal, social and moral duties to make Facebook postings and complaints against plaintiff - Whether postings were made to defame plaintiff - Whether there was positive identification of victim
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PEGUAM NEGARA MALAYSIA v. CHIN CHEE KOW 1. The secretary of an association is the public officer of the association and is therefore the correct person to sue and apply for consent under s. 9 of the Government Proceedings Act 1956 to initiate a proceeding. 2. The attorney general ('AG') has no unfettered or absolute discretion in a non-criminal matter, particularly when it involves the public. Hence, the AG's power to give or refuse consent under s. 9 of the Government Proceedings Act 1956 is amenable to judicial review. PUBLIC LAW: Remedies - Judicial review - Leave to commence judicial review - Objection by attorney general ('AG') - Judicial review on refusal of AG to grant secretary of an association consent to file a civil proceeding - Consent under s. 9 of Government Proceedings Act 1956 ('GPA') - Whether provision of s. 9 of GPA should be read together with s. 2 of Societies Act 1966 - Whether association was adversely affected by decision of AG in refusing consent - Whether real and genuine interest in subject matter has been shown - Whether subject matter of intended proceeding was of public interest - Whether application was frivolous and vexatious ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: Judicial review - Leave to commence judicial review - Principles and procedures - Filing of affidavit in reply - Absence of disputed facts - Whether attorney general was required to file affidavit in reply at leave stage CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Attorney General - Authority - Justiciability of Attorney General's ('AG') consent under s. 9(1) of Government Proceedings Act 1956 - Discretion on non-criminal matter - Whether AG has unfettered discretion in a civil law matter, particularly when in involves the public - Whether AG's power to give or refuse consent amenable to judicial review - Whether court should exercise its judicial supervision
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KEE WAH SOONG v. YAP BOON HWA AND ANOTHER APPEAL 1. Where a joint venture agreement is entered into based on a representation that certain available projects would be placed with the company, which subsequently did not transpire, such inducement amounts to fraudulent misrepresentation. 2. An agreement cannot be final and genuine when there are amendments to crucial terms unilaterally made and handwritten in pencil. CONTRACT: Joint venture - Agreement - Conditions precedent - Failure to comply with conditions precedent - Defendant entered joint venture agreement with plaintiff to develop projects - Plaintiffs were in need of funds to carry out projects and defendant had injected money by purchasing certain shares of plaintiffs in a company so that projects can be emplaced in company - Whether joint venture agreement was conditional upon plaintiffs ensuring projects were emplaced in company - Whether obligation of defendant to pay for full purchase price of shares was secondary CONTRACT: Agreement - Final agreement - Genuine agreement - Amendments concerning price of shares - Amendment were made using hand written notes by pencil - Unilateral amendments - Whether agreement was final when there were amendments to agreement made in pencil - Whether crucial terms to agreement could be made unilaterally CONTRACT: Misrepresentation - Fraudulent misrepresentation - Inducement - Defendant agreed to purchase plaintiffs' shares in a company provided that plaintiffs emplace certain projects in company - Plaintiffs represented to defendant on availability of projects - Whether availability of projects had induced defendant to enter into agreement with plaintiffs - Whether there was fraudulent misrepresentation when projects were never emplaced in company - Whether defendant entitled for damages
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PP lwn. SIVANESON GUNABALAN & SATU LAGI Pesalah yang telah mengaku bersalah atas kesalahan pemilikan dadah berbahaya di bawah s. 39A(2) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 adalah tidak wajar dijatuhkan hukuman pemenjaraan yang sangat panjang. Justeru, hukuman pemenjaraan yang dijatuhkan harus adil, masuk akal dan munasabah kepada tertuduh. PROSEDUR JENAYAH: Penghukuman - Pemenjaraan - Budi bicara mahkamah - Kesalahan pemilikan dadah berbahaya - Pengakuan bersalah - Kuanti dadah adalah kecil - Sama ada hukuman yang dijatuhkan mestilah berbentuk hukuman yang adil, masuk akal dan munasabah kepada tertuduh - Sama ada hukuman pemenjaraan yang dijatuhkan perlu berdasarkan fakta dan keadaan kesalahan kes - Sama ada mitigasi tertuduh harus dipertimbangkan
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KETUA PENGARAH PERTUBUHAN KESELAMATAN SOSIAL lwn. LEONG AH LEE Kecederaan yang dialami ketika melakukan aktiviti rutin harian tidak termasuk di bawah takrif bencana kerja bagi tuntutan faedah hilang upaya di bawah s. 24(1)(a) Akta Keselamatan Pekerja 1969. Tuntutan feadah hilang upaya sementara hanya diberikan untuk bencana kerja jika kecederaan yang dialami adalah akibat daripada kemalangan yang berlaku semasa perjalanan kerja dari tempat kediaman. UNDANG-UNDANG BURUH: Keselamatan sosial - Skim perlindungan - Faedah hilang upaya sementara - Bencana kerja - Kemalangan berlaku ketika perjalanan dari pasar ke rumah - Sama ada tuntutan faedah hilang upaya sementara hanya diberikan jika kemalangan berlaku semasa perjalanan kerja dari tempat kediaman - Sama ada aktiviti rutin harian termasuk di bawah takrif bencana kerja - Akta Keselamatan Pekerja 1969, ss. 2(6) & 24(1)(a)
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CLJ 2020 Volume 7 (Part 3)
A proprietor of property who has sold his property to a purchaser and received the full purchase price thereof stands as a bare trustee to the purchaser vis-a-vis the property, and to that end is prohibited from dealing with the property for the benefit of any new purchaser or holder of interest, including, as the case may be, a chargee, and further, is legally incapable of passing any proprietary or registrable interest to the latter. Where therefore a housing-developer property owner sold a property to a purchaser (deceased) who has paid the purchase price in full, and the developer, without the consent or knowledge of the deceased, proceeded to charge the property to a bank as security for a facility, the charge transaction or presentation is inescapably tainted with illegality, and is indeed void ab initio as against both the developer and the bank. The chargee bank in the obtaining circumstances cannot be considered a bona fide party, is not obtaining any indefeasible title thereto under s. 340(2) of the National Land Code, and in any case, is not entitled to avail itself to the proviso of s. 340(3) of the Code. Ownership of the property as a matter of law must revert to the deceased and/or his estate.
He-Con Sdn Bhd v. Bulyah Ishak & Anor And Another Appeal [2020] 7 CLJ 271 [FC]
LAND LAW: Interest in property - Indefeasibility of title and interest - Vendor registered property in its name despite full payment made by purchaser - Whether vendor intended to divest interest in property - Whether vendor merely bare trustee - Whether incapable of any further dealings with property - Whether subsequent charge to bank valid - Whether transaction based on void instrument - Whether transaction vitiated by s. 340(2) of National Land Code - Whether title obtained by bank defeasible - National Land Code, s. 340(3)
LAND LAW: Interest in property - Indefeasibility of title and interest - Beneficial ownership - Purchase price paid in full - Vendor registered property in its name - Whether sale and purchase agreement concluded between parties - Whether vendor intended to divest interest in property - Whether purchaser was beneficial owner - Whether vendor bare trustee - Whether vendor incapable of any further dealings with property - National Land Code, s. 340(3)
TENGKU MAIMUN TUAN MAT CJ
MOHD ZAWAWI SALLEH FCJ
ABANG ISKANDAR FCJ
IDRUS HARUN FCJ
ABDUL RAHMAN SEBLI FCJ
(Civil Appeal No: 02(f)-22-03-2019(B))
- For the appellant - Lau Kee Sern & Lim Pey Tsyr; M/s Kee Sern, Siu & Huey
- For the respondent - Harjinder Singh Sandhu & 'Izzah Shakirah; M/s Akberdin & Co
(Civil Appeal No: 02(f)-28-04-2019(B))
- For the appellant - Cecil Abraham, Malcolm Fernandez, Syukran Syafiq & Muhd Hadzwan; M/s C Sukumaran & Co
- For the respondent - Harjinder Singh Sandhu & 'Izzah Shakirah; M/s Akberdin & Co
The Court of Appeal is endowed with a review mechanism and has jurisdiction to review its own decision or an earlier decision of its panel. Accordingly, where a panel of the court sat on a criminal appeal and in that capacity convicted the five accused herein for a total of 224 charges under the Banking and Financial Institutions Act 1989 and Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Terrorism Financing Act 2001, it is perfectly lawful for the same panel, prior to sentencing the accused, to have allowed the prosecution to withdraw 70 of the charges and have the number of convictions reduced to 154 instead on the ground that the accused ought not to be convicted of non-existent offences or defective charges. The panel, not being as yet functus officio in the circumstances, is bound to exercise its residual jurisdiction and reopen the appeal, as the process would avoid real injustice which would have ensued had it not amended the list of charges.
Chin Wai Leong & Ors v. PP & Other Applications [2020] 7 CLJ 322 [CA]
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: Sentencing - Review - Review of Court of Appeal's decision - Review of own decision - Applicants found guilty of 224 charges under Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Terrorism Financing and Proceeds of Unlawful Activities Act 2001 ('AMLATFA') - Prosecution later withdrew 70 charges - Appeal Panel varied earlier conviction from 224 charges to 154 charges under AMLATFA and passed sentences accordingly - Whether earlier order of conviction drawn out and perfected - Whether earlier conviction final order - Whether amendment to conviction on charges could be done - Whether court functus officio - Whether conviction and sentences safe and valid
YAACOB MD SAM JCA
MOHAMAD ZABIDIN DIAH JCA
YEW JEN KIE JCA
(Criminal Applications No: W-06-1-01-2018 & W-06-3-03-2018)
- For the applicants - Harpal Singh Grewal, Remy Rao & Nahvinah Selvaraj; M/s AJ Ariffin Yeo & Harpal
- Muhammad Shafee Abdullah, Sarah Abishegam & Wee Yeong Kang; M/s Shafee & Co
- Nicholas Kow & Emile Ezra; M/s Kow, Lau & Ezra - For the respondent - Hamdan Hamzah & Khairul Anuar Abd Halim; DPPs
(Criminal Applications No: W-06-2-01-2018 & W-06-4-03-2018)
- For the applicant - Keppy Wong; M/s Keppy Wong & Assoc
- For the respondent - Hamdan Hamzah & Khairul Anuar Abd Halim; DPP
A regularly obtained judgment in default may be set aside notwithstanding a long time lapse if there are merits in the defence, and if the delay is reasonably accounted for. Hence, where a legal firm who has had a fallout with its legal assistant had obtained a monetary judgment against him for breach of agreement, the fact that the latter had taken some took 2 years and 7 months to set it aside may not be reflective of an indolent litigant if circumstances showed that he had taken various steps to resolve the matter with the firm albeit unsuccessfully, and had encountered numerous difficulties both in seeking to assess the relevant documentation from the firm and obtaining assistance for corroborative evidence. The difficulties faced are not imagined but real, and the failure of the trial court to scrutinise the evidence and test it against the facts constitutes a misdirection which rendered the default judgment liable to be set aside.
Ramasundramoorthy Permalu v. Gregory Yusran & Associates [2020] 7 CLJ 355 [CA]
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Judgments and orders - Judgment in default - Setting aside - Delay in application - Whether timeline must be mandatorily complied with - Whether delay satisfactorily explained - Whether there was defence on merits raised - Whether defence ought to be allowed to be tested against full weight of evidence
MARY LIM JCA
RHODZARIAH BUJANG JCA
HAS ZANAH MEHAT JCA
- For the appellant - Dzaki Ezhar Bahar; M/s Krish & Kiew
- For the respondent - Shamesh Jeevaretnam; M/s Jeeva Partnership
The trial judge in a drug trafficking case, in calling the accused to enter his defence or in finding him guilty of the charge, cannot resort to the double presumptions of possession and trafficking under s. 37(d) and 37(da) respectively of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952. The Federal Court decision in Alma Nudo Atenza v. PP & Another Appeal on the illegality of double presumptions applies retrospectively, and hence, while the High Court below cannot be faulted for applying double presumptions at the point of deciding this case which was before Alma Nudo Atenza, the application is nonetheless invalid and contrary to law.
Yugarajan Letchimanasamy & Anor v. PP & Another Appeal [2020] 7 CLJ 372 [CA]
CRIMINAL LAW: Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 - Section 39B(1)(a) - Trafficking - Conviction and sentence - Appeal against - Whether double presumptions for possession pursuant to s. 37(d) of Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 could be applied together with trafficking of drugs pursuant to s. 37(da) - Whether application of double presumptions for possession and trafficking of drugs invalid - Whether charges preferred against accused persons could be sustained - Failure of prosecution to ensure availability of material witness - Whether raised adverse inference - Element of common intention - Whether proved - Whether conviction and sentence ought to be upheld - Dangerous Drugs Act 1952, ss. 37(d), (da)
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: Appeal - Appeal against conviction and sentence - Trafficking in dangerous drugs - Whether double presumptions for possession pursuant to s. 37(d) of Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 could be applied together with trafficking of drugs pursuant to s. 37(da) - Whether application of double presumptions for possession and trafficking of drugs invalid - Whether charges preferred against accused persons could be sustained - Failure of prosecution to ensure availability of material witness - Whether raised adverse inference - Element of common intention - Whether proved - Whether conviction and sentence ought to be upheld - Dangerous Drugs Act 1952, ss. 37(d), (da) & 39B(1)(a)
HAMID SULTAN ABU BACKER JCA
HADHARIAH SYED ISMAIL JCA
ABU BAKAR JAIS JCA
- For the appellants - S Parameswaran & K Selava; M/s S Param & G Thila
- For the respondent - Ku Hayati Ku Haron; DPP
A child witness of tender years is a competent witness if he understands the nature of his oath and the duty of speaking the truth, and is able to give rational answers to the questions asked; and such competency ought to be determined by way of a preliminary hearing, bearing in mind ss. 118 and 133A of the Evidence Act 1950. Both prudence and the law, however, dictate that the preliminary hearing should be conducted before the child witness takes his oath, and not thereafter.
Baharudin Mat Nor v. PP [2020] 7 CLJ 388 [HC]
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: Sentence - Adequacy - Outraging modesty - Outraging modesty of 12-year-old own daughter - Mitigating factors - Exhibition of remorse and old age - Whether deserving a fine sentence - Penal Code s. 354
CRIMINAL LAW: Penal Code - Section 354 - Outraging modesty - Outraging modesty of 12-year-old own daughter - Full trial - Child witness - Credibility of evidence - Whether conviction justified - Sentenced to ten months' jail - Whether sustainable
EVIDENCE: Witness - Child witness - Outraging modesty - Reliability and credibility of evidence - Evidence Act 1950, ss. 118 & 133A
MUNIANDY KANNYAPPAN JC
- For the appellant - Wideeya Juliana Mustapha; M/s Faisal Azian & Co
- For the respondent - Azrul Faidz Abdul Razak; DPP
An action by an insured motorcar owner seeking partial indemnity from the co-insurer of his vehicle, according to JPJ's vehicle insurance records, in order to satisfy a judgment sum arising from a road accident, cannot succeed if the eight conditions as set out for an insurer's liability under s. 96 of the Road Transport Act 1987 have not been fulfilled; since the insured here was not insured by the previous insurer, and had not been issued with any certificate of insurance by the latter nor had any premiums been paid by the insured to the co-insurer, the claim cannot succeed.
Etiqa Takaful Bhd v. Chong Meng Kooi & Anor [2020] 7 CLJ 398 [HC]
INSURANCE: Liability - Co-insurer - Claim for indemnity - Whether insurance policy issued by co-insurer to insured party within meaning of ss. 91(1)(a), (b) and 96(1) of Road Transport Act 1987 ('RTA') - Whether certificate of insurance delivered by co-insurer to insured party - Whether there was novation of insurance policy - Whether policy had lapsed - Whether insured party could claim against co-insurer for indemnity for half of judgment sum obtained - Whether conditions under s. 96 of RTA fulfilled
WONG KIAN KHEONG J
- For the appellant - Harikannan Ragaran; M/s Jayadeep Hari & Jamil
- For the respondents - Nor Suhaida Ibrahim; M/s Naicker & Assocs
A foreign employee who is not in possession of a valid work permit is nonetheless entitled to have his claim for non-payment of wages heard by the Labour Court pursuant to s. 70 of the Employment Act 1955 if an employment relationship can be established.
Fice Fransina Nenobais v. Lee Hee Chooi [2020] 7 CLJ 416 [HC]
LABOUR LAW: Jurisdiction - Labour Court - Claim for non-payment of salary by employee - Labour Court decided it had no jurisdiction as employee did not possess work permit - Whether employee fell within s. 2 of Employment Act 1955 - Whether pre-mature for Labour Court to consider issue of work permit - Whether claim ought to have been heard on merits - Employment (Restriction) Act 1968, s. 5(1)(a)
AZIZAH NAWAWI J
- For the appellant - SP Devi; M/s P Kuppusamy & Co
- For the respondent - K Renuka Devi & Thneu Wan Jing; M/s V Samy Renu & Co
LNS Article(s)
THE POSITION OF HATE SPEECH IN MALAYSIA AND THE NEED FOR REGULATION [Read excerpt]
by Kho Yii Ting* Kho Feng Ming** [2020] 1 LNS(A) lxxxiiiRELYING ON THE DOCTRINE OF FRUSTRATION DURING A PANDEMIC* [Read excerpt]
by Aisyah Muhammad [2020] 1 LNS(A) lxxxivFREE SPEECH AT WORK FOLAU, BANERJI, AND BEYOND?+ [Read excerpt]
by John Wilson* Kieran Pender** [2020] 1 LNS(A) lxxxii
Principal Acts
Number | Title | In force from | Repealing |
ACT 827 | Currency Act 2020 | Not Yet In Force | - |
ACT 826 | Food Donors Protection Act 2020 | 31 March 2020 [PU(B) 166/2020] | - |
ACT 825 | Anti-Fake News (Repeal) Act 2020 | 31 January 2020 | - |
ACT 824 | Malaysian Health Promotion Board (Dissolution) Act 2019 | 1 April 2020 [PU(B) 119/2020] | - |
ACT 823 | Finance Act 2019 | Income Tax Act 1967 [Act 53] see s 3, Real Property Gains Tax Act 1976 [Act 169] see s 22, Stamp Act 1949 [Act 378] see s 27, Petroleum (Income Tax) Act 1967 [Act 543] see s 29, Sales Tax Act 2018 [Act 806] see s 35, Finance Act 2010 [Act 702] see s 37 and the Finance Act 2018 [Act 812] see s 39 | - |
Amending Acts
Number | Title | In force from | Principal/Amending Act No |
ACT A1617 | Franchise (Amendment) Act 2020 | Not Yet In Force | ACT 590 |
ACT A1616 | Central Bank Of Malaysia (Amendment) Act 2020 | Not Yet In Force | ACT 701 |
ACT A1615 | Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act 2020 | Not Yet In Force | ACT 177 |
ACT A1614 | Labuan Business Activity Tax (Amendment) Act 2020 | 10 February 2020 - para 2(a) and s 13 and 15; Year of assessment 2020 and subsequent years of assessment - para 2(b) and s 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 14; 1 January 2019 - s 8 | ACT 445 |
ACT A1613 | Carriage Of Goods By Sea (Amendment) Act 2020 | Not Yet In Foce | ACT 527 |
PU(A)
Number | Title | Date of Publication | In force from | Principal/ Amending Act No |
PU(A) 223/2020 | Education (Terms Of Educational Institutions Year 2021) Regulations 2020 | 3 August 2020 | 4 August 2020 | ACT 550 |
PU(A) 222/2020 | Prevention And Control Of Infectious Diseases (Measures Within Infected Local Areas) (No. 7) (Amendment) (No. 4) Regulations 2020 | 31 July 2020 | 1 August 2020 | PU(A) 181/2020 |
PU(A) 221/2020 | Prevention And Control Of Infectious Diseases (Measures Within Infected Local Areas) (No. 7) (Amendment) (No. 3) Regulations 2020 | 28 July 2020 | 29 July 2020 | PU(A) 181/2020 |
PU(A) 220/2020 | Prevention And Control Of Infectious Diseases (Fee For Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Detection Test) (Amendment) Regulations 2020 | 28 July 2020 | 29 July 2020 | PU(A) 190/2020 |
PU(A) 219/2020 | Financial Services (Exemption) Order 2020 | 28 July 2020 | 25 March 2020 | ACT 758 |
PU(B)
Number | Title | Date of Publication | In force from | Principal/ Amending Act No |
PU(B) 349/2020 | Notice Of Completion Of Revision And Inspection Of Supplementary Electoral Rolls - Kedah | 29 July 2020 | 30 July 2020 | PU(A) 293/2002 |
PU(B) 348/2020 | Notice Of Completion Of Revision And Inspection Of Supplementary Electoral Rolls - Perlis | 29 July 2020 | 30 July 2020 | PU(A) 293/2002 |
PU(B) 347/2020 | Notice Of Completion Of Revision And Inspection Of Supplementary Electoral Rolls - Parliament | 29 July 2020 | 30 July 2020 | PU(A) 293/2002 |
PU(B) 346/2020 | Reservation Of Land For Public Purpose - Corrigendum | 29 July 2020 | PU(B) 160/2020 | |
PU(B) 345/2020 | Notice Of Initiation Of An Anti-Dumping Duty Investigation With Regard To The Imports Of Polyethylene Terephthalate Originating Or Exported From The People's Republic Of China, The Republic Of Indonesia, Japan, The Republic Of Korea, The United States Of America And The Socialist Republic Of Viet Nam | 28 July 2020 | 29 July 2020 | ACT 504 |
Legislation Alert
Updated
Act/Principal No. | Title | Amended by | In force from | Section amended |
PU(A) 93/2020 | Perintah Kawalan Harga Dan Antipencatutan (Penentuan Harga Maksimum) (No. 2) 2020 | PU(A) 227/2020 | 15 Ogos 2020 | Jadual |
PU(A) 181/2020 | Peraturan-Peraturan Pencegahan Dan Pengawalan Penyakit Berjangkit (Langkah-Langkah Di Dalam Kawasan Tempatan Jangkitan) (No. 7) 2020 | PU(A) 222/2020 | 1 Ogos 2020 | Peraturan 4A |
PU(A) 181/2020 | Peraturan-Peraturan Pencegahan Dan Pengawalan Penyakit Berjangkit (Langkah-Langkah Di Dalam Kawasan Tempatan Jangkitan) (No. 7) 2020 | PU(A) 221/2020 | 29 Julai 2020 | Peraturan 8 |
PU(A) 190/2020 | Peraturan-Peraturan Pencegahan Dan Pengawalan Penyakit Berjangkit (Fi Bagi Ujian Pengesanan Penyakit Koronavirus 2019 (COVID-19)) 2020 | PU(A) 220/2020 | 29 Julai 2020 | Peraturan 3 |
ACT 787 | Akta Kesalahan Yang Berhubungan Dengan Anugerah 2017 | PU(A) 215/2020 | 29 Julai 2020 | Jadual Pertama |
Revoked
Act/Principal No. | Title | Revoked by | In force from |
PU(A) 251/2006 | Entertainments Duty (Exemption) (No. 24) Order 2006 | PU(A) 204/2020 | 1 August 2020 |
PU(A) 286/2015 | Customs Duties (Goods Under the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-Operation Among the Governments of the Member Countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Republic of Korea) (ASEAN Harmonised Tariff Nomenclature) Order 2015 | PU(A) 202/2020 | 1 August 2020 |
PU(A) 84/2020 | Ministers of the Federal Government (No. 2) Order 2020 | PU(A) 201/2020 | See paragraph 1(2) of this Order |
PU(A) 476/2008 | Customs Duties (Goods Under Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Partnership Among Member States of the Asean and Japan) Order 2008 [Revoked By PU(A) 191/2020] | PU(A) 191/2020 | 1 July 2020 |
PU(B) 112/2019 | Appointment of Member of the Authority | PU(B) 279/2020 | 1 June 2020 to 31 May 2022 |