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Issue #38/2020
10 September 2020
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New This Week
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LETITIA BOSMAN v. PP & OTHER APPEALS [2020] 8 CLJ 147
FEDERAL COURT, PUTRAJAYA
ROHANA YUSUF PCA; AZAHAR MOHAMED CJ (MALAYA); ABANG ISKANDAR CJ (SABAH AND SARAWAK); NALLINI PATHMANATHAN FCJ; VERNON ONG LAM KIAT FCJ; ABDUL RAHMAN SEBLI FCJ; ZALEHA YUSOF FCJ; ZABARIAH MOHD YUSOF FCJ; HASNAH MOHAMMED HASHIM FCJ
[CRIMINAL APPEALS NO: 05-76-04-2017(J), 05-179-08-2017(B), 05-214-09-2017(K) & 05(M)-118-05-2018(B)]
13 AUGUST 2020
The mandatory death penalty does not run foul of articles 5, 8 and 121 of the Federal Constitution as it is within Parliament's prerogative to prescribe the measure and range of punishment taking into consideration, inter alia, social policy. The courts, though empowered to pass any sentence within the parameters of a prescribed sentence enacted by Parliament, cannot exceed or limit the power of sentencing in the name of exercising its judicial power. The discretion to determine the measure of punishment is not an integral part of judicial power and any decision to change or abolish the mandatory penalty is for Parliament to make.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Legislation - Constitutionality - Mandatory death penalty - Section 39B of Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 ('DDA') and s. 302 of Penal Code ('PC') - Whether infringed art. 5(1) of Federal Constitution ('FC') - Whether mandatory sentence violated right to life - Whether court empowered to declare legislations void or invalid - Whether power to legislate vested in Parliament - Whether determination of measure of punishment integral part of legislative function - Whether Judiciary bound to pass sentence according to law enacted by Legislature - Whether s. 39B of DDA and s. 302 of PC violated doctrine of separation of powers - Whether mandatory sentence constitutional - Whether right to fair trial under art. 5(1) of FC subject to qualifications - Whether FC provided for prohibition against 'torture, inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment' - Whether s. 302 of PC consistent with arts. 5, 8 & 121 of FC
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: Sentencing - Principles - Mandatory death penalty - Section 39B of Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 ('DDA') and s. 302 of Penal Code ('PC') - Whether infringed art. 5(1) of Federal Constitution ('FC') - Whether mandatory sentence violated right to life - Whether court empowered to declare legislations void or invalid - Whether determination of measure of punishment integral part of legislative function - Whether Judiciary bound to pass sentence according to law enacted by Legislature - Whether mandatory sentence constitutional - Whether right to fair trial under art. 5(1) of FC subject to qualifications - Whether FC provided for prohibition against 'torture, inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment' - Whether s. 302 of PC consistent with arts. 5, 8 & 121 of FC
LETITIA BOSMAN v. PP (NO 2) [2020] 8 CLJ 252
FEDERAL COURT, PUTRAJAYA
ROHANA YUSUF PCA; AZAHAR MOHAMED CJ (MALAYA); ABANG ISKANDAR CJ (SABAH AND SARAWAK); NALLINI PATHMANATHAN FCJ; VERNON ONG LAM KIAT FCJ; ABDUL RAHMAN SEBLI FCJ; ZALEHA YUSOF FCJ; ZABARIAH MOHD YUSOF FCJ; HASNAH MOHAMMED HASHIM FCJ
[CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: 05-76-04-2017(J)]
13 AUGUST 2020
In the case of drug trafficking, it is not imperative for the court to make a specific finding as to whether an accused person has rebutted the presumption of trafficking under s. 37(da) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 (DDA) where a conviction is grounded on clear proof of mens rea possession and knowledge leading to the conclusion that the accused person is trafficking dangerous drugs within the definition of s. 2 of the DDA.
CRIMINAL LAW: Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 - Offence of trafficking - Whether trial judge invoked double presumptions - Failure by trial judge to make specific finding as to which presumption rebutted - Whether resulted in miscarriage of justice - Whether mens rea possession established - Whether knowledge inferred from evidence - Whether conviction safe - Dangerous Drugs Act 1952, ss. 2, 37(d), (da) & 39B(1)(a)
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Brunsfield Construction Sdn Bhd v. LDE Aluminium Industries Sdn Bhd [2019] 1 LNS 780 (CA) overruling the High Court case of LDE Aluminium Industries Sdn Bhd v. Brunsfield Construction Sdn Bhd [Civil Suit No: 22-780-2010]
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George Pathmanathan Michael Gandi Nathan & Anor v. Portcullis International Ltd & Anor [2019] 1 LNS 782 (CA) affirming the High Court case of George Pathmanathan Michael Gandi Nathan & Anor v. Portcullis International Ltd & Anor [Petisyen Pemula No: D3(2)-26-50-2006]
Legal Network Series
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KINGTIME INTERNATIONAL LIMITED & ANOR v. PETROFAC E&C SDN BHD 1. A licensee to a patent has no right on its own to institute a patent infringement suit except within the circumstances stated under ss. 61(1)(a), (2), (3) or (4) of the Patents Act 1983. A licensee may not institute a patent infringement suit when there exists a separate patent infringement suit commenced by the patent owner. 2. An expert has a duty to disclose to the Court any matter within the expert's actual knowledge which impugns or is likely to impugn the expert's independence. The expert's duty to Court overrides his duty to the party or person who calls the expert to testify in court. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: Patent - Infringement - Right of licensee to claim for patent infringement - Owner of patent had already commenced action to claim for patent infringement - Whether a licensee has any right under Patents Act 1983 ('PA') to claim for patent infringement - Whether licensee could only institute patent infringement suit in circumstances under ss. 61(1)(a), (2), (3) or (4) of PA EVIDENCE: Expert evidence - Expert witness - Duty to disclose - Person having ordinary skill in the art ('POSITA') - Whether expert's duty to Court override expert's duty to party or person who calls expert to testify in court - Whether an expert should be seen to be independent - Whether an expert has a duty to disclose to Court any matter within expert's actual knowledge which impugns or is likely to impugn expert's independence - Whether court may be assisted by a POSITA's expert evidence
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AZIYANIRAWATI ZAINOL lwn. CIMB BANK BERHAD 1. Gadaian tanah yang menjadi sekuriti bagi pinjaman tidak boleh dilepaskan semata-mata kerana peminjam telah dilepaskan daripada kebankrapan apabila hutang bagi pinjaman masih belum diselesaikan. Sesuatu gadaian adalah kekal selamanya sebagai cagaran kepada peminjam selagi wujud hutang pinjaman yang tidak diselesaikan. 2. Pemegang gadaian mempunyai hakmilik dan kepentingan yang tidak boleh disangkal serta terjamin dan tidak boleh dibatalkan ke atas gadaian dan justeru pemegang gadaian tidak disekat dengan sebarang had masa untuk melaksanakan remedi di bawah gadaian. UNDANG-UNDANG TANAH: Gadaian - Pelepasan - Peminjam telah dibebaskan dari perintah kebankrapan - Hutang bagi pinjaman masih belum diselesaikan - Sama ada gadaian sebagai sekuriti kepada hutang boleh dilepaskan apabila peminjam dilepaskan daripada kebankrapan - Sama ada pemegang gadaian mempunyai hak untuk tidak melepaskan gadaian selagi wujud pinjaman yang belum diselesaikan pembayarannya - Sama ada gadaian adalah kekal selamanya sebagai cagaran kepada peminjam UNDANG-UNDANG TANAH: Gadaian - Hak pemegang gadaian - Had masa untuk melaksanakan remedi di bawah gadaian - Sama ada pemegang gadaian mempunyai hakmilik dan kepentingan yang tidak boleh disangkal ke atas gadaian - Sama ada pemegang gadaian adalah disekat dengan had masa untuk melaksanakan remedi di bawah gadaian - Kanun Tanah Negara 1965, s. 340
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T-NET INTERNATIONAL (HK) CO LIMITED lwn. HANTONG METAL COMPONENT (PG) SDN BHD Plaintif melalui perjanjian pemilikan mempunyai hak eksklusif ke atas perkakas yang disimpan di premis defendan dan berhak pada bila-bila masa untuk mendapatkan semula perkakas dengan memberikan notis kepada defendan. Tindakan defendan yang enggan untuk mengembalikan semula perkakas setelah permintaan dibuat oleh plaintif terjumlah kepada kemungkiran terma-terma perjanjian pemilikan tersebut dan perlakuan salah milik secara konversi. KONTRAK: Kemungkiran - Terma-terma - Perjanjian pemilikan - Perjanjian pemilikan memperuntukkan plaintif mempunyai hak eksklusif ke atas perkakas yang disimpan di premis defendan - Keengganan defendan untuk memulangkan perkakas selepas notis niat untuk mengambil perkakas diberikan oleh plaintif - Sama ada plaintif pada bila-bila masa berhak mendapatkan semula perkakas dengan memberi notis kepada defendan - Sama ada defendan telah memungkiri perjanjian pemilikan apabila enggan untuk memulangkan kembali perkakas selepas permintaan dibuat oleh plaintif - Sama ada syarat-syarat yang dikenakan defendan bagi membolehkan plaintif mengambil perkakas di premis defendan adalah munasabah - Sama ada plaintif berhak untuk mendapatkan gantirugi bagi semua kerugian yang dialami apabila tidak dapat menggunakan perkakas TORT: Konversi - Salah milik - Defendan enggan memulangkan perkakas plaintif selepas permintaan dibuat - Sama ada defendan telah melakukan salah milik sebaik permintaan plaintif tidak dipenuhi
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GAN KEE EARTHWORK SDN BHD v. LIM EE KHENG By virtue of O. 20 r. 11 of Rules of Court 2012, the Court is vested with power to correct the terms of a consent order which has been perfected, sealed and extracted if it does not reflect the actual terms as recorded in the minutes of the Court and CRT recordings. The Court is not functus officio when it comes to correcting errors so as to correctly and accurately reflect what has been recorded by the Court. CIVIL PROCEDURE: Consent order - Correction - Consent order sealed, perfected and extracted not reflecting actual terms recorded in court minutes and CRT recordings - Power of court to correct terms of consent order - Draft order filed did not incorporate final amendments - Fair order filed pending clarification and settlement of consent order - Whether plaintiff should have withheld filing of fair order until clarification and settlement of consent order - Whether court has power to amend, vary and correct terms of sealed consent order - Whether defendant would suffer irreparable prejudice if perfected order cannot be corrected - Whether court was functus officio - Rules of Court 2012, O. 20 r. 11
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PERAYANAN CHANDRASEGARAN & ANOR v. RAMAN OTHAYANAN & ANOR The Singapore Court is a more suitable forum to try the interests of all parties when parties are residing in Singapore and when the cause of action was premised on recovery of a loan obtained in Singapore. The mere fact that the defendants have a business address in Malaysia is not a factor to be considered in deciding the forum of convenience. CIVIL PROCEDURE: Jurisdiction - Forum convenience - Defendants Malaysian but residing in Singapore - Defendants have permanent address in Singapore and business address in Malaysia - Cause of action premised on recovery of loan given to defendants which was meant to rescue a Singapore company - Whether Malaysian court was appropriate convenient forum to hear plaintiffs' case - Whether defendants' business address in Malaysia is a factor to be considered in deciding forum of convenience - Whether loan transactions likely took place in Singapore - Whether Singapore court was more suitable forum
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CLJ 2020 Volume 8 (Part 2)
The mandatory death penalty does not run foul of articles 5, 8 and 121 of the Federal Constitution as it is within Parliament's prerogative to prescribe the measure and range of punishment taking into consideration, inter alia, social policy. The courts, though empowered to pass any sentence within the parameters of a prescribed sentence enacted by Parliament, cannot exceed or limit the power of sentencing in the name of exercising its judicial power. The discretion to determine the measure of punishment is not an integral part of judicial power and any decision to change or abolish the mandatory penalty is for Parliament to make.
Letitia Bosman v. PP & Other Appeals [2020] 8 CLJ 147 [FC]
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Legislation - Constitutionality - Mandatory death penalty - Section 39B of Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 ('DDA') and s. 302 of Penal Code ('PC') - Whether infringed art. 5(1) of Federal Constitution ('FC') - Whether mandatory sentence violated right to life - Whether court empowered to declare legislations void or invalid - Whether power to legislate vested in Parliament - Whether determination of measure of punishment integral part of legislative function - Whether Judiciary bound to pass sentence according to law enacted by Legislature - Whether s. 39B of DDA and s. 302 of PC violated doctrine of separation of powers - Whether mandatory sentence constitutional - Whether right to fair trial under art. 5(1) of FC subject to qualifications - Whether FC provided for prohibition against 'torture, inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment' - Whether s. 302 of PC consistent with arts. 5, 8 & 121 of FC
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: Sentencing - Principles - Mandatory death penalty - Section 39B of Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 ('DDA') and s. 302 of Penal Code ('PC') - Whether infringed art. 5(1) of Federal Constitution ('FC') - Whether mandatory sentence violated right to life - Whether court empowered to declare legislations void or invalid - Whether determination of measure of punishment integral part of legislative function - Whether Judiciary bound to pass sentence according to law enacted by Legislature - Whether mandatory sentence constitutional - Whether right to fair trial under art. 5(1) of FC subject to qualifications - Whether FC provided for prohibition against 'torture, inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment' - Whether s. 302 of PC consistent with arts. 5, 8 & 121 of FC
ROHANA YUSUF PCA;
AZAHAR MOHAMED CJ (MALAYA);
ABANG ISKANDAR CJ (SABAH AND SARAWAK);
NALLINI PATHMANATHAN FCJ;
VERNON ONG LAM KIAT FCJ;
ABDUL RAHMAN SEBLI FCJ;
ZALEHA YUSOF FCJ;
ZABARIAH MOHD YUSOF FCJ;
HASNAH MOHAMMED HASHIM FCJ
- For the appellants - Gopal Sri Ram, Hisyam Abdullah, Abdul Rashid Ismail, Yasmeen Soh Sha Nisse, Karluis Quek, Azreen Ahmad Rastom, Siti Nurani Md Zahidi & Mohd Nor Hafidzuddin Yusoff; M/s Rashid Zulkifli
- For the respondent - Nik Suhaimi Nik Sulaiman, Umar Saifuddin Jaafar, Mangaiarkarasi Krishnan, Faizah Salleh, Ku Hayati Ku Haron & Asmah Musa Muhammad Azmi Mashud; DPPs
In the case of drug trafficking, it is not imperative for the court to make a specific finding as to whether an accused person has rebutted the presumption of trafficking under s. 37(da) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 (DDA) where a conviction is grounded on clear proof of mens rea possession and knowledge leading to the conclusion that the accused person is trafficking dangerous drugs within the definition of s. 2 of the DDA.
Letitia Bosman v. PP (No 2) [2020] 8 CLJ 252 [FC]
CRIMINAL LAW: Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 - Offence of trafficking - Whether trial judge invoked double presumptions - Failure by trial judge to make specific finding as to which presumption rebutted - Whether resulted in miscarriage of justice - Whether mens rea possession established - Whether knowledge inferred from evidence - Whether conviction safe - Dangerous Drugs Act 1952, ss. 2, 37(d), (da) & 39B(1)(a)
ROHANA YUSUF PCA;
AZAHAR MOHAMED CJ (MALAYA);
ABANG ISKANDAR CJ (SABAH AND SARAWAK);
NALLINI PATHMANATHAN FCJ;
VERNON ONG LAM KIAT FCJ;
ABDUL RAHMAN SEBLI FCJ;
ZALEHA YUSOF FCJ;
ZABARIAH MOHD YUSOF FCJ;
HASNAH MOHAMMED HASHIM FCJ
- For the appellants - Gopal Sri Ram, Hisyam Abdullah, Abdul Rashid Ismail, Yasmeen Soh Sha Nisse, Karluis Quek, Azreen Ahmad Rastom, Siti Nurani Md Zahidi & Mohd Nor Hafidzuddin Yusoff; M/s Rashid Zulkifli
- For the respondent - Nik Suhaimi Nik Sulaiman, Umar Saifuddin Jaafar, Mangaiarkarasi Krishnan, Faizah Salleh, Ku Hayati Ku Haron & Asmah Musa Muhammad Azmi Mashud, DPPs
(1) There is no duty on the prosecution to deliver an unclear CCTV footage to the defence that would be of no assistance to the prosecution's case, and which had not been intended to be part of the prosecution's exhibits or evidence before the commencement of trial under s. 51A(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Code. The failure of the prosecution to disclose the CCTV footage will not cause irreparable prejudice to the accused or deny the accused his right to a fair trial when there is no exculpatory and material evidences favourable to the defence that is withheld or suppressed by the prosecution in the CCTV footage.
(2) A liberal interpretation of the word 'shall' in s. 51A of the Criminal Procedure Code should be applied so as not to curtail the administration of justice in the manner of a case to be carried out. A rigid interpretation may result in a trial being vitiated and result in a guilty person being set free where there is non-compliance.
Benjamin Wil liam Hawkes v. PP [2020] 8 CLJ 267 [FC]
CRIMINAL LAW: Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 - Section 39B(1)(a) - Trafficking - Conviction and sentence - Appeal against - Failure by prosecution during trial to adduce CCTV footage - Whether fatal to prosecution's case - Whether prosecution in breach of s. 51A(1)(b) of Criminal Procedure Code ('CPC') - Whether court obliged to construe word 'shall' in s. 51A(1) as mandatory - Whether CCTV footage fell within ambit of 'documents' as envisaged under s. 51A(1)(b) - Whether prosecution withheld or suppressed evidence of CCTV footage - Whether adverse inference under s. 114(g) of Evidence Act 1950 ought to be invoked - Whether non-disclosure of CCTV footage infringed principle of right to fair trial - Whether conviction and sentence ought to be upheld - Dangerous Drugs Act 1952, s. 37(da)
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: Disclosure of information - Trial - Trafficking in dangerous drugs - Failure by prosecution during trial to adduce CCTV footage - Whether fatal to prosecution's case - Whether prosecution in breach of s. 51A(1)(b) of Criminal Procedure Code ('CPC') - Whether court obliged to construe word 'shall' in s. 51A(1) as mandatory - Whether CCTV footage fell within ambit of 'documents' as envisaged under s. 51A(1)(b) - Whether prosecution withheld or suppressed evidence of CCTV footage - Whether adverse inference under s. 114(g) of Evidence Act 1950 ought to be invoked - Whether non-disclosure of CCTV footage infringed principle of right to fair trial
WORDS & PHRASES: 'shall'- Criminal Procedure Code, s. 51A(1) - Intention of Legislature - Whether mandatory or directory - Whether word 'shall' would by itself make a provision of Act mandatory - Whether word 'shall' must be construed to enable and assist administration of justice and not impede it - Whether liberal meaning or rigid interpretation ought to be given
ROHANA YUSUF PCA;
AZAHAR MOHAMED CJ (MALAYA);
ABANG ISKANDAR CJ (SABAH AND SARAWAK);
NALLINI PATHMANATHAN FCJ;
VERNON ONG LAM KIAT FCJ;
ABDUL RAHMAN SEBLI FCJ;
ZALEHA YUSOF FCJ;
ZABARIAH MOHD YUSOF FCJ;
HASNAH MOHAMMED HASHIM FCJ
- For the appellant - Gopal Sri Ram, Hisyam Abdullah, Abdul Rashid Ismail, Yasmeen Soh Sha Nisse, Karluis Quek, Azreen Ahmad Rastom, Siti Nurani Md Zahidi & Mohd Nor Hafidzuddin Yusoff; M/s Rashid Zulkifli
- For the respondent - Nik Suhaimi Nik Sulaiman, Umar Saifuddin Jaafar, Mangaikarasi Krishnan, Faizah Salleh, Ku Hayati Ku Haron, Asmah Musa & Muhammad Azmi Mashud; AG's Chambers
It is imperative that a trial judge in a drug trafficking case makes an election as to the presumption that he is relying on under the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 as the accused has to rebut the presumption on a balance of probabilities. Failure to do so would place too heavy a burden on the accused in having to rebut all the presumptions, including any alternative ones, invoked against him.
Jorge Crespo Gomez v. PP [2020] 8 CLJ 292 [FC]
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: Appeal - Appeal against conviction and sentence - Accused convicted for trafficking drugs under s. 39B(1) of Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 and sentenced to death - 779g of cocaine found concealed in accused's luggage - Allegation that trial judge made no election as to which presumption was invoked - Whether there was error in handling of presumptions - Whether conviction and sentence safe
ROHANA YUSUF PCA;
AZAHAR MOHAMED CJ (MALAYA);
ABANG ISKANDAR CJ (SABAH AND SARAWAK);
NALLINI PATHMANATHAN FCJ;
VERNON ONG LAM KIAT FCJ;
ABDUL RAHMAN SEBLI FCJ;
ZALEHA YUSOF FCJ;
ZABARIAH MOHD YUSOF FCJ;
HASNAH MOHAMMED HASHIM FCJ
- For the appellant - Gopal Sri Ram, Hisyam Abdullah, Abdul Rashid Ismail, Yasmeen Soh Sha Nisse, Karluis Quek, Azreen Ahmad Rastom, Siti Nurani Md Zahidi & Mohd Nor Hafidzuddin Yusoff; M/s Rashid Zulkifli
- For the respondent - Nik Suhaimi Nik Sulaiman, Umar Saifuddin Jaafar, Mangaikarasi Krishnan, Faizah Salleh, Ku Hayati Ku Haron, Asmah Musa & Muhammad Azmi Mashud; DPPs
In cases of personal violence resulting in death it is necessary for the trial judge to direct his mind on the degree of mens rea in the mind of the accused as the distinction between intention and knowledge under Sections 299 and 300 of the Penal Code, on culpable homicide and murder respectively, are very technical. If, after a thorough evaluation of the evidence before him, a trial judge finds that the offence committed by an accused is not murder but one of culpable homicide, the next step would be to determine whether the accused ought to be convicted for culpable homicide under the first or second part of s. 304 of the Penal Code. Where there is no evidence on the nature of the injuries and its likely and natural effects, then the offence of which the accused should be convicted of is culpable homicide for causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death under limb (a) of s. 304 of the Penal Code and not murder.
Pubalan Peremal v. PP [2020] 8 CLJ 306 [FC]
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: Appeal - Appeal against conviction and sentence - Accused convicted for murder under s. 302 of Penal Code and sentenced to death - Allegation that pathologist's evidence contained infirmities, was lacking and failed to support conviction - Distinction between definitions of culpable homicide and murder - Whether conviction and sentence safe - Whether accused ought to be convicted for culpable homicide for causing such bodily injury as was likely to cause death
ROHANA YUSUF PCA;
AZAHAR MOHAMED CJ (MALAYA);
ABANG ISKANDAR CJ (SABAH AND SARAWAK);
NALLINI PATHMANATHAN FCJ;
VERNON ONG LAM KIAT FCJ;
ABDUL RAHMAN SEBLI FCJ;
ZALEHA YUSOF FCJ;
ZABARIAH MOHD YUSOF FCJ;
HASNAH MOHAMMED HASHIM FCJ
- For the appellant - Gopal Sri Ram, Hisyam Abdullah, Abdul Rashid Ismail, Yasmeen Soh Sha Nisse, Karluis Quek, Azreen Ahmad Rastom, Siti Nurani Md Zahidi & Mohd Nor Hafidzuddin Yusoff; M/s Rashid Zulkifli
- For the respondent - Nik Suhaimi Nik Sulaiman, Umar Saifuddin Jaafar, Mangaiarkarasi Krishnan, Faizah Salleh, Ku Hayati Ku Haron, Asmah Musa & Muhammad Azmi Mashud; DPPs
LNS Article(s)
LIKAS BAY PRECINCT SDN BHD v. BINA PURI SDN BHD[1]
A CASE NOTE* [Read excerpt]
by Roshan Sunther [2020] 1 LNS(A) xciiLATE DISCOVERY OF LATENT DAMAGE?
LIMITATION PERIOD HAS BEEN RELAXED BY NEW SECTION 6A [Read excerpt]
by Heng Yee Keat* Kumara Guru Naiker** [2020] 1 LNS(A) xciiiMISFEASANCE IN PUBLIC OFFICE AN IMPORTANT AND EVOLVING TORT?* [Read excerpt]
by John Wilson** Kieran Pender [2020] 1 LNS(A) xciv
Principal Acts
| Number | Title | In force from | Repealing |
| ACT 827 | Currency Act 2020 | Not Yet In Force | - |
| ACT 826 | Food Donors Protection Act 2020 | 31 March 2020 [PU(B) 166/2020] | - |
| ACT 825 | Anti-Fake News (Repeal) Act 2020 | 31 January 2020 | - |
| ACT 824 | Malaysian Health Promotion Board (Dissolution) Act 2019 | 1 April 2020 [PU(B) 119/2020] | - |
| ACT 823 | Finance Act 2019 | Income Tax Act 1967 [Act 53] see s 3, Real Property Gains Tax Act 1976 [Act 169] see s 22, Stamp Act 1949 [Act 378] see s 27, Petroleum (Income Tax) Act 1967 [Act 543] see s 29, Sales Tax Act 2018 [Act 806] see s 35, Finance Act 2010 [Act 702] see s 37 and the Finance Act 2018 [Act 812] see s 39 | - |
Amending Acts
| Number | Title | In force from | Principal/Amending Act No |
| ACT A1617 | Franchise (Amendment) Act 2020 | Not Yet In Force | ACT 590 |
| ACT A1616 | Central Bank of Malaysia (Amendment) Act 2020 | Not Yet In Force | ACT 701 |
| ACT A1615 | Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act 2020 | Not Yet In Force | ACT 177 |
| ACT A1614 | Labuan Business Activity Tax (Amendment) Act 2020 | 10 February 2020 - para 2(a) and s 13 and 15; Year of assessment 2020 and subsequent years of assessment - para 2(b) and s 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 14; 1 January 2019 - s 8 | ACT 445 |
| ACT A1613 | Carriage of Goods by Sea (Amendment) Act 2020 | Not Yet In Force | ACT 527 |
PU(A)
| Number | Title | Date of Publication | In force from | Principal/ Amending Act No |
| PU(A) 243/2020 | Employees Provident Fund (Amendment) (No. 2) Rules 2020 | 28 August 2020 | 1 September 2020 | PU(A) 493/1991 |
| PU(A) 242/2020 | Langkawi International Yacht Registry (Registration of Yachts) Regulations (Amendment) 2020 | 27 August 2020 | 28 August 2020 | PU(A) 379/2003 |
| PU(A) 241/2020 | Solid Waste and Public Cleansing Management (Compounding of Offences) (Amendment) Regulations 2020 | 27 August 2020 | 1 September 2020 | PU(A) 309/2011 |
| PU(A) 240/2020 | Loans Guarantee (Bodies Corporate) (Remission of Tax and Stamp Duty) (No. 3) Order 2020 | 26 August 2020 | 27 August 2020 | ACT 96 |
| PU(A) 239/2020 | Stamp Duty (Exemption) (No. 5) Order 2020 | 26 August 2020 | 28 August 2020 | ACT 378 |
PU(B)
Legislation Alert
Updated
| Act/Principal No. | Title | Amended by | In force from | Section amended |
| PU(A) 493/1991 | Employees Provident Fund Rules 1991 | PU(A) 243/2020 | 1 September 2020 | Rule 41 |
| PU(A) 309/2011 | Solid Waste and Public Cleansing Management (Compounding of Offences) Regulations 2011 | PU(A) 241/2020 | 1 September 2020 | Regulation 2 |
| PU(A) 478/1989 | Weight Restrictions (Federal Roads) Order 1989 | PU(A) 238/2020 | 27 August 2020 | Second Schedule |
| ACT 371 | Registration of Pharmacists Act 1951 (Revised 1989) | PU(A) 236/2020 | 22 August 2020 | First Schedule |
| PU(A) 327/1993 | Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases (Compounding of Offences) Regulations 1993 | PU(A) 234/2020 | 20 August 2020 | First Schedule |
Revoked
| Act/Principal No. | Title | Revoked by | In force from |
| PU(B) 140/2020 | Appointment and Revocation of Appointment of Deputy Director General of the Board | PU(B) 373/2020 | 1 June 2020 |
| PU(A) 211/2020 | Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases (Medical Attendance and Maintenance of Person Removed to Quarantine Station) Regulations 2020 | PU(A) 233/2020 | 24 July 2020 |
| PU(A) 251/2006 | Entertainments Duty (Exemption) (No. 24) Order 2006 | PU(A) 204/2020 | 1 August 2020 |
| PU(A) 286/2015 | Customs Duties (Goods Under the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-Operation Among the Governments of the Member Countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Republic of Korea) (Asean Harmonised Tariff Nomenclature) Order 2015 | PU(A) 202/2020 | 1 August 2020 |
| PU(A) 84/2020 | Ministers of the Federal Government (No. 2) Order 2020 | PU(A) 201/2020 | See paragraph 1(2) of this Order |