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Issue #14/2021 08 April 2021

New This Week Case(s) of the Week ROVIN JOTY KODEESWARAN v. LEMBAGA PENCEGAHAN JENAYAH & ORS AND OTHER APPEALS [2021] 4 CLJ 1 Appeal Updates Appeal Updates Latest Cases Legal Network Series CLJ 2021 Volume 4 (Part 1) Articles LNS Article(s) Legislation Highlights Principal Acts Amending Acts PU(A) PU(B) Legislation Alert

ROVIN JOTY KODEESWARAN v.
LEMBAGA PENCEGAHAN JENAYAH & ORS AND OTHER APPEALS [2021] 4 CLJ 1
FEDERAL COURT, PUTRAJAYA
ABANG ISKANDAR CJ (SABAH AND SARAWAK); NALLINI PATHMANATHAN FCJ; VERNON ONG LAM KIAT FCJ;
ZABARIAH MOHD YUSOF FCJ; HASNAH MOHAMMED HASHIM FCJ
[CRIMINAL APPEALS NO: 05(HC)-304-12-2019(B), 05(HC)-308-12-2019(B), 05(HC)-303-12-2019(B),05(HC)-305-12-2019(B),
05(HC)-307-12-2019(B) & 05(HC)-7-01-2020(W)]
26 FEBRUARY 2021

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Judicial power - Exercise of judicial power - Ouster Clause stipulating courts precluded from judicially reviewing and scrutinising decision of Prevention of Crime Board in detaining appellants under s. 19A(1) of Prevention of Crime Act 1959 - Whether s. 15B of Prevention of Crime Act 1959 ('POCA') purports to limit exercise of judicial power - Whether s. 15B enacted under art. 149 of Federal Constitution ('FC') ousted jurisdiction of courts to perform judicial review unconstitutional by virtue of art. 4(1) of FC - Whether attempt by Parliament to suppress Constitutional powers given to courts as provided under art. 121(1) of FC - Whether there was encroachment on judicial powers - Whether there was breach of doctrine of separation of powers of Executive, Legislative and Judiciary - Whether there was contravention of basic structure of FC - Whether Parliament may restrict Fundamental Rights on grounds of public order and National Security premised on art. 149 of FC - Whether s. 15B of POCA ultra vires art. 121(1) of FC

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Legislation - Constitutionality - Ouster clauses in legislation dealing specifically with preventive detention enacted pursuant to art. 149 of Federal Constitution ('FC') - Ouster Clause stipulating courts precluded from judicially reviewing and scrutinising decision of Prevention of Crime Board in detaining appellants under s. 19A(1) of Prevention of Crime Act 1959 - Whether s. 15B of Prevention of Crime Act 1959 ('POCA') purports to limit exercise of judicial power - Whether s. 15B enacted under art. 149 of Federal Constitution ('FC') ousted jurisdiction of courts to perform judicial review unconstitutional by virtue of art. 4(1) of FC - Whether attempt by Parliament to suppress Constitutional powers given to courts as provided under art. 121(1) of FC - Whether there was encroachment on judicial powers - Whether there was breach of doctrine of separation of powers of Executive, Legislative and Judiciary - Whether there was contravention of basic structure of FC - Whether Parliament may restrict Fundamental Rights on grounds of public order and National Security premised on art. 149 of FC - Whether s. 15B of POCA ultra vires art. 121(1) of FC

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Courts - Judicial power - Ouster Clause stipulating courts precluded from judicially reviewing and scrutinising decision of Prevention of Crime Board in detaining appellants under s. 19A(1) of Prevention of Crime Act 1959 - Whether s. 15B of Prevention of Crime Act 1959 ('POCA') purports to limit exercise of judicial power - Whether s. 15B enacted under art. 149 of Federal Constitution ('FC') ousted jurisdiction of courts to perform judicial review unconstitutional by virtue of art. 4(1) of FC - Whether attempt by Parliament to suppress Constitutional powers given to courts as provided under art. 121(1) of FC - Whether there was encroachment on judicial powers- Whether there was breach of doctrine of separation of powers of Executive, Legislative and Judiciary - Whether there was contravention of basic structure of FC - Whether Parliament may restrict Fundamental Rights on grounds of public order and National Security premised on art. 149 of FC - Whether s. 15B of POCA ultra vires art. 121(1) of FC

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: Judicial review - Validity of legislation - Ouster Clause stipulating courts precluded from judicially reviewing and scrutinising decision of Prevention of Crime Board in detaining appellants under s. 19A(1) of Prevention of Crime Act 1959 - Whether s. 15B of Prevention of Crime Act 1959 ('POCA') purports to limit exercise of judicial power - Whether s. 15B enacted under art. 149 of Federal Constitution ('FC') ousted jurisdiction of courts to perform judicial review unconstitutional by virtue of art. 4(1) of FC - Whether attempt by Parliament to suppress Constitutional powers given to courts as provided under art. 121(1) of FC - Whether there was encroachment on judicial powers - Whether there was breach of doctrine of separation of powers of Executive, Legislative and Judiciary - Whether there was contravention of basic structure of FC - Whether Parliament may restrict Fundamental Rights on grounds of public order and National Security premised on art. 149 of FC - Whether s. 15B of POCA ultra vires art. 121(1) of FC

PREVENTIVE DETENTION: Habeas corpus - Dismissal of - Appeal against - Accused persons ordered to be detained under s. 19A(1) of Prevention of Crime Act 1959 ('POCA') - Ouster Clause stipulating courts precluded from judicially reviewing and scrutinising decision of Prevention of Crime Board in detaining appellants - Whether s. 15B of Prevention of Crime Act 1959 ('POCA') purports to limit exercise of judicial power - Whether s. 15B enacted under art. 149 of Federal Constitution ('FC') ousted jurisdiction of courts to perform judicial review unconstitutional by virtue of art. 4(1) of FC - Whether attempt by Parliament to suppress Constitutional powers given to courts as provided under art. 121(1) of FC - Whether there was encroachment on judicial powers - Whether there was breach of doctrine of separation of powers of Executive, Legislative and Judiciary - Whether there was contravention of basic structure of FC - Whether Parliament may restrict Fundamental Rights on grounds of public order and National Security premised on art. 149 of FC - Whether s. 15B of POCA ultra vires art. 121(1) of FC

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: Construction of statutes - Powers under Act - Prevention of Crime Act 1959, s. 15B - Whether valid ouster Clause - Whether s. 15B enacted under art. 149 of Federal Constitution ('FC') ousted jurisdiction of courts to perform judicial review unconstitutional by virtue of art. 4(1) of FC - Federal Constitution, art. 151(3) - Prevention of Crime Act 1959, s. 21A

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1. PP v. Chou Mau & Anor [2019] 1 LNS 805 (CA) overruling in part the High Court case of PP v. Chou Mau & Anor [Criminal trial No: 45B-31-07/2014]

2. Gopi Kumar Subramaniam v. PP [2019] 1 LNS 807 (CA) affirming the High Court case of PP v. Gopi Kumar Subramaniam [Criminal Trial No: 45A-5 & 6-1/2017]

Legal Network Series

[2019] 1 LNS 751	FED INTERNATIONAL COLLEGE & SATU LAGI lwn. KETUA PENDAFTAR INSTITUSI PENDIDIKAN TINGGI SWASTA & YANG LAIN Keputusan muktamad berhubung pembatalan kelulusan perakuan pendaftaran dan penolakan pembaharuan perakuan pendaftaran institusi pendidikan tinggi swasta ('IPTS') adalah dibuat oleh Menteri Pendidikan. Sebagai pembuat keputusan, Menteri Pendidikan sewajarnya dijadikan sebagai pihak dalam permohonan semakan kehakiman dan bukan menamakan Ketua Pendaftar IPTS. Kesilapan dalam menamakan pihak-pihak menyebabkan permohonan semakan kehakiman menjadi tidak kompeten dan wajar ditolak. UNDANG-UNDANG PENTADBIRAN: Semakan kehakiman - Prinsip dan prosedur - Pihak-pihak - Kesilapan dalam menamakan pihak-pihak - Permohonan untuk membatalkan keputusan pembatalan perakuan pendaftaran dan penolakan pembaharuan perakuan pendaftaran institusi pendidikan tinggi swasta ('IPTS') - Ketua Pendaftar IPTS telah dinamakan sebagai responden - Sama ada pembuat keputusan bagi pembatalan kelulusan pendaftaran IPTS adalah Menteri Pendidikan atau Ketua Pendaftar IPTS - Sama ada kuasa untuk membatalkan kelulusan pendaftaran IPTS adalah terletak pada Menteri Pendidikan - Sama ada Menteri Pendidikan harus dinamakan sebagai pihak dalam permohonan semakan kehakiman - Sama ada permohonan semakan kehakiman adalah kompeten UNDANG-UNDANG PENTADBIRAN: Perjalanan kuasa-kuasa pentadbiran - Semakan kehakiman - Certiorari - Permohonan untuk membatalkan keputusan pembatalan perakuan pendaftaran dan penolakan pembaharuan perakuan pendaftaran institusi pendidikan tinggi swasta ('IPTS') - Permohonan pembaharuan yang lengkap dikemukakan kurang daripada tempoh masa yang dikehendaki dan kegagalan mematuhi syarat-syarat kelulusan awal pendaftaran - Sama ada sebarang alasan bagi penolakan pembaharuan pendaftaran IPTS perlu diberikan - Sama ada keputusan untuk menolak permohonan pembaharuan perakuan pendaftaran adalah munasabah dan berasas - Sama ada keputusan Menteri Pendidikan adalah berasaskan alasan kepentingan negara, orang awam dan pelajar Bagi pihak pemohon-pemohon - Hilwa Bustam; T/n Shahrizat Rashid & Lee Bagi pihak responden-responden - SFC Natra Idris, Peguam Kanan Persekutuan; Jabatan Peguam Negara
[2019] 1 LNS 793	LOH PAU YOON @ PAU YOON (P) lwn. LEE MAY LING Awad ganti rugi bagi tuntutan fisioterapi boleh dibenarkan sekiranya ianya di peringkat pemulihan sahaja dan bukan selepas tempoh setahun kecederaan dialami. LALULINTAS JALAN: Kecuaian - Kemalangan jalan raya - Perlanggaran antara kereta dan basikal - Penentuan liabiliti - Percanggahan versi kemalangan - Penyandaran kepada keterangan senyap - Penunggang basikal mendakwa kereta melanggar basikal dari arah belakang - Pemandu kereta mendakwa basikal datang dari arah depan dan melanggar pintu kiri kereta - Kesan calar pada kereta tertumpu pada bahagian pintu kiri - Sama ada keterangan senyap menyokong versi pemandu kereta - Sama ada penunggang basikal mempunyai kecuaian yang besar dalam kemalangan GANTI RUGI: Kecederaan diri - Tuntutan fisioterapi - Kecederaan yang dialami melebihi setahun - Sama ada tuntutan fisioterapi boleh dibenarkan selepas tempoh setahun kecederaan - Sama ada tuntutan fisioterapi hanya boleh dituntut di peringkat pemulihan Bagi pihak plaintif/perayu - Kala Lakshmi; T/n Teo & Associates Bagi pihak defendan/responden - CY Ong; T/n CY Ong & Co
[2019] 1 LNS 1017	MOHD ASRI JUSOH & SATU LAGI lwn. HADI ROSNAN & SATU LAGI Kecederaan-kecederaan 'left frontal bone fracture' dan 'right mastoid fracture' merangkumi pada bahagian kepala dan justeru, pemberian satu awad secara global di bawah kecederaan kepala adalah lebih wajar dipertimbangkan berbanding dengan pemberian awad secara berasingan bagi mengelakkan pertindihan. GANTI RUGI: Rayuan - Rayuan terhadap kuantum - Kecederaan kepala - Hakim bicara memberikan pertimbangan berasingan bagi kecederaan 'left frontal bone fracture' dan 'right mastoid fracture' - Unsur-unsur pertindihan - Sama ada pemberian awad secara berasingan mewujudkan unsur-unsur pertindihan - Sama ada satu awad secara global di bawah kecederaan kepala adalah wajar diberikan Bagi pihak perayu - Omar Bakhi Ahmad; T/n VP Nathan & Partners Bagi pihak responden - K Ganesan & Kameshwary; T/n Kames & Associates
[2019] 1 LNS 1298	DATO' SRI ANDREW KAM TAI YEOW v. HOONG BEE YOOK It is usual for a judge to make judicial comments or express preliminary views on issues pertaining to the case before them during case management. Such comments or views do not suggest that the judge had prejudged the merits of the case which gives rise to an apprehension of bias. CIVIL PROCEDURE: Judge - Recusal - Application made mid-stream into trial and after plaintiff closed case - Judge made judicial comments or expressed preliminary views on issues during case management - Whether non-committal remark made by judge was consistent with earlier ruling made - Whether judicial comments or expression of preliminary views by a judge could give rise to an apprehension of bias - Whether there was real danger of bias - Whether judge conducted trial properly and impartially without any biasness - Whether there was basis for recusal For the appellant - RK Nathan, Vinod Kamanathan & Mahathir Abdullah; M/s Athi Seelan Mahathir And Partners For the respondent - CK Lim, Chin Yan Leng & David Yii; M/s YC Wong
[2019] 1 LNS 1300	ANG KUI HONG v. PRUDENTIAL ASSURANCE (M) BERHAD & ANOR An insured is not entitled to claim for total and permanent disability benefits under an insurance policy where the insured is able to find a reasonable alternative employment and receive remuneration therefrom. A mere conferring of OKU status would not qualify an insured for total and permanent disability benefits. INSURANCE: Policy - Repudiation - Claim for total and permanent disability benefits - Insured's claim rejected on basis that insured was capable of secondary tasks - Medical reports confirmed insured was capable of secondary tasks - Insured continued to work and receive lower remuneration - Insured was given OKU card - Whether insured improved with time - Whether insured could still find reasonable alternative employment - Whether insured suffered from total disablement - Whether insured would qualify for total and permanent disability benefits For the plaintiff - S Murali; M/s Murali Sandrakasan For the 1st defendant - Wong Hok Mun & PS Koh; M/s Azim, Tunku Farik & Wong

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CLJ 2021 Volume 4 (Part 1)

In a challenge against the constitutionality of s. 15B of the Prevention of Crime Act 1959 ('POCA') ie the ouster clause which stipulates that the courts are precluded from judicially reviewing and scrutinising the decision of the Prevention of Crime Board ordering the appellants to be detained under s. 19A(1) of the POCA, Parliament did not encroach into the judicial powers of the court by limiting judicial review to procedural non-compliance by virtue of the said s. 15B as it was within their power to do so. Parliament has the legislative power to enact federal law in relation to preventive detention under art. 149 of the Federal Constitution (FC). Section 15B of the POCA is a federal law, from where the courts derive their power in judicial review under POCA. The exercise of judicial power does not begin until and unless the court is called upon to do so. Therefore, the substratum of laws must first exist before judicial authority comes into being. There was no usurpation of judicial powers by the legislature. Section 15B, which limits judicial review by the courts only on procedural non-compliance, does not suppress the constitutional powers given to the courts as provided under art. 121 of the FC, and neither does it breach the doctrine of separation of powers between the three branches; namely, the executive, legislative and the judiciary, and thus, was not unconstitutional by virtue of art. 4(1) of the FC.
Rovin Joty Kodeeswaran v. Lembaga Pencegahan Jenayah & Ors And Other Appeals [2021] 4 CLJ 1 [FC]

• SUBJECT
• CORAM
• COUNSEL

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LNS Article(s)

1. POST COVID-19: EMPLOYERS' DUTY IN THE WORKPLACE ^{[Read excerpt]}
   by Nor Hasliza Mat Hasan* Kamal Halili Hassan** [2021] 1 LNS(A) xlv

[2021] 1 LNS(A) xlv



MALAYSIA

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POST COVID-19: EMPLOYERS' DUTY IN THE WORKPLACE

by
Nor Hasliza Mat Hasan*
Kamal Halili Hassan**

Introduction

COVID-19 has already created dramatic disruptions across the country. It has significantly changed the landscape of health and safety in the workplace. The rapid global spread of the COVID-19 virus has required employers and self-employed persons to carefully consider the duty of care owed to employees, contractors, and persons other than their employees. Exposure to COVID-19 causes a health risk to employees and other people at the workplace. Given the existential threat posed by the pandemic to the workplace, employers play a very significant role in preventing the spread of the disease. Employers should focus and pay careful attention to the safety of employees to reduce employees' risk of infection and their legal risks. Employers are required to have a safety plan to evaluate the risk of exposure in their workplace. Suitable control measures also must be implemented to ensure employees are not exposed to conditions that could be harmful to their health and safety to meet their obligations to provide a safe workplace.

. . .

* Faculty of Business, Multimedia University.

** Faculty of Law, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia.

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2. REINSTATING SECTION 42 OF THE ARBITRATION ACT 2005: A DESIRABLE WAY FORWARD FOR MALAYSIA* ^{[Read excerpt]}
   by Soh Zhen Ning** [2021] 1 LNS(A) xlvi

[2021] 1 LNS(A) xlvi



MALAYSIA

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REINSTATING SECTION 42 OF THE ARBITRATION ACT 2005:
A DESIRABLE WAY FORWARD FOR MALAYSIA*

by
Soh Zhen Ning**

The Malaysian Bar Council recently proposed the reinstatement of a 'modified' section 42 of the Arbitration Act 2005 (AA 2005) for reviewing domestic arbitral awards on questions of law.^[1] This article examines the desirability of reintroducing section 42 AA, and postulates that a restrictive right to appeal against aberrant domestic awards which contain errors of law should be viewed as beneficial for the development of arbitration law in Malaysia.

A. Introduction

In Malaysia, parties to an arbitration currently have no right to challenge an award which contains an error of law. The former section 42 provided the right to refer to the courts 'any question of law arising out of an award'. Parliament repealed section 42 in 2018 with the stated objective of promoting Malaysia as an arbitration-friendly jurisdiction.^[2]

In the two years since, the absence of any supervision at all by the Malaysian courts over the legal merits of domestic arbitral awards has raised widespread concern within the arbitral community.^[3] Effectively, a perverse domestic award replete with glaring errors of law is beyond challenge or review.

. . .

* This article was originally published in January 2021 in Arbitration in Malaysia: The Way Forward by the International Arbitration Practice of Lee Hishammuddin Allen & Gledhill. Reproduced with permission.

** Associate, Lee Hishammuddin Allen & Gledhill; LLM (Cantab), LLB (Hons) (Liv); Advocate and Solicitor of the High Court of Malaya; called to the Bar of England and Wales (szn@lh-ag.com).

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3. VOLUNTARY OR MANDATORY CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: WHICH IS THE BETTER WAY TO FOSTER GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE? ^{[Read excerpt]}
   by Tan Wai Kit* [2021] 1 LNS(A) xlvii

[2021] 1 LNS(A) xlvii



International

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VOLUNTARY OR MANDATORY CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY:
WHICH IS THE BETTER WAY TO FOSTER GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE?

by
Tan Wai Kit*

Introduction

In today's global economy, multinational companies ("MNCs") are increasingly pressurized by civil societies and other stakeholders to take responsibility for harms or negative externalities resulting from their commercial activities.^[1] Nevertheless, under the backdrop of increasing globalization, the effectiveness of states' role in regulating the MNCs is diminishing as the MNCs continue to gather immense economic and political powers at international level over time.^[2] Over and above, companies may also employ regulatory arbitrage to simply bypass unfavourable state regulation.^[3] In order to fill up this regulatory gap, companies are called to embrace the notion of corporate social responsibilities ("CSR") to integrate other stakeholders' concerns and interests into their business decisions, policies and operations. In general, the CSR is founded on the concept of voluntary self-regulation and, thus the same is outside or beyond legal requirement.^[4]

. . .

*LLB (Hons) Multimedia University, LLM (International Commercial Law) University of Bristol.

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