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Issue #45/2021
11 November 2021
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New This Week
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KETHEESWARAN KANAGARATNAM & ANOR v. PP [2021] 9 CLJ 749
HIGH COURT MALAYA, KLANG
AZMI ABDULLAH J
[NOTICE OF MOTION NO: BL-44-6-09-2020]
03 JUNE 2021
The applicants' motion for s. 61A of the Anti-Trafficking in Persons and Anti-Smuggling of Migrants Act 2007 ('ATIPSOM') ('impugned provision') declared unconstitutional, in contravention of arts. 121(1), 8(1) and 5(1) of the Federal Constitution and the statutory requirements of Evidence Act 1950 ('EA') and Criminal Procedure Code ('CPC'), was dismissed because: (i) the judicial power of courts to decide or arrive at its decision had not been excluded; (ii) it does not accord unfair trial to applicants; (iii) ATIPSOM contains a provision of appeal; and (iv) ATIPSOM, being a specific Act, its application prevails over the EA and CPC, which both are general Act, due to the maxim generalibus specialia derogant.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Legislation - Constitutionality - Anti-Trafficking in Persons and Anti-Smuggling of Migrants Act 2007 ('ATIPSOM'), s. 61A ('impugned provision') - Impugned provision provided deposition by trafficked persons or smuggled migrants who could not be found be accepted as prima facie evidence without need for cross-examination - Whether impugned provision contravened arts. 121(1), 8(1) and 5(1) of Federal Constitution - Whether impugned provision excludes judicial power of courts to decide or arrive at decision - Whether denial of right to cross-examine denial of right to fair trial - Whether denial of right to cross-examine caused inequality to applicants - Whether ATIPSOM being specific Act prevails over Evidence Act 1950 and Criminal Procedure Code
SURAINI KEMPE & ORS v. KERAJAAN MALAYSIA & ORS [2021] 9 CLJ 979
HIGH COURT MALAYA, KUALA LUMPUR
AKHTAR TAHIR J
[ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO: WA-24NCVC-2356-12-2020]
27 SEPTEMBER 2021
The word 'father' appearing in art. 14(1)(b), read together with the Second Schedule in s. 1(c) of Part II of the Federal Constitution, includes the mother and, therefore, children who are born out of the Federation, to mothers who are Malaysian citizens, are entitled to citizenship by operation of law if all the procedures similar to those followed by the father are adhered to.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Citizenship - Citizenship by operation of law - Citizenship of children born to Malaysian citizen mothers but out of Federation - Whether art. 14(1)(b), read together with Second Schedule in s. 1(c) of Part II of Federal Constitution discriminatory towards Malaysian citizen mothers whose children are born out of Federation - Whether ought to be read harmoniously with art. 8 of Federal Constitution - Whether word 'father' in impugned provision includes 'mother'
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Citizenship - Locus - Citizenship of children born to Malaysian citizen mothers but out of Federation - Locus - Malaysian citizen mothers whose children are born out of Federation seeking declaration that art. 14(1)(b), read together with Second Schedule in s. 1(c) of Part II of Federal Constitution, discriminatory towards mothers - Whether locus and legitimate expectation established - Whether there were grievances
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Citizenship - Jurisdiction of court - Citizenship of children born to Malaysian citizen mothers out of Federation - Malaysian citizen mothers whose children are born out of Federation seeking declaration that art. 14(1)(b), read together with Second Schedule in s. 1(c) of Part II of Federal Constitution, discriminatory towards mothers - Whether court seized with jurisdiction to hear matter
"Under the laws, after having compensated the parcel owners of strata units for the market values of their respective strata units, the acquisition authority still has to pay a reasonable compensation to the management corporation of the strata development for having acquired the common property in the same strata development in the same acquisition process, provided that the valuation of such compensation amount shall be done in accordance with the provisions of sub-para. 1(2C) of the First Schedule to the Land Acquisition Act 1960, namely, the basis of the reasonable cost to the proprietor of the scheduled land of using or purchasing other land and devoting it to the same purpose to which the scheduled land is devoted." - per Tee Geok Hock JC in Perbadanan Pengurusan Ara Ampang v. Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Hulu Langat [2021] 6 CLJ 441
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Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Johor v. Nusantara Daya Sdn Bhd [2021] 7 CLJ 1 (FC) overruling the Court of Appeal case of Nusantara Daya Sdn Bhd v. Pentadbir Tanah Johor Bahru [2020] 1 LNS 95 and affirming the High Court case of Nusantara Daya Sdn Bhd v. Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Johor Bahru [2018] 1 LNS 1559
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Samuel Ikechukwu Umegolu (W/Nigeria) v. PP [2019] 1 LNS 1655 (CA) affirming the High Court case of PP v. Samuel Ikechukwu Umegolu [Criminal Trial No: 45A-5-01/2013]
Legal Network Series
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LEE BOON KEONG & YANG LAIN lwn. YEW KOK CHOOI & SATU LAGI Sekiranya satu tanah dimiliki oleh beberapa pemilik dan pemilik-pemilik tersebut mengetahui pembahagian tanah masing-masing sebelum pecah bahagian tanah dibuat, apabila salah satu pemilik melakukan sebarang kegiatan di atas bahagian tanahnya, maka pemilik bahagian tanah yang lain tidak wajar membawa tindakan pencerobohan dan menuntut keuntungan daripada pemilik yang melakukan kegiatan di atas bahagian tanah tersebut melainkan jika wujud sebarang perjanjian kerjasama dan perkongsian keuntungan antara kesemua pemilik. UNDANG-UNDANG TANAH: Pencerobohan - Ganti rugi - Tindakan oleh perayu-perayu sebagai pemilik 1/2 bahagian tanah terhadap responden-responden sebagai pemilik 1/2 bahagian tanah yang lain - Pihak-pihak mengetahui pembahagian tanah sebelum pecah bahagian tanah - Responden-responden memasuki projek pengeluaran pasir di atas tanah milik mereka - Perayu-perayu tidak mengeluarkan sebarang perbelanjaan tetapi menuntut ganti rugi dan keuntungan - Sama ada wujud sebarang perjanjian kerjasama antara perayu-perayu dan responden-responden berkaitan projek pengeluaran tanah dan perkongsian keuntungan - Sama ada wujud pencerobohan atas tanah
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SRI MAHANUM YUP v. WAKIL DIRI KEPADA HARTA PUSAKA RADEN BENNI RS TANUWIDJAJA & ANOR Where an employee sustained an injury due to a collision between two motor vehicles owned by the same employer, the said employee cannot be accused of having been injured in consequence of an employment injury. The injury sustained by the said employee is instead a result of a motor vehicle accident and in such circumstances, the employee is not barred to file a claim by s. 31 of the Employees' Social Security Act 1969. LABOUR LAW: Employment - Compensation - Claim for - Motor vehicle accident - Dependency claim - Fatal accident - Passenger's claim - Passenger carried in pursuance of contract of employment - Vehicles involved in accident owned by same owner - Owner of vehicles was employer of deceased passenger - Whether injury sustained by deceased was in consequence of an employment injury - Whether claim was prohibited under s. 31 of Employees' Social Security Act 1969 ('Act 1969') - Whether proviso in s. 31 of Act 1969 applicable
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A SARPIAN AZMI lwn. PP Dalam memutuskan bahawa suatu kes prima facie pengedaran dadah berbahaya telah dibuktikan, anggapan pemilikan dan pengetahuan bawah s. 37(d) dan anggapan mengedar bawah s. 37(da) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 hendaklah digunapakai oleh Mahkamah sekiranya fakta asas untuk mengaktifkannya telah dibuktikan oleh pihak pendakwaan. Namun demikian, anggapan-anggapan tersebut harus digunakan secara berasingan dan bukan secara berganda. PROSEDUR JENAYAH: Rayuan - Rayuan terhadap sabitan dan hukuman - Pengedaran dadah berbahaya - Hakim bicara menggunapakai anggapan pemilikan dan pengetahuan bawah s. 37(d) dan anggapan mengedar bawah s. 37(da) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 secara berasingan dalam pembuktian kes prima facie - Sama ada hakim bicara telah melanggar larangan terhadap penggunaan anggapan berganda - Sama ada anggapan-anggapan di bawah s. 37(d) dan s. 37(da) hendaklah digunapakai setelah fakta asas untuk mengaktifkannya telah dibuktikan oleh pihak pendakwaan
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TERESA KOK SUH SIM v. JAMAL MD YUNOS 1. An application for striking out must be made promptly and such application should be refused when it is filed after the action has been set down for trial and in the absence of any satisfactory explanation for the delay in filing the said application. 2. The question as to whether an action is premature or otherwise is a matter to be determined at the trial and it cannot be grounds to strike out the said action. CIVIL PROCEDURE: Striking out - Principles and procedures - Application filed after action has been set down for trial - Application filed a few days before trial - Whether there was unreasonable delay in making application - Whether defendant had offered satisfactory explanation on delay in filing application - Whether application should be refused CIVIL PROCEDURE: Striking out - Action - Action premised on tort of defamation - Alleged defamatory remarks made at press conference - Allegation of misappropriation of state funds for personal gain as member of Parliament - Defendant lodged report against plaintiff with Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission ('MACC') - Action filed before completion of investigation by MACC - Whether plaintiff's case was premature - Whether plaintiff's suit disclosed cause of action and raised questions fit to be decided by judge - Whether a suit is premature or otherwise is a matter to be determined at trial - Whether plain and obvious case for striking out
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PCOM PACIFIC SDN BHD v. APEX COMMUNICATIONS SDN BHD & ANOR A principal who refuses to pay an adjudication amount to a party who has obtained an adjudication decision in his favour pursuant to s. 30(1) of the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 has the burden of proof to show that there are no monies due and owing to the party against whom the adjudication decision was made with cogent substantiating documents. CONSTRUCTION LAW: Adjudication - Payment claims - Direct payment from principal - Claim for direct payment from principal of contractor - Principal alleged monies were due and owing by subcontractor to principal and deny owing monies to sub-subcontractor - Principal and subcontractor were connected companies - Whether principal had issued mandatory notice under s. 30(2) of Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 - Whether alleged money owing to principal by subcontractor was proven to be true - Whether there were cogent substantiating documents in support of principal's statement of account to show money owing by subcontractor to principal
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CLJ 2021 Volume 9 (Part 5)
1. The statement and the affidavit of an applicant plays important roles in the substantive application for an order of certiorari, declaration and mandamus. The law clearly provides that, at the hearing of the substantive application, the court will not allow the applicant to rely on any grounds not set out in the statement.
2. The discretionary powers of the Director General ('DG') of the Department of Wildlife and National Parks ('Department') under s. 50 of the Wildlife Conservation Act 2010 ('Act') is purely administrative or an executive function involving technical and policy considerations of the Department. It is for the Department, having considered internal policies, consideration and requirements, to decide which officers are to be authorised to do the conservation works under s. 50 of the Act. The court, not being in any position to have the necessary technical information or policies of the department, could not step into the shoes of the DG.
Lembaga Tatatertib Kumpulan Sokongan (No. 1) Jabatan Perlindungan Hidupan Liar Dan Taman Negara & Ors v. Mariani Ramli [2021] 9 CLJ 695 [CA]
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: Judicial review - Application for - Application for judicial review against decision of public authorities - Public servant dismissed from service - Absent from duty despite leave not being approved - Whether there was biasness in decision - Whether issue of biasness pleaded - Whether consequential order made following decision based on issue not pleaded ought to be set aside - Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) Regulations 1993, reg. 38(g)
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Pleadings - Issues - Issues not pleaded - Application for judicial review against decision of public authorities - Public servant dismissed from service - Absent from duty despite leave not being approved - Whether issues found by judge pleaded - Whether consequential order made following decision based on issue not pleaded ought to be set aside - Rules of Court 2012, O. 53 rr. 3(2) & 7
HANIPAH FARIKULLAH JCA
AZIZAH NAWAWI JCA
LEE HENG CHEONG JCA
- For the appellants - Shahmin Amiza; SFC
- For the respondent - Jessica Binwanis, Devana & Ramithra; M/s Theiva Lingam
Where the defendants in the main claim sued the plaintiffs, in their personal capacity, and as office bearers of a society, Siburan Village Hall Committee, and the plaintiffs filed the counterclaim in their personal capacity as well to protect the society's reputation, it followed that the alleged defamatory articles referred to the plaintiffs personally and in their official capacities. The articles, as a whole, imputed dishonourable or discreditable conduct and lack of integrity on the part of the society, of which the plaintiffs were the office-bearers. Taking into account, inter alia, that there were unproven charges that materially injured the reputation of the plaintiffs, that the words complained of were not comments based on facts and were not comments which were fair and which a fair minded person could make on proven facts, and that the defendants' communication via the press conference was made to parties who did not have a corresponding duty or interest to receive it, the defendants failed in the defence of justification, fair comment and qualified privileges. The imputations contained in the articles were thus defamatory of the plaintiffs and the society.
Liu Thian Leong & Ors v. Jee Nyen Chong & Ors [2021] 9 CLJ 715 [CA]
TORT: Defamation - Libel - Publication of defamatory articles in newspapers - Whether words complained of defamatory - Whether publications referred to plaintiffs in their official capacities - Whether claimants had right to bring representative action in libel for damages - Whether pleading based on two causes of action - Whether defences of qualified privilege, fair comment and justification proved - Whether actual or express malice proved - Damages - Claim for
TORT: Defamation - Defences - Justification - Charges against plaintiffs - Whether proved - Whether unproved charges materially injured claimants' reputation - Whether defence of justification failed
TORT: Defamation - Defences - Fair comment - Whether publications matter of public interest - Whether statement of facts 'total falsehood' - Whether there were proved facts to warrant comment - Whether defence of fair comment rejected
TORT: Defamation - Defences - Qualified privilege - Element of reciprocity between maker of communication and receiver - Whether made on occasion of privilege - Whether right of qualified privilege exceeded - Whether defence of qualified privilege failed
TORT: Defamation - Damages - Claim for - Claims in personal capacity and as office-bearers - Whether entitled to separate awards - Whether individual and office-bearers capacities conflated - Whether award for aggravated damages allowed
HANIPAH FARIKULLAH JCA
RAVINTHRAN PARAMAGURU JCA
CHE MOHD RUZIMA GHAZALI JCA
- For the appellants - Chong Siew Chiang, Ronald Ong & Michael Kong; M/s Chong Brothers Advocs
- For the respondents - Henry Ling; M/s Ling & Wong Advocs
The applicants' motion for s. 61A of the Anti-Trafficking in Persons and Anti-Smuggling of Migrants Act 2007 ('ATIPSOM') ('impugned provision') declared unconstitutional, in contravention of arts. 121(1), 8(1) and 5(1) of the Federal Constitution and the statutory requirements of Evidence Act 1950 ('EA') and Criminal Procedure Code ('CPC'), was dismissed because: (i) the judicial power of courts to decide or arrive at its decision had not been excluded; (ii) it does not accord unfair trial to applicants; (iii) ATIPSOM contains a provision of appeal; and (iv) ATIPSOM, being a specific Act, its application prevails over the EA and CPC, which both are general Act, due to the maxim generalibus specialia derogant.
Ketheeswaran Kanagaratnam & Anor v. PP [2021] 9 CLJ 749 [HC]
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Legislation - Constitutionality - Anti-Trafficking in Persons and Anti-Smuggling of Migrants Act 2007 ('ATIPSOM'), s. 61A ('impugned provision') - Impugned provision provided deposition by trafficked persons or smuggled migrants who could not be found be accepted as prima facie evidence without need for cross-examination - Whether impugned provision contravened arts. 121(1), 8(1) and 5(1) of Federal Constitution - Whether impugned provision excludes judicial power of courts to decide or arrive at decision - Whether denial of right to cross-examine denial of right to fair trial - Whether denial of right to cross-examine caused inequality to applicants - Whether ATIPSOM being specific Act prevails over Evidence Act 1950 and Criminal Procedure Code
AZMI ABDULLAH J
- For the applicant - A Athimulan & K Kumaraendran; M/s Mohana Krishnan
- For the respondent - Yusaini & Haslinda Che Seman; DPP
Under the Street, Drainage and Building Act 1974, plans relating to 'sewerage system' does not come within the purview of DBKL. Consequently, since DBKL need not consider or approve matters pertaining to sewerage system prior to issuing a development order, there is no duty in law on DBKL to inspect the pre-existing sewerage system on any property or to assess the impact that the sewerage system on the property may have in environment. Sections 3 and 45 of the Water Services Industry Act 2006 and rr. 7 and 9 of the Water Services Industry (Planning, Design and Construction of Sewerage System and Septic Tank) Rules 2013 specifies that it is Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Air Negara ('SPAN') and not DBKL who has the sole jurisdiction and power to grant approval for the construction of the sewerage system. Since DBKL is not the controlling statutory authority in relation to 'public sewer', the third party proceedings filed by the applicant against DBKL ought to be set aside. Upholding the applicant's complaints would effectively mean that DBKL would usurp the functions and jurisdiction of SPAN.
Lee Chin Yong v. Medical Defence Malaysia Bhd; Datuk Bandar Kuala Lumpur (Third Party) [2021] 9 CLJ 766 [HC]
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: Exercise of administrative powers - Government department - Third party proceedings against DBKL for approving and issuing development order that allegedly caused sewerage problems - Whether DBKL negligent in issuing development order - Whether DBKL has jurisdiction to consider or approve anything related to sewerage system - Whether power to grant approval of construction of sewerage system rests on Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Air Negara - Whether Federal Government has authority with respect to matters relating to sewerage systems and services with effect of enactment of Sewerage Services Act 1993 - Whether relief sought against DBKL could not be granted as matter of law - Whether claim against DBKL obviously unsustainable - Whether third party action ought to be set aside - Water Services Industry Act 2006, ss. 3, 45, 64(1) & 66 - Street, Drainage and Building Act 1974, s. 70(2)(a) & (b) - Water Services Industry (Planning, Design and Construction of Sewerage System and Septic Tank) Rules 2013, rr. 7, 9, 18, 24, 25 & 34 - Sewerage Services Act 1993, ss. 3, 31 & 46
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Third party proceedings - Setting aside - Application for - Action against Government department - Third party proceedings against DBKL for approving and issuing development order that allegedly caused sewerage problems - Whether DBKL negligent in issuing development order - Whether DBKL has jurisdiction to consider or approve anything related to sewerage system - Whether power to grant approval of construction of sewerage system rests on Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Air Negara - Whether Federal Government has authority with respect to matters relating to sewerage systems and services with effect of enactment of Sewerage Services Act 1993 - Whether relief sought against DBKL could not be granted as matter of law - Whether claim against DBKL obviously unsustainable - Whether third party action ought to be set aside - Water Services Industry Act 2006, ss. 3, 45, 64(1) & 66 - Street, Drainage and Building Act 1974, s. 70(2)(a) & (b) - Water Services Industry (Planning, Design and Construction of Sewerage System and Septic Tank) Rules 2013, rr. 7, 9, 18, 24, 25 & 34 - Sewerage Services Act 1993, ss. 3 31 & 46
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: Construction of statutes - Interpretation - Distinction between s. 70(2)(a) and s. 70(2)(b) of Street, Drainage and Building Act 1974 - Whether matters relating to sewerage system fall outside DBKL's scope of responsibility - Applicability of Water Services Industry Act 2006 - Whether Federal Government has authority with respect to all matters relating to sewerage systems and services - Whether Federal Government exercises authority through Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Air Negara - Whether DBKL cloaked with any powers on matters related to sewerage system - Sewerage Services Act 1993, ss. 3, 31 & 46 - Water Services Industry Act 2006, ss. 3, 45, 64(1), 66 - Street, Drainage and Building Act 1974, s. 70(2)(a) & (b) - Water Services Industry (Planning, Design and Construction of Sewerage System and Septic Tank) Rules 2013, rr. 7, 9, 18, 24, 25 & 34 - Sewerage Services Act 1993, ss. 3, 31 & 46
QUAY CHEW SOON JC
- For the defendant - Anit Kaur Randhawa; M/s Asbir, Hira Singh & Co
- For the 3rd party - Jaqdesh Singh & Sofina Thafiqah Zulkifli; M/s Theselim Mohd Yusoff & Co
The recital of the Prevention of Crime Act 1959 ('POCA') must be read to include the whole of art. 149(1) of the Federal Constitution, ie, paras. (a) to (f) inclusive, and not just para. (a). The POCA was enacted by Parliament pursuant to art. 149 as a whole and applies to both Malaysian citizen and non-citizen. There could not be and exist a situation where, while a citizen is subjected to the full force of the law for committing a crime, a non-citizen is immune from such acts.
Li Shishun v. Osman Affendi Mohd Shalleh & Ors And Other Applications [2021] 9 CLJ 789 [HC]
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: Habeas corpus - Application for - Application for release from detention - Non-citizen applicants involved in activities of management and promotion of unlawful gambling - Applicants detained under Prevention of Crime Act 1959 ('POCA') - Whether detention outside scope of POCA - Whether unlawful gambling fall within POCA - Whether POCA applied to non-citizens - Federal Constitution, arts. 5(2), 149(1) & 151 - Courts of Judicature Act 1964, s. 25(2) - Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967, ss. 15 & 17A
COLLIN LAWRENCE SEQUERAH J
- For the applicants - Gobind Singh Deo, Jacky Loi, Lim Jing Wen, Haijan Omar, PG Cyril, Loh Suk Hua & Meneesha Kaur; M/s Gobind Singh Deo & M/s TY Teh & Partners
- For the respondents - Muhammad Sinti, Zulkifli Abdullah & Farah Ezli Yusop Khan; DPPs
(i) The application for sanction and approval of scheme of arrangement ('scheme') between a company and its creditors under s. 366(4) of the Companies Act 2016 ('CA') was allowed because: (a) the company had satisfied all the advertisement and service requirements under ss. 366 and 369 of the CA; (b) the scheme was one which an intelligent and honest man would approve; (c) the company was allowed to vary the terms of the security arrangement it entered with its guarantor; (d) the issues raised by the interveners to contest the application was unmeritorious; and (e) the interveners' application to have their ongoing proceedings against the company and its guarantor was dismissed as it would beat the purpose of the scheme, to allow the company to focus its efforts and resources to rehabilitate, so as to repay its debts to its creditors.
(ii) The grant of restraining order ('RO'), which was extended to the guarantor, was legal due to the fact the guarantor would be the one who would repay the debts of the company to the creditors. The guarantor was thus integral and inextricably linked to the scheme. If the RO was not granted and the proceedings were allowed to be commenced and continued against the guarantor, the assets that could be used to repay the debts would dissipate and it would hence, be fatal to the workings of the scheme and in turn, be detrimental to the creditors.
Sentoria Bina Sdn Bhd v. Impak Kejora Sdn Bhd & Ors (Interveners) [2021] 9 CLJ 814 [HC]
COMPANY LAW: Arrangement, scheme of - Arrangement between company and creditors - Application for sanction and approval of scheme of arrangement - Whether all advertisements and service requirements under ss. 366 and 369 of Companies Act 2016 fulfilled - Whether scheme of arrangement one where intelligent and honest man would approve - Whether court should substitute commercial views of creditors with its own - Whether scheme of arrangement could vary terms of security arrangement between company and its guarantor - Whether interveners raised meritorious issues in contesting sanction of scheme of arrangement - Whether leave should be granted for interveners to continue ongoing proceedings against company and its guarantor - Companies Act 2016, s. 366(4)
COMPANY LAW: Arrangement, scheme of - Restrain of proceedings - Restraining order granted extended to guarantor - Whether restraining order granted legal - Whether guarantor of company had integral role and inextricably linked to scheme of arrangement sought to be sanctioned - Whether denial of restraining order would be fatal to scheme of arrangement as a whole
ANAND PONNUDURAI JC
- For the applicant - DP Naban, Gopi Seshadari, Chong Hau Yean & Alya Izzati; M/s Gopi Seshadari
- For the 1st intervener - Chris YH Tan, Lee Shih En; M/s J M Chong Vincent Chee & Co
- For the 2nd & 4th interveners - Cecilia Tan Shee Shia & Soon Zhen Hui; M/s Soh Hayati & Co
- For the 3rd intervener - Helmi Hamzah & Alif Ridhwan Mohd Yusof; M/s Hisham, Sobri & Kadir
CLJ 2021 Volume 9 (Part 6)
(1) Shareholders of a company have a statutory and contractual pre-emptive right to be offered new shares premised on a reading of s. 85(1) of the Companies Act 2016. Section 75 of the same also states that directors shall not exercise any power to allot shares in the company unless prior approval by way of resolution by the company is obtained. An invalid offer and issuance of placement shares constitutes an unfairly prejudicial conduct within the meaning of s. 346 of the Companies Act 2016 as shareholders are oppressed due to the unjustified dilution of its shareholding in the company when the placement shares are offered to outsiders.
(2) Directors of a company have an incumbent duty to inform shareholders of any intention to both 'enter into' and 'carry into effect' an acquisition of substantial assets. For the purpose of satisfying proviso (i) of s. 223(1) of the Companies Act 2016, it is sufficient that the entering into of the arrangement or transaction is 'made subject to the approval of the company by way of resolution.' The shareholders' approval must be specified as a condition precedent to any arrangement or transaction of substantial value.
(3) The denial of a shareholder's fundamental statutory right to vote provided in s. 223 of the Companies Act 2016 constitutes an oppression on the minority, especially when it is designed to facilitate a covert reverse take-over of the company and its subsidiaries. This would unfairly prejudice the interests of the shareholder as a member because the value of its investments in the company would have substantially diminished.
(4) Directors of a company ought to obtain the consent and authority of the shareholders prior to the filing of validation proceedings instead of filing without the prior knowledge or approval of the shareholders, which results in unfair prejudice to the shareholder as its substantive rights are impinged. The shareholder will be denied the opportunity to participate in the validation proceedings and to prove to the court that the company and the relevant board of directors does not have the necessary authorisation to carry out any share buy-back transactions and that the transactions sought to be validated continue to be unlawful. This in turn shows that the 'affairs of the company' continue to be conducted in a manner in disregard and/or unfairly prejudicial to the interests of the shareholder as a member of the company.
Concrete Parade Sdn Bhd v. Apex Equity Holdings Bhd & Ors [2021] 9 CLJ 849 [CA]
COMPANY LAW: Members' rights - Oppression - Whether shareholder has statutory and contractual pre-emptive right to be offered new shares in company - Whether direction to the contrary must be obtained before shares offered to outsiders - Whether there was breach of s. 85 of Companies Act 2016 - Whether s. 75 of Companies Act 2016 grants directors power of allotment in respect of placement shares - Whether directors have incumbent duty to inform shareholder of intention to 'enter into' and 'carry into effect' acquisition of assets - Whether there was contravention of s. 223 of Companies Act 2016 - Whether there was denial of statutory right to vote - Whether share buy-back transactions carried out by company unlawful - Whether directors' act of filing validation proceedings without obtaining consent and authority of shareholders resulted in unfair prejudice - Whether shareholder's substantive rights impinged - Whether court has unfettered discretion to make order empowered by s. 346(2) of Companies Act 2016
COMPANY LAW: Directors - Oppression suit - Members' rights - Whether shareholder has statutory and contractual pre-emptive right to be offered new shares in company - Whether direction to the contrary must be obtained before shares offered to outsiders - Whether there was breach of s. 85 of Companies Act 2016 - Whether s. 75 of Companies Act 2016 grants directors power of allotment in respect of placement shares - Whether directors have incumbent duty to inform shareholder of intention to 'enter into' and 'carry into effect' acquisition of assets - Whether there was contravention of s. 223 of Companies Act 2016 - Whether there was denial of statutory right to vote - Whether share buy-back transactions carried out by company unlawful - Whether directors' act of filing validation proceedings without obtaining consent and authority of shareholders resulted in unfair prejudice - Whether shareholder's substantive rights impinged - Whether court has unfettered discretion to make order empowered by s. 346(2) of Companies Act 2016
YAACOB MD SAM JCA
SURAYA OTHMAN JCA
LAU BEE LAN JCA
- For the appellant - Cyrus Das, Alvin Tang, Khor Heng How, Fiona Bodipalar & Abigail Nimbalker; M/s Bodipalar Ponnudurai De Silva
- For the 1st, 2nd & 16th respondents - Rabindra S Nathan, Mak Lin Kum, R Himahlini & Lyness Lim Wei Xeng; M/s Himahlini & Loh
- For the 3rd, 4th & 5th respondents - Kennie Ang Joo Koon & Yin Yin; M/s Ivan Lau & Xuen
- For the 6th & 7th respondents - Wong Kah Hui & Ong Jian Nee; M/s KH Wong & Co
- For the 8th respondent - Richard WG Lee, Elizabeth Goh Huay Ling & Soon Jia Yee; M/s Jeff Leong, Poon & Wong
- For the 9th & 12th respondents - Shim De Zhen & Hazwan Lee Haris Lee; M/s Yeoh Shim Siow & Lay Kuan
- For the 10th respondent - Yuvaraj Sugapathy; M/s Sugapathy & Partners
- For the 11th respondent - Tan Eng Keat; M/s Gan, Lee & Tan
- For the 13th respondent - Yee Jun Hong & Frederick Teng Siaw Chuing; M/s JH Yee & Co
- For the 14th respondent - N Nathan & Shahman; M/s Kumar Jaspal Quah & Aishah
- For the 15th respondent - Jasvinder Singh; M/s Asyraf, Vivek & Wee
To be entitled to a Fortuna injunction, in order to restrain the presentation of the winding petition against an applicant company, the applicant must satisfy that the winding-up petition (i) has no chance of success, whether as a matter of law or fact. This is also to say that there is a bona fide dispute of the debt on the substantial ground so that presentation of the winding-up petition to enforce payment would amount to an abuse of the process of court; and (ii) might produce irreparable damage to the company.
Sime Darby Energy Solution Sdn Bhd v. RZH Setia Jaya Sdn Bhd [2021] 9 CLJ 880 [CA]
CONSTRUCTION LAW: Adjudication - Decision - Claim for unpaid sum by subcontractor against main contractor - Adjudicator decided in favour of subcontractor - Enforcement of adjudication decision - Whether subcontractor entitled to admitted debt - Whether there was bona fide dispute on debt - Financial capacity of main contractor to pay debt - Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Injunction - Fortuna injunction - Application for Fortuna injunction to restrain filing of winding up petition - Claim for unpaid sum by subcontractor against main contractor - Adjudicator decided in favour of subcontractor - Enforcement of adjudication decision - Subcontractor served statutory notice pursuant to s. 466(1)(a) of Companies Act 2016 - Whether injunction ought to be granted - Whether winding-up petition stood chance to succeed - Whether was bona fide dispute of debt - Whether presentation of winding-up petition might produce irreparable damage - Whether Fortuna injunction abuse of court process - Whether main contractor acted timeously in applying for injunction
NOR BEE ARIFFIN JCA
AZIZAH NAWAWI JCA
GUNALAN MUNIANDY JCA
- For the appellant - Vijayalatha P Velupillai; M/s Velupillai & Assocs
- For the respondent - Kelvin Ng Chun Yee & Eric Chan See Quan; M/s Vin & Isaac Lee
An execution creditor, who has obtained an enforcement order which had not been stayed or set aside up to the date of the hearing before the Deputy Registrar, is entitled to avail itself to the machinery enforcement by way of writ of seizure and sale of a piece of land as a means of recovering a judgment debt and to obtain a prohibitory order so as to maintain the status quo pending the disposal of the said land by sale in the execution proceedings. An execution creditor need not be a charge of the land to be entitled to obtain an order for sale as the order for sale is applied for, and obtained, by the execution creditor pursuant to O. 47 r. 7 of the Rules of Court 2012. It is a form of enforcement available to all execution creditors.
Econpile (M) Sdn Bhd v. ASM Development (KL) Sdn Bhd [2021] 9 CLJ 896 [HC]
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Execution - Proceedings - Prohibitory order - Filing of writ of seizure and sale ('WSS') and notice of application for amended prohibitory order ('PO') against land - Whether execution creditor entitled to avail itself to machinery of enforcement by way of WSS on land as means of recovering judgment debt and obtain PO to maintain status quo pending disposal of land by sale in execution proceedings - Whether execution debtor had intention of obeying enforcement order - Whether there was sufficient cause to set aside PO - Whether execution debtor prejudiced - Whether execution creditor came to court with clean hands
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Stay of execution - Application for - Special circumstances - Whether arose - Whether proper exercise of discretion of court if status quo remained - Balance between competing interests of parties - Whether execution debtor would suffer irreparable harm and prejudice - Whether execution creditor would be deprived of fruits of its litigation
LAND LAW: Order for sale - Reserve price - Whether execution creditor entitled to obtain order for sale - Whether execution creditor's valuation report considered all relevant factors affecting market value of land - Appropriate adjustments to comparables - Whether proper guidelines followed in fixing reserve price - Rules of Court 2012, O. 47 r. 7
ALIZA SULAIMAN J
- For the execution creditor/plaintiff - Rohan Arasoo Jeyabalah, Amy Hiew Kar Yi & Pan Yan Teng; M/s Harold & Lam Partnership
- For the execution creditor/plaintiff - Harold Tan & Amy Hiew Kar Yi; M/s Harold & Lam Partnership
- For the execution debtor/defendant - Annesha Mary Koshy; M/s Edwin Lim & Suren
The Director General of Inland Revenue, being an important public authority, has a bounden duty to give reasons for transfer pricing adjustments, which is a complex matter and could never be straightforward. By failing to proffer any reasons or evidence, the DGIR is said to have acted arbitrarily and, as such, any decision flowing from such failure would amount to a breach of the principles of natural justice and procedural fairness.
Ensco Gerudi (M) Sdn Bhd v. Ketua Pengarah Hasil Dalam Negeri [2021] 9 CLJ 918 [HC]
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: Judicial review - Application for - Application to review decision of Director General of Inland Revenue ('DGIR') - DGIR initiated audit on matter already determined by superior courts - Whether earlier decision of superior courts binding on parties - Whether DGIR's decisions to raise tax assessments illegal and in excess of jurisdiction - Whether DGIR had duty to give reasons for decisions - Whether there were exceptional circumstances warranting judicial review application - Income Tax Act 1967, ss. 91(3) & 140A
NOORIN BADARUDDIN J
- For the applicant - Jason Liang, Anlynn Ng & Kellie Yap; M/s Wong & Partners
- For the respondent - Ahmad Isyak Mohd Hassan; SRC & Mohammad Danial Ahmad; RC
Mengambil kira s. 154 Kanun Tatacara Jenayah, satu pertuduhan di bawah s. 217 Kanun Keseksaan mesti menerangkan bentuk pengingkaran perintah undang-undang yang dikata dilakukan oleh tertuduh serta undang-undang yang dilanggari beliau. Kegagalan berbuat demikian memudaratkan kes tertuduh dan boleh menjurus kepada kegagalan keadilan; ia tidak boleh dibaiki atau diselamatkan oleh keterangan yang dikemukakan semasa perbicaraan, sekaligus mewajarkan pelepasan dan pembebasan tertuduh.
Muhammad Effendy Saleh lwn. PP [2021] 9 CLJ 943 [HC]
PROSEDUR JENAYAH: Pertuduhan - Kecacatan - Kanun Keseksaan, s. 217 - Mengingkari perintah undang-undang untuk menyelamat seseorang daripada dihukum - Kegagalan menyebut perbuatan yang menjadi inti pati kesalahan - Kegagalan menyebut undang-undang yang dilanggari - Sama ada menjurus pada kegagalan keadilan - Sama ada mewajarkan pelepasan dan pembebasan tertuduh - Kanun Tatacara Jenayah, s. 154
WAN AHMAD FARID WAN SALLEH H
- Bagi pihak perayu - Sukri Hj Mohamed & Syed Muhammad Syafiq Syed Abu Bakar; T/n Wan Haron Sukri & Nordin
- Bagi pihak responden - Hajarul Falenna Ittah Abu Bakar Adli; TPR
The plaintiff in an accident case must discharge his burden of proof and prove, on a balance of probabilities, that the accident was caused by the defendant and that the injuries and damages he suffered were a result of and/or caused by the accident as required under s. 101 of the Evidence Act 1950. The fact that a defendant submitted that it had no case to answer and called no witnesses and led no evidence did not absolve the plaintiff from discharging its burden of proof in law as the burden remained with the plaintiff to prove its case. The Sessions Court Judge clearly did not have a sufficient appreciation of the law and had ignored oral evidence of witnesses, police reports and findings of the police and the results of the inquest investigation. The Sessions Court Judge was plainly wrong in finding that the plaintiffs had proved its case against the defendants, hence, her decision that the defendants were 100% liable ought to be set aside.
Pacific & Orient Insurance Co Bhd v. Tang Loon Pau & Ors [2021] 9 CLJ 952 [HC]
INSURANCE: Liability - Road accident - Apportionment of liability - Insurance company appealed against decision of Sessions Court Judge ('SCJ') allowing plaintiffs' claim against defendants for hit and run accident involving motorcycle ridden by plaintiff and deceased wife - Whether first defendant's car hit plaintiff's motorcycle - Whether plaintiffs discharged burden of proof and proved on balance of probabilities its case against defendants - Defendants chose to submit no case to answer - Discrepancies in evidence - Whether SCJ had sufficient judicial appreciation of evidence - Whether finding of 100% liability against defendants ought to be set aside
ROAD TRAFFIC: Accident - Liability - Apportionment of liability - Insurance company appealed against decision of Sessions Court Judge ('SCJ') allowing plaintiffs' claim against defendants for hit and run accident involving motorcycle ridden by plaintiff and deceased wife - Whether first defendant's car hit plaintiff's motorcycle - Whether plaintiffs discharged burden of proof and proved on balance of probabilities its case against defendants - Defendants chose to submit no case to answer - Discrepancies in evidence - Whether SCJ had sufficient judicial appreciation of evidence - Whether finding of 100% liability against defendants ought to be set aside
ROAD TRAFFIC: Accident - Damages - Quantum of - Claim for - Dislocation to first plaintiff's right patella and injury to knee ligaments - Whether caused by accident - Whether claim for first plaintiff's loss of earnings allowed
FAIZAH JAMALUDIN J
- For the appellant - Archana Devi Thirumalai & Ratnavathy Navaratnam; M/s Viknes Ratna & Co
- For the 1st-6th respondents - Khairul Aiman Kamar Rozaman; M/s G Dorai & Co
The word 'father' appearing in art. 14(1)(b), read together with the Second Schedule in s. 1(c) of Part II of the Federal Constitution, includes the mother and, therefore, children who are born out of the Federation, to mothers who are Malaysian citizens, are entitled to citizenship by operation of law if all the procedures similar to those followed by the father are adhered to.
Suraini Kempe & Ors v. Kerajaan Malaysia & Ors [2021] 9 CLJ 979 [HC]
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Citizenship - Citizenship by operation of law - Citizenship of children born to Malaysian citizen mothers but out of Federation - Whether art. 14(1)(b), read together with Second Schedule in s. 1(c) of Part II of Federal Constitution discriminatory towards Malaysian citizen mothers whose children are born out of Federation - Whether ought to be read harmoniously with art. 8 of Federal Constitution - Whether word 'father' in impugned provision includes 'mother'
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Citizenship - Locus - Citizenship of children born to Malaysian citizen mothers but out of Federation - Locus - Malaysian citizen mothers whose children are born out of Federation seeking declaration that art. 14(1)(b), read together with Second Schedule in s. 1(c) of Part II of Federal Constitution, discriminatory towards mothers - Whether locus and legitimate expectation established - Whether there were grievances
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Citizenship - Jurisdiction of court - Citizenship of children born to Malaysian citizen mothers out of Federation - Malaysian citizen mothers whose children are born out of Federation seeking declaration that art. 14(1)(b), read together with Second Schedule in s. 1(c) of Part II of Federal Constitution, discriminatory towards mothers - Whether court seized with jurisdiction to hear matter
AKHTAR TAHIR J
- For the plaintiffs - Gurdial Singh Njar, Joshua Andran & Abraham Au; M/s Joshua Alvin Khoo & Yong
- For the defendants - Liew Horng Bin; SFC
Section 149(1) of the Labuan Companies Act 1990 ('LCA') is the main secrecy provision prohibiting disclosure of documents and information relating to the business and affairs of a Labuan company or foreign Labuan company. Section 146(3) of the LCA provides that civil proceedings relating to a Labuan company or foreign Labuan company referred to in s. 149(2) shall be heard in camera unless the court otherwise orders and the details of such proceedings are not to be published to other persons except with leave of court.
The Customs And Tax Administration Of The Kingdom Of Denmark v. Danidan Capital Ltd & Ors [2021] 9 CLJ 993 [HC]
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Disclosure - Proceedings - Leave - Application for - Allegations of multinational fraud - Fraudulent applications for refund of alleged withheld dividend tax - Applicant commenced recovery action for losses in various foreign jurisdictions - Application for leave to furnish, disclose and publish details of proceedings in High Court Labuan to foreign jurisdictions - Whether details of proceedings in High Court Labuan relevant to proceedings in foreign jurisdictions - Whether application ought to be allowed - Rules of Court 2012, O. 92 r. 4 - Labuan Companies Act 1990, s. 149(3) - Labuan Financial Services and Securities Act 2010, s. 178(4)
LEONARD DAVID SHIM JC
- For the plaintiff - Preetha Pillai, Vijay Raj, Alithea Wong & Kailash Kalaiarasu; M/s Skrine
- For the 12th defendant - Aik Yin Chien; M/s Izad Kazran & Co
- For the 25th, 26th, 33rd & 64 defendants - Abdullah Abdul Rahman, Derrick Moh; M/s Chooi & Company + Cheang & Ariff
- For the 27th, 28th, 35th, 36th, 42nd, 59th & 65th defendants - Gregory Ling & Vellie Nethi; M/s Ranjit Singh & Yeoh
- For the 29th, 30th, 34th, 39th & 66th defendants - Edwin Lim; M/s James Khong
- For the 31st, 32nd, 37th, 38th, 40th, 41st, 60th & 67th defendants - Jasmin Raj; M/s K Nadarajah & Partners Advocs
- For the 61st & 62nd defendants - Sylvie Tan & Izzaty Rosli; M/s Ariff Rozhan & Co
- For the 63rd defendant - Edmund Yee; M/s Lee Hishammuddin Allen & Gledhill
LNS Article(s)
GROUP COMPANIES — ALL FOR ONE AND ONE FOR ALL?* [Read excerpt]
by SM Shanmugam and Hooi Chung Wai** [2021] 1 LNS(A) cxxxivA DEEP DIVE INTO THE LAW OF COMPULSORY LAND ACQUISITION [Read excerpt]
by Voon Teck Sing* [2021] 1 LNS(A) cxlRE-THINKING THE DATA PROTECTION ACT 2010: REGULATING THE FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY [Read excerpt]
by Mohd Bahrin Bin Othman[i] Bryan Francis[ii] Mohammad Asyraf Bin Mohd Tasrib[iii] Muhammad Ashraf Bin Mohd Nor[iv] Nurul Izzah Binti Hesham[v] [2021] 1 LNS(A) cxli
Principal Acts
| Number | Title | In force from | Repealing |
| ACT 831 | Finance Act 2020 | The Income Tax Act 1967 [Act 53] see s 3, the Real Property Gains Tax Act 1976 [Act 169] see s 31, the Stamp Act 1949 [Act 378] see s 39, the Petroleum (Income Tax) Act 1967 [Act 543] see s 51, the Labuan Business Activity Tax Act 1990 [Act 445] see s 55, the Finance Act 2012 [Act 742] see s 63 and the Finance Act 2018 [Act 812] see s 65 | - |
| ACT 830 | Temporary Measures For Government Financing (Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)) Act 2020 | 27 February 2020 until 31 December 2022 except s 3; 26 October 2020 until 31 December 2022 - s 3 | - |
| ACT 829 | Temporary Measures For Reducing The Impact of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Act 2020 | Part I - 23 October 2020 (shall continue for a period of two years); Part II, Part III (Limitation Act 1953), Part IV (Sabah Limitation Ordinance), Part V (Sarawak Limitation Ordinance), Part VI (Public Authorities Protection Act 1948), Part IX (Consumer Protection Act 1999), Part X (Distress Act 1951) - 18 March 2020 until 31 December 2020; Part VII (Insolvency Act 1967) - 23 October 2020 until 31 August 2021; Part VIII (Hire-Purchase Act 1967) - 1 April 2020 until 31 December 2020; Part XI (Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Act 1966), Part XII (Industrial Relations Act 1967), Part XIII (Private Employment Agencies Act 1981), Part XIX - 18 March 2020; Part XIV (Land Public Transport Act 2010), Part XV (Commercial Vehicles Licensing Board Act 1987) - 1 August 2020 until 31 December 2021; Part XVI (Courts of Judicature Act 1964), Part XVII (Subordinate Courts Act 1948), Part XVIII (Subordinate Courts Rules Act 1955) - 18 March 2020 until 23 October 2020 (shall continue for a period of two years) | - |
| ACT 828 | National Land Code (Revised 2020) | 15 October 2020 pursuant to paragraph 6(1)(xxiii) of the Revision of Laws Act 1968 [Act 1]; Revised up to 14 October 2020; First enacted in 1965 as Act of Parliament No 56 of 1965 | - |
| ACT 827 | Currency Act 2020 | 1 October 2020 [PU(B) 476/2020] | - |
Amending Acts
| Number | Title | In force from | Principal/Amending Act No |
| ACT A1634 | Co-Operative Societies (Amendment) Act 2021 | 1 April 2021 [PU(B) 174/2021] | ACT 502 |
| ACT A1633 | Tourism Tax (Amendment) Act 2021 | 1 April 2021 [PU(B) 148/2021] - s 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20; and s 10 (only for new subsection 20C(3) of the new part VA of the Tourism Tax Act 2017 [Act 791]); 1 July 2021 [PU(B) 148/2021] - s 10 (except for the provision of new subsection 20C(3) of the new part VA of the principal Act) and 21 | ACT 791 |
| ACT A1632 | Service Tax (Amendment) Act 2020 | 1 January 2021 [PU(B) 716/2020] | ACT 807 |
| ACT A1631 | Sales Tax (Amendment) Act 2020 | 1 January 2021 [PU(B) 715/2020] | ACT 806 |
| ACT A1630 | Free Zones (Amendment) Act 2020 | 1 January 2021 [PU(B) 719/2020] | ACT 438 |
PU(A)
| Number | Title | Date of Publication | In force from | Principal/ Amending Act No |
| PU(A) 414/2021 | National Heritage (Declaration of National Heritage) (Heritage Object) Order 2021 | 5 November 2021 | 6 November 2021 | ACT 645 |
| PU(A) 413/2021 | Proclamation of Emergency (Sarawak) (Revocation) 2021 | 3 November 2021 | 4 November 2021 | ACT 000 |
| PU(A) 412/2021 | Poisons (Amendment of Poisons List) (No. 2) Order 2021 | 2 November 2021 | 3 November 2021 | ACT 366 |
| PU(A) 411/2021 | Price Control and Anti-Profiteering (Price Marking of Price-Controlled Goods) (No. 6) Order 2021 | 29 October 2021 | 1 November 2021 to 7 November 2021 | ACT 723 |
| PU(A) 410/2021 | Price Control and Anti-Profiteering (Determination of Maximum Price) (No. 8) Order 2021 | 29 October 2021 | 1 November 2021 to 7 November 2021 | ACT 723 |
PU(B)
| Number | Title | Date of Publication | In force from | Principal/ Amending Act No |
| PU(B) 558/2021 | Notice of Contested Election Legislative Assembly For The State of Malacca | 10 November 2021 | 11 November 2021 | PU(A) 386/1981 |
| PU(B) 557/2021 | Notice To Third Parties | 10 November 2021 | 11 November 2021 | ACT 613 |
| PU(B) 556/2021 | Notice Under Section 70 | 9 November 2021 | 10 November 2021 | ACT 333 |
| PU(B) 555/2021 | Notice To Third Parties | 9 November 2021 | 10 November 2021 | ACT 613 |
| PU(B) 554/2021 | Appointment of Judge of The Syariah Subordinate Court | 9 November 2021 | 6 October 2021 | ACT 505 |
Legislation Alert
Updated
| Act/Principal No. | Title | Amended by | In force from | Section amended |
| ACT 366 | Poisons Act 1952 (Revised 1989) | PU(A) 412/2021 | 3 November 2021 | First Schedule |
| PU(A) 142/2014 | Credit Reporting Agencies (Registration) Regulations 2014 | PU(A) 408/2021 | 1 November 2021 | Regulation 10; First Schedule and Second Schedule |
| PU(A) 206/2018 | Sales Tax (Imposition of Sales Tax in Respect of Designated Areas) Order 2018 | PU(A) 407/2021 | 25 October 2021 | Paragraph 2 |
| PU(A) 74/2006 | Administration of Islamic Law (Federal Territories) (Tauliah to Teach the Religion of Islam) Rules 2006 | PU(A) 405/2021 | 21 October 2021 | Rules 2, 4, 5, 12, 21, 22 - 27, new rules 22A, 22B, 25A, 25B, 25C and 25D; amendment of First Schedule and Second Schedule, new Third Schedule |
| PU(A) 77/1991 | Control of Supplies (Exemption) Order 1991 | PU(A) 399/2021 | 15 October 2021 | Paragraph 5 and Third Schedule |
Revoked
| Act/Principal No. | Title | Revoked by | In force from |
| PU(A) 323/2021 | Proklamasi Darurat (Sarawak) | PU(A) 413/2021 | 4 November 2021 |
| PU(A) 323/2021 | Proclamation of Emergency (Sarawak) | PU(A) 413/2021 | 4 November 2021 |
| PU(B) 485/2021 | Notis Di Bawah Seksyen 70 | PU(B) 516/2021 | 27 Oktober 2021 |
| PU(B) 485/2021 | Notice Under Section 70 | PU(B) 516/2021 | 27 October 2021 |
| PU(A) 343/2021 | Perintah Menteri-Menteri Kerajaan Persekutuan (No. 2) 2021 | PU(A) 383/2021 | Lihat perenggan 1(2) |