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Issue #9/2021
04 March 2021

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New This Week

CASE(S) OF THE WEEK

AMITABHA GUHA & ANOR v. PENTADBIR TANAH DAERAH HULU LANGAT [2021] 3 CLJ 1
FEDERAL COURT, PUTRAJAYA
AZAHAR MOHAMED CJ (MALAYA); VERNON ONG LAM KIAT FCJ; ZABARIAH MOHD YUSOF FCJ
[CIVIL APPEAL NO: 01(f)-35-11-2019(B)]
12 JANUARY 2021

(1) Section 49 of the Land Acquisition Act 1960 ('LAA') provides that an appeal may lie from a decision of the High Court to the higher courts, provided that the appeals must not relate to a decision comprising of an award of compensation; to underscore the finality of decisions on compensation, there shall be no further appeal on the matter. (s. 40D(3)).

(2) The right to late payment charges is in the nature of a substantive right, particularly so in the case of late payment charges under s. 32 of the LAA. As a general rule, statutory amendments that affect substantive rights do not operate retrospectively. The LAA is a special enactment dealing with the fundamental right to property under art. 13 of the Federal Constitution; as a general rule, such statutes should be construed strictly and any doubt should be resolved in favour of the landowner so as to give meaning to the constitutional approach of a person's right to his property.

(3) A landowners' entitlement to costs in the High Court is clearly circumscribed by s. 51(1)(c) of the LAA. If the landowners' claim exceeds the amount of the High Court award by more than 20%, then they are not entitled to any costs in the High Court proceedings. However, landowners are entitled to costs under s. 14(5) of the LAA which amount the Land Administrator is required to determine, such costs to include the valuation fee and expenses incurred in the proceedings before the Land Administrator.

LAND LAW: Acquisition of land - Award of compensation - Assessment - Quantum of - Determination of market value - Whether court to use 'any suitable method of valuation' to arrive at market value - Whether fit and proper case to award injurious affection - Calculation of date for late payment charges - Whether right to late payment charges a substantive right - Whether landowners ought to be awarded costs before Land Administrator and in courts - Land Acquisition Act 1960, ss. 14(5), 32, 40D(3), 48, 49, 51(1)(c)

LAND LAW: Acquisition of land - Award of compensation - Questions relating to decision of High Court on compensation - Whether decision final - Land Acquisition Act 1960, ss. 40D(3), 49


TONG SEK EE v. HO SHU JOON & ANOR [2021] 3 CLJ 119
COURT OF APPEAL, PUTRAJAYA
AHMADI ASNAWI JCA; AB KARIM AB JALIL JCA; NOR BEE ARIFFIN JCA
[CIVIL APPEAL NO: W-02(IM)-2210-10-2018]
18 DECEMBER 2020

Section 13A(1) of the Birth and Death Registration Act 1957 ('Act') is plain, unambiguous and explicit; if the child is a legitimate child, ordinarily the surname of the father may be entered. The word 'ordinarily' in s. 13A(1) of the Act simply means usually or normally or in the normal course of events, the child's surname should derive from his father. However, since s. 13A(1) of the Act does not preclude the registration of a legitimate child's name using the mother's surname, the surname could also be derived from the mother.

FAMILY LAW: Children - Surname - Legitimate child - Marriage dissolved days after birth of child - Child's name registered using mother's surname - Parties entered into decree nisi - Child's name in decree nisi used mother's surname - Father applied to change child's surname to follow his - Whether father estopped from raising issue of surname - Whether law allows legitimate child to carry mother's surname instead of father's - Births and Deaths Registration Act 1957, s. 13A(1)

WORDS & PHRASES: 'ordinarily' - Births and Deaths Registration Act 1957, s. 13A(1) - Surname of legitimate child - Natural and ordinary meaning of 'ordinarily' - Whether to mean surname of legitimate child is of father only - Whether provisions of s. 13A(1) preclude mother from registering child's name using her surname


APPEAL UPDATES  
  1. Khaw Eng Peng v. Goh Aik Lai [2019] 1 LNS 716 (CA) overruling the High Court case of Goh Aik Lai v. Khaw Eng Peng [Civil Suit No: 22-460-2008]

  2. Norshuime Baharudin v. Leong Yee Heng And Another Appeal [2019] 1 LNS 774 (CA) overruling the High Court case of Leong Yee Heng v. Norshuime Baharudin & Anor [2015] 1 LNS 123

LATEST CASES

Legal Network Series

[2018] 1 LNS 1525

PP lwn. SHAHAREEIL SAID & SATU LAGI

1. Rantaian barang kes tidak terputus semata-mata kerana barang kes dadah yang dirampas telah dileraikan bagi tujuan analisa. Barang kes dadah yang dileraikan adalah masih sama walaupun ia telah menjadi mampat semula.

2. Isteri tertuduh yang sekadar menjadi penumpang kereta yang dipandu oleh tertuduh di mana dadah berbahaya dijumpai tidak memainkan peranan aktif bagi membolehkan s. 34 Kanun Keseksaan terpakai.

UNDANG-UNDANG JENAYAH: Dadah berbahaya - Pengedaran - Dadah jenis cannabis sejumlah 96,542.42 g - Dadah-dadah dijumpai dalam bonet belakang dan di bahagian ruang kaki tempat duduk belakang penumpang sebelah kiri kereta yang dipandu oleh tertuduh - Pertikaian berkenaan identiti dadah - Dadah dileraikan bagi tujuan analisa - Tertuduh dalam keadaan cemas ketika serbuan - Kereta dibawa dari negara Thailand ke Malaysia - Sama ada barang kes dadah adalah masih sama - Sama ada rantaian barang kes telah terputus - Sama ada tertuduh mempunyai jagaan dan kawalan keatas dadah - Sama ada pendakwaan boleh bergantung kepada anggapan bertindan - Sama ada dadah adalah untuk tujuan pengedaran

UNDANG-UNDANG JENAYAH: Niat bersama - Pertuduhan pengedaran dadah - Dadah dijumpai di dalam kereta - Penumpang kereta dituduh bersama pemandu kereta - Penumpang merupakan isteri kepada pemandu kereta - Sama ada penumpang kereta mempunyai sebarang pengetahuan berkenaan dadah - Sama ada penumpang kereta memainkan peranan yang aktif - Sama ada penumpang kereta mempunyai milikan dadah - Sama ada elemen niat bersama telah dibuktikan - Kanun Keseksaan, s. 34

  • Bagi pihak tertuduh 1 - Ai Cha Ran Din Chee Ron; T/n Ai Cha Ran & Co
  • Bagi pihak tertuduh 2 - Ahmad Taufiq Baharom; T/n Abdul Halim Said & Co
  • Bagi pihak pendakwaan - Hazril Harun; Timbalan Pendakwa Raya, Bahagian Perundangan, Jabatan Kastam Diraja Malaysia

[2018] 1 LNS 1902

KHOR BEE GUAT lwn. ALIANZ GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY (M) BERHAD

Pengambil insurans perlu mendedahkan fakta sebenar secara jujur ketika membuat tuntutan di bawah polisi insurans. Apabila pengambil insurans gagal mendedahkan tuntutan secara jujur, maka berlaku pemecahan kepada terma-terma polisi yang mewajarkan penanggung insurans untuk menolak tuntutan insurans.

INSURANS: Tuntutan - Insurans motor - Penolakan tuntutan - Uberima fides - Kenderaan yang dinyatakan di dalam laporan polis berlainan dengan kenderaan yang dirujuk oleh pemandu ketika memberikan keterangan di Mahkamah - Data CBS yang diambil daripada kunci motokar menunjukkan motokar tidak dipandu selama beberapa minggu sebelum kemalangan - Sama ada plaintif telah mendedahkan fakta sebenar dengan jujurnya ketika membuat tuntutan di bawah polisi insurans - Sama ada wujud pemecahan kepada terma polisi yang mewajarkan penolakan tuntutan insurans

KETERANGAN: Dokumen - Peraturan keterangan parol - Saksi cuba membuat pembetulan kenyataan bertulis asal di dalam laporan polis ketika perbicaraan - Sama ada saksi boleh dibenarkan memperbetulkan kenyataan bertulis asal melalui keterangan lisan di Mahkamah - Akta Keterangan 1950, ss. 91 & 92

PROSEDUR SIVIL: Pliding - Pembelaan - Frod - Defendan mendakwa tuntutan plaintif berasaskan frod - Perkataan frod tidak dinyatakan secara spesifik di dalam pembelaan - Defendan sekadar menyatakan tuntutan plaintif dicurigai serta bercanggah dengan fakta dan palsu - Sama ada pernyataan yang diplidkan oleh defendan di dalam pembelaan menunjukkan tuntutan plaintif adalah berasaskan frod

  • Bagi pihak perayu - Suria Kumar DJ Paul & Renuka Paspanathan; T/n B Mohan, Raveen & Partnes
  • Bagi pihak responden - Leslie Bala & Yong Che Hong; T/n Othman Hashim & Co

[2018] 1 LNS 2108

WONG YOU FARR lwn. PP

Berkenaan kes rogol, pembelaan tertuduh bahawa tertuduh telah mati pucuk harus disokong oleh keterangan pegawai perubatan dan bukan berdasarkan keterangan tertuduh dan isterinya semata-mata. Apabila pembelaan gagal untuk mengemukakan atau mengajukan soalan mengenai isu mati pucuk kepada saksi pendakwaan serta mengemukakan sebarang keterangan perubatan, maka dakwaan sedemikian hanyalah satu pembelaan yang bersifat pemikiran terkemudian.

UNDANG-UNDANG JENAYAH: Rogol - Rogol statutori - Mangsa dirogol oleh majikannya - Mangsa memberitahu ibunya berkenaan perlakuan rogol tertuduh selepas beberapa hari - Kelewatan dalam membuat laporan polis dan pemeriksaan perubatan - Sama ada mangsa telah memberikan keterangan yang konsisten dan begitu meyakinkan - Sama ada keterangan mangsa disokong oleh keterangan saksi yang lain - Sama ada dakwaan bahawa tertuduh mati pucuk telah dicabar oleh keterangan mangsa - Sama ada kerelaan mangsa di bawah umur adalah relevan - Kanun Keseksaan, s. 376(1)

PROSEDUR JENAYAH: Pembelaan - Penafian - Kesalahan rogol statutori - Tertuduh mendakwa dia telah mati pucuk - Keterangan tertuduh berkenaan keadaan mati pucuk hanya disokong oleh keterangan isterinya - Tertuduh tidak mengemukakan keterangan perubatan - Pembelaan gagal mengajukan soalan mengenai isu mati pucuk kepada saksi pendakwaan semasa kes pendakwaan - Sama ada pembelaan tertuduh bersifat pemikiran kemudian - Sama ada keterangan tertuduh dan isterinya memadai untuk membuktikan keadaan mati pucuk tertuduh

PROSEDUR JENAYAH: Bicara - Perjalanan bicara - Pertukaran hakim bicara ketika pertengahan kes pendakwaan - Sama ada pertukaran hakim bicara telah mendatangkan ketidakadilan dan prejudis yang material kepada tertuduh - Sama ada tertuduh telah diberikan perbicaraan yang adil dan saksama - Sama ada perbicaraan semula adalah wajar

  • Bagi pihak perayu - Muhammad Rafique Rashid Ali & Fahmi Adilah; T/n Fahmi Zhafri Ashraf & Co
  • Bagi pihak responden - Nithtia Sivasamy, Bahagian Pendakwaan; Jabatan Peguam Negara, Pusat Pentadbiran Kerajaan Persekutuan

[2019] 1 LNS 348

EKRAM BUILDERS SDN BHD v. JABATAN KERJA RAYA NEGERI PERAK

1. A contractor has an obligation to carry out remedial work in respect of any defect or damage discovered during the defect liability period provided that there is a causal link between the defect or damage complained of with the material used or quality of the work done by the contractor which falls short of the requirements in the agreement.

2. Meetings, communications, discussions or continuous negotiations between parties will not constitute as acknowledgment of debt which give rises to a fresh accrual of action under s. 26 of the Limitation Act 1953.

CONTRACT: Building contract - Defects - Plaintiff appointed another contractor to remedy defects and claimed costs for remedial works from defendant - Whether defendant was required to carry out repair work in respect of any defect or damage discovered during defect liability period - Whether plaintiff was able to show causal link between defects or damage discovered with material used or quality of work done by defendant - Whether written instructions had been issued by plaintiff to defendant calling for remedial work - Whether issuance of written instructions calling for remedial work was a prerequisite to a commencement of action against defendant - Whether plaintiff was entitled to claim for balance sum from defendant after deduction of performance bond sum

LIMITATION: Contract - Accrual of cause of action - Recovery of damages for remedial work due to defects - Whether cause of action accrued when plaintiff exercised their right to performance bond or from expiry of defect liability period - Whether meetings, communications, discussions or continuous negotiations could constitute an acknowledgment of debt giving rise to a fresh accrual of action - Whether plaintiff's action was time barred

CIVIL PROCEDURE: Res judicata - Applicability - Issue of limitation was a sole ground for striking out application - Striking out application was dismissed and matter proceeded to trial - Whether there was element of finality on issue of limitation - Whether issue of limitation was res judicata

  • For the applicant - Norazali Nordin; M/s Ammar Aziz & Co
  • For the respondent - Teoh Chin Chong, Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri Perak

[2019] 1 LNS 1124

ESSITY HYGIENE AND HEALTH AB v. PRABA'S VCARE HEALTH CLINIC PRIVITED LIMITED

A plaintiff is entitled to expunge the defendant's impugned trade mark upon establishing a prima facie case of non-usage by the defendant as registered proprietor of the impugned mark during the relevant statutory period. The existence of the plaintiff's application to register the trade mark in Malaysia and registration of its trade mark in other jurisdictions are sufficient to meet the threshold of a person aggrieved to enable removal of the defendant's impugned trade mark which is not in usage.

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: Trade Marks - Expungement - Application to expunge from register - Trademark not in usage - Whether plaintiff met threshold of a person aggrieved - Whether plaintiff was desirous to expand trading of its products using plaintiff's mark in Malaysia - Whether it was incumbent upon plaintiff to demonstrate that it had sold products bearing plaintiff's mark in Malaysia prior to and during statutory non-use period - Whether plaintiff had conducted adequate and sufficient market surveys concerning usage of defendant's impugned trade mark - Whether plaintiff established a prima facie case of non-use by defendant as registered proprietor of impugned mark - Trade Marks Act 1976, s. 46

  • For the plaintiff - Su Siew ling & Amos Khaw Aik Ween; Zaid Ibrahim & Co
  • For the defendant - Foong Cheng Leong & Hee Pau Ling; Foong Cheng Leong & Co

CLJ 2021 Volume 3 (Part 1)

(1) Section 49 of the Land Acquisition Act 1960 ('LAA') provides that an appeal may lie from a decision of the High Court to the higher courts, provided that the appeals must not relate to a decision comprising of an award of compensation; to underscore the finality of decisions on compensation, there shall be no further appeal on the matter. (s. 40D(3)).

(2) The right to late payment charges is in the nature of a substantive right, particularly so in the case of late payment charges under s. 32 of the LAA. As a general rule, statutory amendments that affect substantive rights do not operate retrospectively. The LAA is a special enactment dealing with the fundamental right to property under art. 13 of the Federal Constitution; as a general rule, such statutes should be construed strictly and any doubt should be resolved in favour of the landowner so as to give meaning to the constitutional approach of a person's right to his property.

(3) A landowners' entitlement to costs in the High Court is clearly circumscribed by s. 51(1)(c) of the LAA. If the landowners' claim exceeds the amount of the High Court award by more than 20%, then they are not entitled to any costs in the High Court proceedings. However, landowners are entitled to costs under s. 14(5) of the LAA which amount the Land Administrator is required to determine, such costs to include the valuation fee and expenses incurred in the proceedings before the Land Administrator.
Amitabha Guha & Anor v. Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Hulu Langat [2021] 3 CLJ 1 [FC]

LAND LAW: Acquisition of land - Award of compensation - Assessment - Quantum of - Determination of market value - Whether court to use 'any suitable method of valuation' to arrive at market value - Whether fit and proper case to award injurious affection - Calculation of date for late payment charges - Whether right to late payment charges a substantive right - Whether landowners ought to be awarded costs before Land Administrator and in courts - Land Acquisition Act 1960, ss. 14(5), 32, 40D(3), 48, 49, 51(1)(c)

LAND LAW: Acquisition of land - Award of compensation - Questions relating to decision of High Court on compensation - Whether decision final - Land Acquisition Act 1960, ss. 40D(3), 49

 

 

AZAHAR MOHAMED CJ (MALAYA)
VERNON ONG LAM KIAT FCJ
ZABARIAH MOHD YUSOF FCJ

  • For the appellants - Ambiga Sreenevasan, Shireen Selvaratnam, Heng Yee Kiat & Lim Wei Jiet; M/s Christopher & Lee Ong
  • For the respondent - Siti Fatimah Talib & Etty Eliany Tesno; State Legal Advisor, Selangor

When there is a default in the schedule of payments in a loan facility under an Islamic banking contract, it would be unconscionable for a bank to introduce penalty by unilaterally increasing the rate of Ta'widh; there must first be an enabling provision in the facility agreements for the penalty to be charged. Absent such provision, it would be disingenuous for the bank to impose it under the guise of their Islamic Interbank Money Market ('IIMM') rate or the Bank Negara Malaysia Pro-rated IIMM Rate when contractually, Ta'widh had been fixed at 1% per annum and no written notice had been given to the borrower for its increase.
Pan Northern Air Services Sdn Bhd v. Maybank Islamic Bhd & Another Appeal [2021] 3 CLJ 34 [CA]

BANKING: Islamic banking - Loan facility - Principles for ta'widh - Correct rate applicable - Whether issue ought to be referred to Shariah Advisory Council - Borrower claiming for excess amount of ta'widh paid from bank - Whether limitation set in - Whether there was full accord and satisfaction with payment made barring borrower from claiming refund of excess - Whether an accord and satisfaction subject to reservation of borrower's right to challenge correctness of ta'widh charged - Central Bank of Malaysia Act 2009, s. 56 - Limitation Act 1953, s. 6(1)(a)

 

 

AB KARIM AB JALIL JCA
LEE SWEE SENG JCA
S NANTHA BALAN JCA

  • For the appellant - Sukhdev Singh Randhawa & Muhamed Fariz Mohd Ali; M/s Azlan Shah Sukhdev & Co
  • For the respondent - Andrew Chiew Ean Vooi & Mong Chung Seng; M/s Lee Hishammuddin Allen & Gledhill

The Interest Schemes Act 2016 ought not to be applied retrospectively in the absence of any express provision; such application would substantially impair the existing rights or obligations of parties; Section 2 of the Act, expressly excluded shares in a corporation from the definition of 'interest' and therefore, the right to the club membership, acquired by way of ownership of shares, could not be equated to an investment scheme.
Saujana Resort (M) Bhd v. Chin Cheen Foh & Ors And Another Appeal [2021] 3 CLJ 71 [CA]

COMPANY LAW: Shares - Valuation - Offer for share subscription under Companies Act 1965 - Share subscription entitles membership of Club - Whether shareholding constituted interest scheme within ss. 2 and 4 of Interest Schemes Act 2016 ('Act') - Whether Act applied retrospectively - Whether shares fell within definition of 'unlisted recreational Club' - Whether 'interest' under s. 2 of Act excludes shares - Whether application of Act would change nature and character of shareholding

 

 

BADARIAH SAHAMID JCA
LAU BEE LAN JCA
VAZEER ALAM MYDIN MEERA JCA

  • For the appellant - DP Naban, Bahari Yeow & Alex Choo; M/s Rosli Dahlan Saravana Partnership
  • For the respondents - Alan Adrian Gomez & Mervyn Lai; M/s Tommy Thomas

The Yang di-Pertua Negeri of Sabah acted within the permitted perimeters of his constitutional powers under the Sabah State Constitution in consenting to the dissolution of the Sabah State Legislative Assembly and signing the Proclamation of Dissolution of the State Assembly. Such proclamation and decision to dissolve the State Assembly are non-justiciable and are not amenable to judicial review. There are matters that are always not justiciable before the courts and the courts are entitled to dismiss such application for judicial review even at leave stage.
Tan Sri Musa Hj Aman & Ors v. Tun Datuk Seri Panglima Hj Juhar Hj Mahiruddin & Ors [2021] 3 CLJ 87 [CA]

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: Judicial review - Exercise of discretion - Dissolution of Sabah State Legislative Assembly by Yang di-Pertua Negeri of Sabah ('YDPN') on written request and advice of Chief Minister of Sabah - Whether dissolution of State Legislative Assembly non-justiciable - Whether amenable to judicial review - Whether written request valid - Provisions of Sabah Constitution

 

 

AB KARIM AB JALIL JCA
ABU BAKAR JAIS JCA
SUPANG LIAN JCA

  • For the appellants - Firoz Hussein Ahmad Jamaluddin, Tengku Fuad Tengku Ahmad & Wilson Chang; M/s FT Ahmad & Co
  • For the 1st respondent - Brenndon Keith Soh, Dayangku Fazidah Hatun Pg Bagul & Chee Chun Yen; Senior State Counsel, Sabah
  • For the 2nd & 4th respondents - Cyrus Das & Chung Jiun Dau; M/s Chung & Assocs
  • For the 3rd respondent - Suzana Atan & Narkunavathy Sundareson, SFCs

Section 13A(1) of the Birth and Death Registration Act 1957 ('Act') is plain, unambiguous and explicit; if the child is a legitimate child, ordinarily the surname of the father may be entered. The word 'ordinarily' in s. 13A(1) of the Act simply means usually or normally or in the normal course of events, the child's surname should derive from his father. However, since s. 13A(1) of the Act does not preclude the registration of a legitimate child's name using the mother's surname, the surname could also be derived from the mother.
Tong Sek Ee v. Ho Shu Joon & Anor [2021] 3 CLJ 119 [CA]

|

FAMILY LAW: Children - Surname - Legitimate child - Marriage dissolved days after birth of child - Child's name registered using mother's surname - Parties entered into decree nisi - Child's name in decree nisi used mother's surname - Father applied to change child's surname to follow his - Whether father estopped from raising issue of surname - Whether law allows legitimate child to carry mother's surname instead of father's - Births and Deaths Registration Act 1957, s. 13A(1)

WORDS & PHRASES: 'ordinarily' - Births and Deaths Registration Act 1957, s. 13A(1) - Surname of legitimate child - Natural and ordinary meaning of 'ordinarily' - Whether to mean surname of legitimate child is of father only - Whether provisions of s. 13A(1) preclude mother from registering child's name using her surname

 

AHMADI ASNAWI JCA
AB KARIM AB JALIL JCA
NOR BEE ARIFFIN JCA

  • For the appellant - Balbir Singh & Zakiah Zaki; M/s Najiana Wan Balbir
  • For the respondent - Ravi Nekoo & Parvinder Kaur; M/s Hakem Arabi & Assocs

The offence under s. 165 of the Penal Code was designed to criminalise a public servant obtaining a valuable thing, which can include an interest in such valuable thing, such interest being of a legal or equitable nature, for no consideration or for inadequate consideration and the person from whom the public servant had accepted the said gifts was known to the public servant to have had dealings or connection with the official function of his department.
Syed Afendy Ali Syed Abid Ali v. PP [2021] 3 CLJ 134 [HC]

CRIMINAL LAW: Penal Code - Section 165 - Public servant obtaining any valuable thing, without consideration, from person concerned in any proceeding or business transacted by such public servant - Whether ingredients of offence under s. 165 of Penal Code proved - Whether accused public servant - Whether accused accepted valuable thing for himself without consideration or adequate consideration - Whether person from whom accused had accepted gifts known to accused to have had dealings or in connection with official function of accused's department

 

 

COLLIN LAWRENCE SEQUERAH J

  • For the appellant - Hamidi Mohd Noh; M/s Syahrul & Hamidi
  • For the respondent - Norzilati Izhani Zainal; DPP

ARTICLES

LNS Article(s)

  1. SPORTS VIOLENCE, CONSENT AND CRIMINAL LAW – THE MALAYSIAN PERSPECTIVE [Read excerpt]
    by S. Santhana Dass* [2021] 1 LNS(A) xxviii

  2. [2021] 1 LNS(A) xxviii
    logo
    MALAYSIA

    SPORTS VIOLENCE, CONSENT AND CRIMINAL LAW –
    THE MALAYSIAN PERSPECTIVE


    by
    S. Santhana Dass*

    Sports injuries is on the rise with the increased pace, intensity, contact, speed and competitiveness of present-day sports. Though the majority of the cases are considered minor, the incidence of players being injured has increased manyfold[1] and this has resulted and can result in grievous injuries being caused on the field. If grievous injury results, the criminality of the act by the person causing it becomes relevant and the understanding of when criminal law comes into play will help players engaged in contact sports especially to know their rights and the defence they can rely on.

    When is it appropriate for criminal proceedings to be instituted after an injury is caused to one player by another player in the course of a sporting event? If criminal proceedings are instituted, is the defence of consent available to the player who caused the injury?

    . . .

    *LLB(Hons) University of Singapore, LLM (Sports Law and Practice) De Montford University, Leicester, England.


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  3. JUSTIFYING THE DOCTRINE OF REVERSE VEIL PIERCING: WHAT PURPOSE DOES IT SERVE? [Read excerpt]
    by Lim Tze Loong* [2021] 1 LNS(A) xxix

  4. [2021] 1 LNS(A) xxix
    logo
    INTERNATIONAL

    JUSTIFYING THE DOCTRINE OF REVERSE VEIL PIERCING:
    WHAT PURPOSE DOES IT SERVE?


    by
    Lim Tze Loong*

    INTRODUCTION

    The concepts of separate legal personality and limited liability are firmly intertwined within the doctrines of corporate law. This takes cognizance that the corporate personality of a corporation is a distinct one; it is a legal person, separate from its owners.[1] It is capable of entering into contracts and accruing debt. The debt belongs to the corporation. However, the doctrine of 'piercing the corporate veil' (traditional veil piercing) represents one of the rare exceptions, where the court will disregard the separate legal personality of the corporation to find its owners liable for the debts of the corporation.[2] Reverse veil piercing means the opposite; under that doctrine the corporation can be held liable for the debts of the owner instead.[3] Reverse veil piercing is a grey area where there is no uniformity to the rule.[4] It is riddled with ambiguity and receives different judicial treatment in the various states/jurisdictions of the United States. This paper argues that reverse veil piercing remains an essential doctrine. It is a viable remedy and is capable of overcoming its limitations.

    . . .

    * Advocate of the High Court of Sabah & Sarawak LLB (Leicester), Barrister-at-law (Gray's Inn), LLM (York), MBA (UKM), MACL (Michigan).


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  5. PREVENTING CHILD MARRIAGE PRACTICE IN MALAYSIA TO PROTECT CHIILDREN'S RIGHTS [Read excerpt]
    by Thogai Letchumy Malayandy*, Prof. Madya Dr. Shahrul Mizan Bin Ismail** [2021] 1 LNS(A) xxx

  6. [2021] 1 LNS(A) xxx
    logo
    MALAYSIA

    PREVENTING CHILD MARRIAGE PRACTICE IN MALAYSIA TO PROTECT CHIILDREN'S RIGHTS

    by
    Thogai Letchumy Malayandy*
    Prof. Madya Dr. Shahrul Mizan Bin Ismail**

    1.0 ABSTRACT

    Despite laws against child marriages, the practice remains widespread and has become a major problem in many developing countries especially in countries from Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, which includes Malaysia. In Malaysia, many are concerned about the issue of child marriage since it violates children's right to health, education, equality and a life free from violence and exploitation. As such, this study shall first expound on the legal definition of a child under Malaysian law and child marriage. Further, this study shall critically analyse the demographic and practice of child marriage in Malaysia. Besides that, this study is also an appraisal of the laws put in place by the Malaysian government to protect children from child marriage and whether such provisions are adequate to prevent child marriage. It will also look into the available International human rights laws which protect children from child marriage and will analyse to what extent this practice violates and/or clashes with the said international human rights law. This study concludes that there is a need to amend the current provisions to ensure that Malaysian children will be protected from child marriage in accordance with the international conventions, particularly, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 (UDHR), Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). This study adopts a qualitative analysis research methodology in which references are made to related literature, particularly, the Malaysian and international laws, international conventions, online journals, annual reports, news articles and other relevant documents.

    . . .

    * LL.B (Hons) UUM; Advocate & Solicitor (Malaya).

    ** LL.B (Hons) (IIUM), LL.M (Human Rights) (Nottingham), Ph.D (UKM); Advocate & Solicitor (Malaya) (Non-practising); Profesor Madya of Law Faculty, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia.


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LEGISLATION HIGHLIGHTS

Principal Acts

Number Title In force from Repealing
ACT 831 Finance Act 2020 The Income Tax Act 1967 [Act 53] see s 3, the Real Property Gains Tax Act 1976 [Act 169] see s 31, the Stamp Act 1949 [Act 378] see s 39, the Petroleum (Income Tax) Act 1967 [Act 543] see s 51, the Labuan Business Activity Tax Act 1990 [Act 445] see s 55, the Finance Act 2012 [Act 742] see s 63 and the Finance Act 2018 [Act 812] see s 65 -
ACT 830 Temporary Measures For Government Financing (Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)) Act 2020 27 February 2020 until 31 December 2022 except s 3; 26 October 2020 until 31 December 2022 - s 3 -
ACT 829 Temporary Measures For Reducing The Impact of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Act 2020 Part I - 23 October 2020 (shall continue for a period of two years); Part II, Part III (Limitation Act 1953), Part IV (Sabah Limitation Ordinance), Part V (Sarawak Limitation Ordinance), Part VI (Public Authorities Protection Act 1948), Part IX (Consumer Protection Act 1999), Part X (Distress Act 1951) - 18 March 2020 until 31 December 2020; Part VII (Insolvency Act 1967) - 23 October 2020 until 31 August 2021; Part VIII (Hire-Purchase Act 1967) - 1 April 2020 until 31 December 2020; Part XI (Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Act 1966), Part XII (Industrial Relations Act 1967), Part XIII (Private Employment Agencies Act 1981), Part XIX - 18 March 2020; Part XIV (Land Public Transport Act 2010), Part XV (Commercial Vehicles Licensing Board Act 1987) - 1 August 2020 until 31 December 2021; Part XVI (Courts of Judicature Act 1964), Part XVII (Subordinate Courts Act 1948), Part XVIII (Subordinate Courts Rules Act 1955) - 18 March 2020 until 23 October 2020 (shall continue for a period of two years) -
ACT 828 National Land Code (Revised 2020) 15 October 2020 pursuant to paragraph 6(1)(xxiii) of the Revision of Laws Act 1968 [Act 1]; Revised up to 14 October 2020; First enacted in 1965 as Act of Parliament No 56 of 1965 -
ACT 827 Currency Act 2020 1 October 2020 [PU(B) 476/2020] -

Amending Acts

Number Title In force from Principal/Amending Act No
ACT A1634 Co-Operative Societies (Amendment) Act 2021 Not Yet In Force ACT 502
ACT A1633 Tourism Tax (Amendment) Act 2021 Not Yet In Force ACT 791
ACT A1632 Service Tax (Amendment) Act 2020 1 January 2021 [PU(B) 716/2020] ACT 807
ACT A1631 Sales Tax (Amendment) Act 2020 1 January 2021 [PU(B) 715/2020] ACT 806
ACT A1630 Free Zones (Amendment) Act 2020 1 January 2021 [PU(B) 719/2020] ACT 438

PU(A)


PU(B)

Number Title Date of Publication In force from Principal/ Amending Act No
PU(B) 133/2021 Reservation of Land For Public Purpose For Lot 481054 Mukim Kuala Lumpur 3 March 2021 4 March 2021 ACT 828
PU(B) 132/2021 Reservation of Land For Public Purpose For Lot 21679 Mukim Batu 3 March 2021 4 March 2021 ACT 828
PU(B) 131/2021 Notice To Third Parties 1 March 2021 2 March 2021 ACT 613
PU(B) 130/2021 Revocation of Declarations of Quarantine Stations 2021 26 February 2021 27 February 2021 ACT 342
PU(B) 129/2021 Declaration of Quarantine Stations 2021 26 February 2021 27 February 2021 ACT 342

Legislation Alert

Updated

Act/Principal No. Title Amended by In force from Section amended
PU(A) 65/2021 Peraturan-Peraturan Pencegahan Dan Pengawalan Penyakit Berjangkit (Langkah-Langkah Di Dalam Kawasan Tempatan Jangkitan) (Kawalan Pergerakan Bersyarat) (No. 3) 2021 PU(A) 89/2021 3 Mac 2021 Jadual Pertama
PU(A) 65/2021 Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases (Measures Within Infected Local Areas) (Conditional Movement Control) (No. 3) Regulations 2021 PU(A) 89/2021 3 March 2021 First Schedule
PU(A) 64/2021 Peraturan-Peraturan Pencegahan Dan Pengawalan Penyakit Berjangkit (Langkah-Langkah Di Dalam Kawasan Tempatan Jangkitan) (Kawalan Pergerakan) (No. 3) 2021 PU(A) 88/2021 3 Mac 2021 Jadual Pertama
PU(A) 64/2021 Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases (Measures Within Infected Local Areas) (Movement Control) (No. 3) Regulations 2021 PU(A) 88/2021 3 March 2021 First Schedule
AKTA 612 Akta Pembangunan Sumber Manusia Berhad 2001 PU(A) 84/2021 1 Mac 2021 Jadual Pertama

Revoked

Act/Principal No. Title Revoked by In force from
PU(A) 59/2021 Perintah Lembaga Minyak Sawit Malaysia (Ses) (Pindaan) 2021 PU(A) 72/2021 16 Februari 2021
PU(A) 59/2021 Malaysian Palm Oil Board (Cess) (Amendment) Order 2021 PU(A) 72/2021 16 February 2021
PU(A) 22/2021 Peraturan-Peraturan Pencegahan Dan Pengawalan Penyakit Berjangkit (Langkah-Langkah Di Dalam Kawasan Tempatan Jangkitan) (Kawalan Pergerakan Bersyarat) (No. 2) 2021 PU(A) 65/2021 19 Februari 2021
PU(A) 22/2021 Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases (Measures Within Infected Local Areas) (Conditional Movement Control) (No. 2) Regulations 2021 PU(A) 65/2021 19 February 2021
PU(A) 21/2021 Peraturan-Peraturan Pencegahan Dan Pengawalan Penyakit Berjangkit (Langkah-Langkah Di Dalam Kawasan Tempatan Jangkitan) (Kawalan Pergerakan) (No. 2) 2021 PU(A) 64/2021 19 Februari 2021