CASE(S) OF THE WEEK
SPICON PRODUCTS SDN BHD v. TENAGA NASIONAL BHD & ANOR [2022] 4 CLJ 195
FEDERAL COURT, PUTRAJAYA
MOHD ZAWAWI SALLEH FCJ; ZABARIAH MOHD YUSOF FCJ; MARY LIM FCJ; HARMINDAR SINGH DHALIWAL FCJ; RHODZARIAH BUJANG FCJ
[FEDERAL COURT NO: 01(I)-5-03-2020(M)]
04 MARCH 2022
A landowner, despite having accepted the award of compensation by the land administrator without any objection, may still be entitled to intervene and participate in land reference proceedings, initiated by the paymaster who had filed an objection in Form N with regard to the award. The landowner as a 'person interested' under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act 1960, is entitled to safeguard its rights and interests as the outcome of the land reference proceedings will eventually have a bearing on the award.
LAND LAW: Acquisition of land - Reference to court - Landowner accepted award of compensation without objection - Whether entitled to intervene in land reference initiated by paymaster - Whether landowner obliged to lodge Form N with land administrator - Whether landowner 'person interested' to be added as party - Whether appearance in reference proceedings consistent with rights and interests under art. 13 of Federal Constitution - Whether landowner directly affected by objection by paymaster - Whether ought to be allowed to intervene in reference proceedings - Land Acquisition Act 1960, ss. 2, 37(1), (3), 38(3), 43, 44(1) & 45(2) - Rules of Court 2012, O. 15 r. 6
WORDS & PHRASES: 'person interested' - Land Acquisition Act 1960, s. 2 - Landowner accepted award of compensation without objection - Whether entitled to intervene in land reference initiated by paymaster - Whether landowner 'person interested' - Whether appearance consistent with rights and interests under art. 13 of Federal Constitution - Whether landowner directly affected by objection by paymaster - Land Acquisition Act 1960, ss. 37(1), (3), 38(3), 43, 44(1) & 45(2)
MEGA PALM SDN BHD & ANOR v.
HUN TEE SIANG (MENYAMAN ATAS KAPASITINYA SEBAGAI PEMEGANG JAWATAN DI PERSATUAN PENDUDUK COUNTRY HEIGHTS DAMANSARA, KUALA LUMPUR) & ORS [2022] 4 CLJ 248
COURT OF APPEAL, PUTRAJAYA
NOR BEE ARIFFIN JCA; S NANTHA BALAN JCA; MARIANA YAHYA JCA
[CIVIL APPEAL NO: W-02(IM)(NCVC)-1557-08-2021]
10 MARCH 2022
A fresh action is necessary to enforce a consent judgment if the compromise recorded in a consent order/judgment goes beyond the ambit of the original action.
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Judgments and orders - Consent order - Parties entered into consent order - Terms of consent order not fully honoured - Aggrieved party commenced fresh action to enforce consent order and/or apply for consequential orders or reliefs under consent order - Whether fresh action could only be filed when party is seeking to set aside consent order and not when enforcing it - Whether there was variation to consent order - Whether variation went beyond ambit of original action - Whether enforcement of consent order ought to be done in original suit
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Jurisdiction - High Court - Aggrieved party commenced suit and parties entered into consent order - Terms of consent order not fully honoured - Aggrieved party commenced fresh action to enforce consent order - Whether court seized with jurisdiction to entertain fresh action - Whether enforcement of consent order ought to be done in original suit
JUDICIAL QUOTES
“We will say at once that overturning our own precedent is a serious matter. This court must always respect its own precedents. The rule of legal precedence must be followed in the interest of certainty. Great sanctity must be attached to the finality of our judgment. This is not to say that this court should never depart from an earlier decision. We do not blindly honour stare decisis. While it is true that we can overturn our own precedent in exceptional cases where it is really necessary, as an apex court, we need to be cautious about departing from our own earlier decision especially in a case that concerns the interpretation of a legislative provision, lest we lose the trust of public by persistent shifts of laws. The law is about stability, predictability and certainty that allow the public and the business community to plan and organise their lives based on the previous precedent. A degree of certainty, consistency and predictability in the law is one of the foundations upon which our justice system operates. Therefore, we remind ourselves that it is of utmost importance this court adheres to its past rulings.” - Per Azahar Mohamed CJ in Tenaga Nasional Bhd v. Chew Thai Kay & Anor [2022] 2 CLJ 333
LATEST CASES
Legal Network Series
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[2020] 1 LNS 325
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SHEIKDAWUD M MOHAMED MUSTAFA & ANOR v. PP
1. The prosecutor has discretion in calling the witnesses who are essential to the unfolding of the narrative on which the prosecution case is established and the Court will not interfere with such discretion unless it can be shown that the prosecutor was influenced by oblique motive. When a particular witness is irrelevant to the prosecution's case, the non-calling of the said witness will not leave a gap in the prosecution's case.
2. In the absence of evidence on record indicating that the credibility of the said agent provocateur as a witness was seriously challenged and contradicted, a trial judge's finding that the said agent provocateur was a credible witness does not warrant appellate intervention.
CRIMINAL LAW: Dangerous drugs - Trafficking - Sale of drugs - Accused brought drugs to prearranged venue for purpose of selling - Whether act of accused falls within definition of trafficking although agreed conditions of sale had not been complied with - Whether sale was completed even though price has not been paid - Whether sale of drugs was completed as at point of arrest - Dangerous Drugs Act 1952, s. 2
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: Appeal - Appeal against conviction and sentence - Offence of trafficking dangerous drugs - Allegation that prosecution failed to call material witness - A real person who was involved in drug trafficking activities and was arrested on the same day but at a different time and place not called as witness - Agent provocateur who was called as prosecution's witness was able to confirm identity of accused as person who negotiated terms of drug purchase - Whether prosecution has discretion to call witness - Whether non-calling of irrelevant witness could leave any gap in prosecution's case - Whether prosecution was influenced by oblique motive - Whether there was suppression of evidence on part of prosecution - Whether findings of trial judge that agent provocateur was a credible witness warrant appellate interference
EVIDENCE: Statement - Cautioned statement - Effect of - Cautioned statement of witness recorded in relation to investigation into another case - Whether cautioned statement recorded in relation to another case could be tendered in instant case
- For the appellants - Hisyam Teh Poh Teik; M/s Teh Poh Teik & Co
- For the respondent - Gan Chee Keong; DPP, Attorney General's Chambers
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[2020] 1 LNS 331
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PEKAN NENAS INDUSTRIES SDN BHD v. FORESIGHT LAUNCH SDN BHD
1. A sale and purchase agreement of a property entered on an as-is-where-is basis and subject to any existing tenancy agreement will not be vitiated merely because the vendor is aware of the tenant's illegal conduct on the property. It follows that the illegality of a tenancy agreement cannot be used as the basis for a purchaser to terminate the sale and purchase agreement.
2. The rule that parties in litigation are bound by the four corners of their pleadings only applies to the parties but not to the Court. In the interest of justice, the Court may exercise its overriding discretion to allow a new point to be argued that was not raised in the pleading.
CONTRACT: Sale and purchase agreement - Termination - Agreement was entered to purchase property on as-is-where-is basis - Agreement was subject to any existing tenancy agreement - Substantial damage caused to property after execution of agreement as a result of fire and explosion arising from tenant's activities - Damage subsequently repaired - Purchaser terminated agreement based on subsisting tenancy agreement that was alleged to be illegal - Whether law presumes tenancy agreement between vendor and third party was for lawful purpose - Whether illegality of tenancy agreement could form a basis for termination of agreement by purchaser - Whether doctrine of frustration applies
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Pleadings - Departure from - Overriding discretion of Court - Interest of justice - Whether Court is bound by pleadings of parties - Whether Court could allow a new point not pleaded by parties to be argued - Rules of Court 2012, O. 1A & O. 92 r. 4
EVIDENCE: Adverse inference - Failure to call witness - Failure to produce relevant documents - Absence of efforts to fill gaps of witnesses' evidence - Whether evidence of witnesses called were adequate - Whether adverse inference may be drawn from silence and absence of requested evidence - Evidence Act 1950, s. 114(g)
- For the appellant/defendant - Gunasakaren Vinodsagaran & Wong Chan Hwa; M/s The Law Chamber of Vin Sa & Ian
- For the respondent/plaintiff - Lee Kok Phong; M/s M Scully
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[2020] 1 LNS 363
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PP v. XU RUN MARKETING SDN BHD
The definition of door-to-door sale under s. 2 of the Direct Sales and Anti-Pyramid Scheme Act 1993 ('Act 1993') involves seeking out prospective purchasers and negotiating with the prospective purchaser with a view of making a contract for sale. Hence, where a person is charged for an offence under s. 4 of the Act 1993 for engaging in a door-to-door business without license, it must be shown that there was a negotiation towards concluding a sale.
CRIMINAL LAW: Direct Sales and Anti-Pyramid Scheme Act 1993 - Section 4(1) - Offence of conducting business of direct selling without valid license - Accused was arrested during a raid in a premise tenanted by accused - No sale activity conducted at premises at time of raid - Whether accused had conducted a direct sale as defined in s. 2 of Direct Sales and Anti-Pyramid Scheme Act 1993 - Whether there was any evidence to show that accused was conducting a direct sale as defined in s. 2 of Act 1993 at his premise on date of raid - Whether there was any negotiation towards concluding a sale - Whether mere demonstration and services performed at premise amounts to a direct sale
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: Appeal - Acquittal and discharge - Acquittal at end of prosecution's case - Charge under s. 4(1) of Direct Sales and Anti-Pyramid Scheme Act 1993 ('Act 1993') - Offence of conducting business of direct selling without valid license - Accused was charged on basis he had promotional booths at several locations - Accused was arrested during a raid in a premise tenanted by accused - Whether accused could be charged on account of an alleged offence which was committed on a date not stated in charge - Whether there was sufficient evidence to support direct sale
WORDS AND PHRASES: 'door-to-door sale' - Direct Sales and Anti-Pyramid Scheme Act 1993, s. 2(a) and (b) - Whether both part (a) and (b) must be read conjunctively - Whether involves seeking out prospective purchasers and also negotiations with prospective purchaser with a view to make a contract for sale
- For the appellant - Loo Whooi Meen; M/s Karpal Singh & Company
- For the respondent - Ainy Suhailah Yunus; Deputy Public Prosecutor
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[2019] 1 LNS 2076
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PP lwn. SHARUL NIZAM AB RAHIM
Bagi kesalahan bawah s. 233(1)(a) Akta Komunikasi dan Multimedia 1998, pihak pendakwaan bukan sahaja harus membuktikan bahawa pernyataan-pernyataan yang telah dibuat di dalam media sosial bersifat menjelikkan tetapi juga kesemua pernyataan-pernyataan tersebut telah ditulis dan dikendalikan oleh tertuduh sendiri.
PROSEDUR JENAYAH: Rayuan - Pelepasan dan pembebasan - Kesalahan bawah s. 233(1)(a) Akta Komunikasi dan Multimedia 1998 - Pertuduhan penghantaran komunikasi berbentuk komen melalui aplikasi akaun Facebook yang bersifat menjelikkan - Dakwaan komunikasi bersifat perkauman - Siasatan pihak forensik PDRM terhadap laptop milik tertuduh yang dirampas gagal menjumpai sebarang pernyataan-pernyataan sebagaimana dalam kesemua pertuduhan - Sama ada terdapat keterangan yang cukup untuk mengaitkan tertuduh dengan pernyataan-pernyataan yang dipertikaikan - Sama ada tertuduh merupakan individu yang menulis dan mengendalikan kesemua penyataan-pernyataan yang telah diterbitkan dalam media sosial
- Bagi pihak TPR/perayu - Shashitah Mohamed Hanifa; Timbalan Pendakwa Raya, Kamar Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri Selangor
- Bagi pihak responden - Wan Muhamad Hafiz & Aimi Shazwan; T/n Afifah, Wan & Aimi Shazwani
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[2019] 1 LNS 2077
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SURESH MARRIAPPAN lwn. MENTERI DALAM NEGERI, MALAYSIA & YANG LAIN
1. Apabila borang I tidak mencukupi untuk pemohon mencatat alasan-alasan untuk membantah perintah tahanan, pemohon wajar dibekalkan dengan kertas yang berasingan untuk dikepilkan bersama dengan borang I tersebut, di mana kertas berasingan tersebut akan menjadi suatu tambahan kepada borang I.
2. Seorang pegawai siasatan yang telah dilantik oleh Menteri bawah s. 5(1) Akta Dadah Berbahaya (Langkah-Langkah Pencegahan Khas) 1985 tidak perlu membuktikan pelantikannya dengan melampirkan surat pelantikannya di dalam afidavit. Afidavit yang difailkan oleh pegawai siasatan tersebut semata-mata adalah memadai untuk membuktikan pelantikannya.
PENAHANAN PENCEGAHAN: Perintah tahanan - Habeas corpus - Dakwaan ketidakpatuhan bentuk representasi - Pemohon diberikan beberapa helaian kertas untuk menulis catatan representasi - Pemohon diberikan borang I sehari selepas pemohon dimasukkan ke pusat tahanan - Sama ada pemohon wajar diberikan kertas yang berasingan untuk menulis alasan-alasan bantahan terhadap perintah tahanan sekiranya borang I tidak mencukupi - Sama ada helaian kertas yang berasingan menjadi sebahagian borang I - Sama ada terdapat ketidakpatuhan kk. 3(4) dan 4 Kaedah-Kaedah Dadah Berbahaya (Langkah-Langkah Pencegahan Khas) (Prosedur Lembaga Penasihat) 1987
PENAHANAN PENCEGAHAN: Perintah tahanan - Habeas corpus - Pegawai siasatan mengambil masa selama 7 hari untuk menyerahkan laporan siasatan bertulis kepada Menteri - Pegawai siasatan tidak mengemukakan surat pelantikan di dalam afidavit - Sama ada pegawai siasatan telah mengemukakan laporan secara bertulis kepada Menteri dalam masa yang segera sebagaimana yang diperuntukkan bawah s. 54(2) Akta Tafsiran 1948 dan 1967 - Sama ada terdapat kelewatan dalam penyerahan laporan siasatan pemohon kepada Menteri - Sama ada pelantikan pegawai siasatan adalah sah - Sama ada afidavit pegawai siasatan adalah memadai untuk membuktikan pelantikan pegawai siasatan
- Bagi pihak pemohon - Nordiana Mahamad; T/n Tetuan KL Chee & Co
- Bagi pihak responden - Adilah Roslan; Pejabat Penasihat Undang-Undang Kementerian Dalam Negeri
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CLJ 2022 Volume 4 (Part 1)
To hold that the conduct of an accused amounts to a statement under s. 37B of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 would be to overstretch the language beyond its common usage. Conduct could not be considered as a statement under the section that requires caution to be administered before it could be admitted in evidence. The word 'statement' in s. 37B must be confined to 'something that is stated' or 'written or oral communication'.
Ariff Arhannan Che Udin v. PP [2022] 4 CLJ 1 [FC]
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | WORDS & PHRASES
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: Appeal - Appeal against conviction - Accused charged and convicted for trafficking in 721.26g cannabis - Accused sentenced to death - Conduct of picking up bag containing drugs and handing to police - Whether amounted to statement - Whether cautioned statement ought to have been administered - Whether evidence of conduct relevant and admissible under s. 8(2) of Evidence Act 1950 - Dangerous Drugs Act 1952, ss. 6, 39B(1)(a) & 37B
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: Statement - Cautioned statement - Accused charged and convicted for trafficking in 721.26g cannabis - Accused sentenced to death - Appeal against conviction - Conduct of picking up bag containing drugs and handing it to police - Whether amounted to statement - Whether cautioned statement ought to be have been administered - Dangerous Drugs Act 1952, ss. 6, 39B(1)(a) & 37B
WORDS & PHRASES: 'Statement' - Dangerous Drugs Act 1952, s. 37B - Whether confined to 'something that is stated' - Whether 'written or oral communication' - Whether includes conduct
VERNON ONG LAM KIAT FCJ
ABDUL RAHMAN SEBLI FCJ
ZABARIAH MOHD YUSOF FCJ
- For the appellant - Hisyam Teh Poh Teik & Kee Wai Lon; M/s Hisyam Teh
- For the respondent - Aslinda Ahad & Nahra Dollah; DPPs
Where the intention to specifically exclude certain beneficiaries is expressed in a testamentary instrument, the absence of a residuary clause would not entitle the beneficiaries intended to be excluded, to take under the will. The bequest will thus be shared among those whom the testator intended to benefit. As the testator's wishes are set in clear words, it behoves upon the court to ensure such wishes are implemented.
Kalwant Singh Ujagar Singh & Anor v. Jaswant Kaur Ujagar Singh & Ors [2022] 4 CLJ 21 [FC]
SUCCESSION
SUCCESSION: Will - Distribution of estate - Intention of testator - Exclusion of certain heirs as beneficiaries - Absence of residuary clause - Whether fell into partial intestacy - Whether property ought to be distributed according to will - Wills Act 1959, s. 18
TENGKU MAIMUN TUAN MAT CJ
ROHANA YUSUF PCA
NALLINI PATHMANATHAN FCJ
ZABARIAH MOHD YUSOF FCJ
HARMINDAR SINGH DHALIWAL FCJ
- For the appellants - Gopal Sri Ram, Harvinderjeet Singh, Sara Ann Chay Sue May & Yasmeen Soh; M/s Vin Law Co
- For the respondents - Jasvinder Singh & Vivek Sukumaran; M/s Asyraf, Vivek & Wee
Keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan bersifat muktamad dan mengikat bawah prinsip duluan, walaupun tiada alasan keputusan bertulis disediakan, khasnya apabila Mahkamah Persekutuan telah meneliti rekod-rekod rayuan yang difailkan dan mendengar semua hujahan yang dikemukakan oleh kedua-dua belah pihak sebelum membuat keputusan. Oleh sebab Mahkamah Persekutuan telah memutuskan, dalam kes terdahulu yang membangkitkan persoalan spesifik yang sama dengan kes ini bahawa s. 62 Akta Suruhanjaya Pencegah Rasuah Malaysia 2019 adalah sah dan tidak bertentangan dengan peruntukan-peruntukan Perlembagaan Persekutuan, kes ini tidak tergolong dalam persoalan undang-undang yang luar biasa sukarnya atau tidak pernah diputuskan sebelum ini. Keputusan tersebut adalah muktamad dan mengikat, walaupun tiada alasan keputusan bertulis disediakan. Oleh itu, ambang yang diperlukan bawah s. 417 Kanun Tatacara Jenayah tidak dipenuhi untuk mewajarkan prosiding perbicaraan di Mahkamah Sesyen dipindahkan ke Mahkamah Tinggi.
Lim Guan Eng lwn. PP [2022] 4 CLJ 42 [CA]
PROSEDUR JENAYAH | KETERANGAN
PROSEDUR JENAYAH: Prosiding - Pemindahan - Permohonan pemindahan prosiding di Mahkamah Sesyen ke Mahkamah Tinggi - Bangkitan soalan undang-undang - Hujahan bahawa soalan undang-undang hanya boleh dijawab oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan dan, oleh itu, prosiding harus bermula di Mahkamah Tinggi - Sama ada soalan undang-undang yang dibangkitkan mempunyai kesulitan luar biasa jika dibangkitkan di Mahkamah Sesyen - Sama ada soalan undang-undang yang dibangkitkan sudah dijawab oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan - Sama ada keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan mengikat walaupun tiada penghakiman bertulis - Sama ada pemohon berjaya melepasi ambang yang diperlukan untuk membolehkan prosiding perbicaraan dipindahkan - Kanun Tatacara Jenayah, s. 417
PROSEDUR JENAYAH: Penghakiman - Penghakiman tidak bertulis - Stare decisis - Sama ada keputusan mahkamah muktamad dan mengikat walaupun tiada penghakiman bertulis
KETERANGAN: Dokumen - Penzahiran - Permohonan mendapatkan pernyataan saksi - Permohonan pemindahan prosiding di Mahkamah Sesyen ke Mahkamah Tinggi - Bangkitan soalan undang-undang - Hujahan bahawa soalan undang-undang hanya boleh dijawab oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan dan, oleh itu, prosiding harus bermula di Mahkamah Tinggi - Dalihan bahawa undang-undang berkaitan permohonan mendapatkan pernyataan saksi bawah s. 51 Kanun Tatacara Jenayah tidak jelas - Sama ada soalan yang dibangkitkan baru dan unik - Sama ada terdapat keputusan terdahulu berkaitan soalan yang dibangkitkan untuk dijadikan panduan dan ikutan
NOR BEE ARIFFIN HMR
CHE MOHD RUZIMA GHAZALI HMR
HASHIM HAMZAH HMR
- Bagi pihak perayu - Gobind Singh Deo, Ramkarpal Singh & Mohd Haijan Omar; T/n Karpal Singh & Co
- Bagi pihak responden - Wan Shaharuddin Wan Ladin, Law Chin How & Francine Cheryl Rajendran; Jabatan Peguam Negara
It is not justified for the applicant to file an application for judicial review when there is in existence the specific remedy of appeal, as in this case, an appeal to the Special Commissioners of Income Tax against the decision of the Director General of Inland Revenue, more so, when there are no exceptional circumstances to allow such application. Hence, the challenge against the additional notices of assessment ought to fail as the DGIR had rightly exercised his statutory powers under the Income Tax Act 1967.
Seaport Worldwide Sdn Bhd v. Ketua Pengarah Hasil Dalam Negeri & Another Appeal [2022] 4 CLJ 59 [CA]
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | REVENUE LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: Judicial review - Application for - Application against decision of Director General of Inland Revenue in imposing additional assessment - Grant of prohibition order by High Court while appeal to Special Commissioners of Income Tax still pending - Whether applicant exhausted domestic appeal process under s. 99(1) of Income Tax Act 1967 - Whether special circumstances existed to allow by-passing of alternative remedy - Whether additional assessment made pursuant to statutory powers - Whether excess or absence of jurisdiction in assessment of tax proven - Whether High Court erred in granting prohibition order
REVENUE LAW: Income tax - Additional assessment - Income under lease agreement - Whether revenue income - Whether lease agreement indicated disposal of leasehold interest in land - Whether transaction mere lease of land - Whether fell within definition of 'project development' under reg. 3 of Income Tax (Property Development) Regulations 2007 - Whether imposition of penalty in accordance with law - Income Tax Act 1967, ss. s. 4(a), (d), 33(1), 113(2)(a) & (b)
SURAYA OTHMAN JCA
LEE HENG CHEONG JCA
NORDIN HASSAN JCA
(Civil Appeal No: J-01(IM)-323-07-2020)
- For the appellant - Anand Raj & Abhilaash Subramaniam; M/s Shearn Delamore & Co
- For the respondent - Nor Mareza Mat Rejab & Syazana Safiah Rozman; FCs
(Civil Appeal No: J-01(A)-352-08-2020)
- For the appellant - Nor Mareza Mat Rejab & Syazana Safiah Rozman; FCs For the
- respondent - Anand Raj & Abhilaash Subramaniam; M/s Shearn Delamore & Co
The power of the court to grant bail is as determined by law. The court merely exercises its powers provided by validly and constitutionally-passed law and if those powers are not granted, it could not then be said that there is an usurpation of the judicial power of the court. Section 41B of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 ('DDA') is indeed constitutional and does not in any way curtail an accused's right to access to justice. Parliament is after all competent to pass a law that is discriminatory so long as the law is proportionate to the objective it seeks to achieve. Whilst an accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty, there is a clear need to mitigate flight risks. The creation of class of persons under s. 41B of the DDA ie, those prohibited from accessing bail, is proportionate and justified, taking into account the objective of that law.
Balachandran K Arujunan & Anor v. PP [2022] 4 CLJ 82 [HC]
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: Bail - Application for - Application for bail premised on medical issues and gender - Appeal against Magistrate's decision - Magistrate denied bail - Whether s. 41B of Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 amounted to usurpation of judicial power of court - Whether s. 41B ultra vires arts. 4, 5, 8 and 121 of Federal Constitution - Whether there was presumption of constitutionality of s. 41B - Exercise and limits of judicial power to grant or not to grant bail - Whether s. 41B took precedence over s. 388(1) of Criminal Procedure Code
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Federal Constitution - Constitutionality - Constitutionality of s. 41B of Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 - Whether s. 41B unconstitutional as not passed pursuant to art. 149 of Federal Constitution - Whether s. 41B amounted to usurpation of judicial power of court - Whether s. 41B ultra vires arts. 4, 5, 8 and 121 of Federal Constitution - Whether applicant denied right to access to justice
MOHD RADZI ABDUL HAMID JC
- For the applicants - N Sivananthan & Nabila Habib; M/s Sivananthan
- For the respondent - Khairul Anuar Abdul Halim, Noor Azura Zulkifle & Yazid Mustaqim Roslan; DPPs
When a leave application for judicial review has been granted for specific prayers and the matter is currently at the substantive stage, any amendment to be made to it must be made within the time allowed to apply for leave. In the absence of any prayer for extension of time, the court is not seized with the jurisdiction to entertain any application to amend. Furthermore, when the declaration sought is not a new matter arising out of the affidavits of the parties, the statement is not open to amendment because the condition under O. 53 r. 7 of the Rules of Court 2012 had not been fulfilled.
Detik Hartamas Sdn Bhd v. Ketua Pengarah Hasil Dalam Negeri [2022] 4 CLJ 112 [HC]
CIVIL PROCEDURE
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Amendment - Leave to amend - Application for leave to amend to insert new prayer or ground for judicial review - Whether there was application for extension of time - Whether applicant may enlarge reliefs prayed for in leave application once leave for judicial review granted - Whether O. 53 r. 7 of Rules of Court 2012 fulfilled - Whether court seized with jurisdiction to entertain application to amend
- For the applicant - Saravana Kumar & Nur Amira Ahmad Azhar; M/s Rosli Dahlan Saravana Partnership
- For the respondent - Normareza Mat Rejab & Syazana Safiah Rosman; SFCs
In a case where the accused is charged under s. 323 of the Penal Code for allegedly causing hurt to a child and the evidence presented is in toto based on circumstantial evidence, it is pivotal to determine the specific time frame that the injury is said to have been caused, as doubts may arise as to whether the child was indeed in the care of the accused during the specific time frame given by the forensic specialist. As it is a fundamental principle of criminal law that an accused can only be found guilty once a case is proved beyond reasonable doubt, a case based entirely on suspicion alone could ultimately lead to an acquittal.
Mas Haini Mohd Zaini v. PP [2022] 4 CLJ 125 [HC]
CRIMINAL LAW | CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CRIMINAL LAW: Penal Code - Section 323 - Voluntarily causing hurt to a child - Allegation of - Appeal against conviction and sentence - Whether prosecution's case rested purely on circumstantial evidence - Whether evidence led by prosecution within specified time frame - Credibility of witnesses - Whether there was doubt as to truthfulness and veracity of witnesses - Whether conduct of accused consistent with her innocence - Drafting of charge - Whether appellate interference justified - Whether accused ought to be acquitted and discharged
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: Appeal - Appeal against conviction and sentence - Accused charged pursuant to s. 323 of Penal Code - Voluntarily causing hurt to a child - Whether prosecution's case rested purely on circumstantial evidence - Whether evidence led by prosecution within specified time frame - Credibility of witnesses - Whether there was doubt as to truthfulness and veracity of witnesses - Whether conduct of accused consistent with her innocence - Drafting of charge - Whether appellate interference justified - Whether accused ought to be acquitted and discharged
- For the appellant - Arafas Abdul Razak & Muhaimin Hashim; M/s Arafas & Jannah
- For the respondent - Aisyah Al Humairah Kamaruzaman; DPP
The right of the defence to automatic disclosure of statements of witness or upon request, where such witnesses are offered to the defence at the close of prosecution case, must await legislative intervention. The decision of this court was made on very restricted, limited and confined facts peculiar to this case, namely, the advanced age of the witness which may affect his recollection of events, the futility of interviewing him in light of his advanced age, the fact that his evidence for the defence might well influence the outcome of the charge against the appellant. This decision did not decide that, as a general rule, statements of witnesses offered to the defence at the close of the prosecution case, must be supplied to the defence.
Vasanta Amarasekera v. PP [2022] 4 CLJ 148 [HC]
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: Statement - Copy of statement of witness - Application for prosecution to provide copy of statement of witness offered by prosecution - Criminal Procedure Code, s. 112 - Applicant charged under s. 467 of Penal Code for forging will belonging to deceased - Witness offered at close of prosecution's case - Request for copy of s. 112 statement rejected by prosecution - Application to Magistrate's Court to provide copy s. 112 statement dismissed - Whether applicant had right of law to be furnished with copy of s. 112 statement - Whether prosecution had common law duty to disclose and provide 'unused materials' to applicant - Whether s. 112 statement 'privileged' document - Whether necessary and/or desirable for s. 112 statement to be furnished to applicant - Whether highly prejudicial to applicant if disclosure of s. 112 statement refused - Whether applicant denied right to fair trial
COLLIN LAWRENCE SEQUERAH J
- For the appellant - Alex Nandaseri De Silva, Quek Yiing Huey, Amrit Pal Singh, Angeline Tay Lee Yin & Ng Jun Wei; M/s Bodipalar Ponnudurai De Silva
- For the respondent - Izalina Abdullah & Nur Ashikin Mokhtar; DPPs
ARTICLES
LNS Article(s)
ROLE OF ARBITRATOR AND JUDGE: IS IT THE SAME?* [Read excerpt]
by Prof. Datuk Dr. Hj. Hamid Sultan bin Abu Backer** [2022] 1 LNS(A) xlv
[2022] 1 LNS(A) xlv
MALAYSIA
ROLE OF ARBITRATOR AND JUDGE: IS IT THE SAME?*
by
Prof. Datuk Dr. Hj. Hamid Sultan bin Abu Backer**
Abstract
This article will profess that the role of an arbitrator and that of a judge in civil and commercial disputes in reaching the final decision is one and the same, but the methodology employed to derive at the decision may differ.
The proposition advocated above is not one without its own controversies on the basis that the arbitrator is only bound by the party autonomy concept with the rules and laws applicable to arbitration proceedings. In addition, the rules of court and that of evidence of the National Court are not relevant to the arbitrator unless the parties have agreed to its application.[1]
In contrast, a judge is not bound by the party autonomy concept. His obligation is to decide according to the rule of law of the State, taking into consideration rules of evidence as well as other relevant law and legal principles in coming to a decision. However, the judge, as a matter of procedure, can at his discretion restrict the scope of legal disputes as agreed by the parties.
. . .
PRINCIPLE OF 'GREATEST GOOD FOR THE GREATEST NUMBER' DURING COVID-19: COMPARISON TO IMMANUEL KANT'S ETHICS THEORY [Read excerpt]
by Ainnur Annisa binti Abdul Razak[i]Syafiqah Hanan binti Sulaiman[ii]Shahrul Mizan bin Ismail[iii] [2022] 1 LNS(A) xlvi
[2022] 1 LNS(A) xlvi
MALAYSIA
PRINCIPLE OF 'GREATEST GOOD FOR THE GREATEST NUMBER' DURING COVID-19:
COMPARISON TO IMMANUEL KANT'S ETHICS THEORY
by
Ainnur Annisa binti Abdul Razak[i]
Syafiqah Hanan binti Sulaiman[ii]
Shahrul Mizan bin Ismail[iii]
ABSTRACT
COVID-19 is a pandemic that is presently affecting the world. Medical supplies have grown scarce due to the large number of cases reported each day throughout the world. It gets to the point that citizens are denied admission to hospitals, both public and private, to receive adequate treatment. As a result, the goal of this study is to see if the health worker's principle of 'greatest good for the greatest number' in refusing the patients' rights to treatment is ethically acceptable according to Immanuel Kant's theory. Kant's three components of the categorical imperative consisting of the formula of universal law, the formula of human ends in itself, and the formula of autonomy, are famous for determining whether an act is moral or immoral. This principle adheres to the utilitarianism concept; thus, this article will examine whether the public will benefit more if doctors are allowed to choose which patients to treat and if sacrificing a few individuals to benefit society is morally tolerable under Kant's view. This study concludes that the medical practice during COVID-19 is not in line with the categorical imperative approach by Immanuel Kant but could be justified based on the utilitarianism view, namely the 'greatest good for the greatest number'.
. . .
STRENGTHENING THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR CYBERBULLYING AND CYBERCRIME IN MALAYSIA [Read excerpt]
by Dr Heama Latha Nair[i]Dr Ambikai S T Singam[ii] [2022] 1 LNS(A) xlvii
[2022] 1 LNS(A) xlvii
MALAYSIA
STRENGTHENING THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR CYBERBULLYING AND CYBERCRIME IN MALAYSIA
by
Dr Heama Latha Nair[i]
Dr Ambikai S T Singam[ii]
ABSTRACT
The rapid growth and availability of information and communication technology (ICT) have led traditional bullying and harassment activities to appear on the internet. With the rapid development and availability of modern information technology in many parts of the world, including Malaysia, cyberbullying has become a major concern in recent decades. This study will identify the distinctive features of cyberbullying, which include the high degree of anonymity, the power imbalance between the offender and the victim, the potentially public nature of cyberbullying and the victim's defenselessness, and the high probability of repetition, with anonymity being one of the unique features of cyberbullying. Erstwhile, bullying could be seen either physically or verbally, as opposed to today's approach, which is attributed significantly to the use of social media as a result of technological modernisation.
. . .
LEGISLATION HIGHLIGHTS
Principal Acts
Amending Acts
| Number |
Title |
In force from |
Principal/Amending Act No |
| ACT A1649 |
Patents (Amendment) Act 2022 |
18 March 2022 [PU(B) 168/2022] except s 14, para 26(a), s 45 and 47, para 48(a), s 55 and para 57(b) |
ACT 291 |
| ACT A1648 |
Occupational Safety and Health (Amendment) Act 2022 |
Not Yet In Force |
ACT 514 |
| ACT A1647 |
Malaysia Deposit Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act 2022 |
22 February 2022 [PU(B) 120/2022] except sections 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26 and 27 |
ACT 720 |
| ACT A1646 |
Wildlife Conservation (Amendment) Act 2022 |
Not Yet In Force |
ACT 716 |
| ACT A1645 |
Copyright (Amendment) Act 2022 |
18 March 2022 [PU(B) 167/2022] except s 4, 5, 6 and 10 |
ACT 332 |
PU(A)
PU(B)
Legislation Alert
Updated
| Act/Principal No. |
Title |
Amended by |
In force from |
Section amended |
| PU(A) 34/2011 |
Malaysia Deposit Insurance Corporation (Differential Premium Systems in Respect of Deposit-Taking Members) Regulations 2011 |
PU(A) 24/2022 |
Assessment year of 2022 |
Regulations 2 - 7, 9 and 10 |
| AKTA 291 |
Akta Paten 1983 |
PU(A) 63/2022 |
18 Mac 2022 |
Jadual Kedua |
| ACT 291 |
Patents Act 1983 |
PU(A) 63/2022 |
18 March 2022 |
Second Schedule |
| AKTA 291 |
Akta Paten 1983 |
AKTA A1649 |
18 Mac 2022 [PU(B) 168/2022] kecuali seksyen 14, perenggan 26(a), seksyen 45 dan 47, perenggan 48(a), seksyen 55 dan perenggan 57(b) |
Seksyen 3, 13, 14, 17B, 18, 19, 21, 23A, 25, 26A, 26B, 27, 28, 29A, 30, 31A, 32A, 33, 33A, 33B, 33C, 33D, 34, 34A, 35, 35A, 36, 37, 39, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 52A, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57(2), 59, 75, 76A,78F, 78G, 78N, 79, 79A(1A) & (1B), 80 - 84, 86, 86A, 87, 87A, 88 dan 88A - 88E |
| ACT 291 |
Patents Act 1983 |
ACT A1649 |
18 March 2022 [PU(B) 168/2022] except s. 14, para. 26(a), s. 45 and 47, para. 48(a), s. 55 and para. 57(b) |
Sections 3, 13, 14, 17B, 18, 19, 21, 23A, 25, 26A, 26B, 27, 28, 29A, 30, 31A, 32A, 33, 33A, 33B, 33C, 33D, 34, 34A, 35, 35A, 36, 37, 39, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 52A, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57(2), 59, 75, 76A,78F, 78G, 78N, 79, 79A(1A) & (1B), 80 - 84, 86, 86A, 87, 87A, 88 and 88A - 88E |
Revoked
| Act/Principal No. |
Title |
Revoked by |
In force from |
| PU(A) 449/2021 |
Road Transport (Prohibition of Use of Road) (Federal Roads) (No. 15) Order 2021 |
PU(A) 73/2022 |
1 April 2022 |
| PU(A) 159/2012 |
Copyright (Licensing Body) Regulations 2012 |
PU(A) 61/2022 |
18 March 2022 |
| PU(A) 127/2017 |
Malaysia Deposit Insurance Corporation (Order of Priority For Payments of Different Categories of Islamic Deposits, Determination and Classification of Assets and Application of Disposal Proceeds of Assets in the Winding Up of Deposit-Taking Member) Regulations 2017 |
PU(A) 41/2022 |
1 March 2022 |
| PU(A) 182/2018 |
Perintah Pendaftaran Ahli Farmasi (Pindaan Jadual Pertama) 2018 |
PU(A) 486/2021 |
31 Disember 2021 |
| PU(A) 182/2018 |
Registration of Pharmacists (Amendment of First Schedule) Order 2018 |
PU(A) 486/2021 |
31 December 2021 |
|
