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Issue #22/2022
02 June 2022
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CASE(S) OF THE WEEK
MOHD ISMAIL SYED MERAH v. PP & OTHER APPEALS [2022] 5 CLJ 218 The discovery and seizure of cash monies amounting to RM1.3 million at the house of an accused who is a police officer earning between RM6,000 and RM8,000 a month and who is not known to have owned any business, coupled with the facts that he has also had dealings with illegal lottery operators, had previously purchased for his personal gain insurance and investments portfolios worth millions of ringgit and had failed to convincingly explain the sources of the monies or take reasonable steps to ascertain that the monies were not proceeds of unlawful activity, have all made his convictions under s. 4(1)(a) of the Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Terrorism Financing and Proceeds of Unlawful Activities Act 2001 safe and sound. Public interest also demands that a deterrent sentence be imposed; hence, the 4-year concurrent imprisonment sentence without any fine sentence imposed by the High Court on each of the eight charges is set aside, and substituted, effectively and substantively, with 10 years' jail and a fine of RM42 million in default 48 months' jail. CRIMINAL LAW: Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Terrorism Financing and Proceeds of Unlawful Activities Act 2001 - Section 4(1)(a) - Cash monies and jewellery suspected to be proceeds of unlawful activity seized at accused's house - Evidence of illegal gambling operators making payments to accused, a police officer, to protect their business - Whether monies used for accused's investment plans proceeds of unlawful activity - Whether prima facie case established - Standard of proof applicable - Whether accused's defence an afterthought - Whether accused succeeded in raising reasonable doubt on prosecution's case - Whether sentences meted out ought to reflect seriousness of offence - Whether there was special circumstance to grant stay of forfeiture of accused's seized properties CRIMINAL LAW: Sentencing - Offences under Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Terrorism Financing and Proceeds of Unlawful Activities Act 2001 - Section 4(1)(a) - Cash monies and jewellery seized at accused's house suspected to be proceeds of unlawful activity - Accused a police officer - Whether public trust betrayed - Whether public interest demands deterrent sentence - Whether there was failure to impose fine as required under s. 4(1) - Whether sentences meted out ought to reflect seriousness of offence - Whether there was special circumstance to grant stay of forfeiture of accused's seized properties JUDICIAL QUOTES“I think it needs no explanation that a writ of possession and a committal action are execution or enforcement proceedings to deal with non-adherences to any judgment or order of the court. A writ of possession is not by itself an order of the court. As such, a failure to adhere to a writ of possession cannot be a basis to initiate contempt proceedings within the contemplation of O. 45 of the RC 2012. The very writ of possession or execution is meant and designed to enforce any issues of compliance with any judgment or order of the court. It is manifest that there are two prescribed methods of enforcement under O. 45 r. 3, namely by way of writ of possession and where r. 5 applies, an order of committal. The entire scheme of O. 45, in particular rr. 3 and 5 concern the execution of a judgment or an order of the court.” – per Mohd Nazlan Ghazali J in Harta Bitara Development Sdn Bhd v. Khairuddin Hj Mustapa (President Pertubuhan Seni Silat Lincah Malaysia) [2022] 3 CLJ 106 LATEST CASESLegal Network Series
CLJ 2022 Volume 5 (Part 1) Section 15B of the Prevention of Crime Act 1959 (POCA) cannot operate to immunise all decisions made under POCA by use of the ouster clause therein. The ouster clause in s. 15B, in seeking to oust the jurisdiction of the court in relation to judicial scrutiny of preventive detention proceedings pertaining to acts of the Prevention of Crime Board constituted under the Act (save for failure to comply with procedural requirements thereof), purports to exclude habeas corpus notwithstanding the express safeguards housed in arts. 4 and 5(2) of the Federal Constitution. It purports to strip the court of its constitutionally entrenched supervisory judicial function, and is thus unconstitutional, void and of no effect. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: Judicial review - Habeas corpus - Application by detainee under preventive detention pursuant to s. 19A(1) of Prevention of Crime Act 1959 ('POCA') - Whether s. 15B of POCA seeks to oust jurisdiction of court pertaining to judicial scrutiny of preventive detention - Degree of judicial scrutiny - Whether limited to compliance with procedural requirements under POCA - Whether habeas corpus excluded from judicial scrutiny - Whether ouster clause inconsistent with arts. 4(1) and 5(2) of Federal Constitution - Whether ouster clause void and of no effect - Whether rendered court's powers of judicial review no longer restricted to reviewing merely irregularities CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Legislation - Constitutionality - Ouster clause under s. 15B of Prevention of Crime Act 1959 ('POCA') - Whether s. 15B purports to delineate jurisdiction of courts - Whether sought to restrict judicial powers in relation to preventive detention under POCA - Whether decision of Prevention of Crime Board immune from judicial scrutiny - Whether ouster clause inconsistent with arts. 4(1) and 5(2) of Federal Constitution - Whether ouster clause void and of no effect CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Fundamental liberties - Right to be heard - Habeas corpus - Application by detainee under preventive detention pursuant to s. 19A(1) of Prevention of Crime Act 1959 - Whether afforded full opportunity to be heard - Contradictory versions pertaining to request for witness by detainee - Whether contradictions could be resolved by evidence - Whether withholding of evidence gives rise to adverse inference - Whether detainee denied full opportunity to put forward representations - Whether amounted to breach of natural justice - Federal Constitution, art. 151
NALLINI PATHMANATHAN FCJ
For there to be an infringement of trade mark under s. 38(1) of the Trade Marks Act 1976, the impugned mark must be identical with or so nearly resembling the registered trade mark, and is likely to deceive or cause confusion to customers. In this case, although the plaintiffs were the registered owners of the ‘SkyWorld’ trade mark and the defendants were using the same generic name for their corporate and domain name, the defendants could not be said to have infringed the plaintiffs’ registered trade mark as, except for the oral resemblance, there was no real resemblance between the two. Likewise, the trade mark that the defendants had sought to register differed visually to a great extent with that of the plaintiffs’ trade mark, such that there was no likelihood of confusion or deception in the course of trade in relation to the two marks; there being no element of misrepresentation or passing off, the defendants therefore could not be said to have unlawfully interfered with the plaintiffs’ trade. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: Trade marks - Infringement - Allegation of - Whether corporate names and web domain name resembled registered trade mark - Whether audibly similar but visually different - Whether likely to deceive or cause confusion to customers - Whether element of infringement satisfied - Trade Marks Act 1976, s. 38(1) INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: Trade marks - Passing off - Allegation of - Whether there was misrepresentation and harm to products - Whether elements of confusion or deception established - Whether passing off made out
NALLINI PATHMANATHAN FCJ
Kepentingan awam memerlukan kemuktamadan dalam litigasi dan apabila perkara sama yang telah diputuskan meritnya, dibangkitkan semula, doktrin res judicata akan terpakai untuk menghalang tindakan tersebut. Dalam kes ini, permohonan kebenaran mengeluarkan notis pihak ketiga melibatkan perkara sama yang telah diputuskan secara muktamad di mahkamah terdahulu dan tiada pengecualian terpakai. Oleh itu, permohonan tersebut tidak wajar dibenarkan. PROSEDUR SIVIL
PROSEDUR SIVIL: Prosiding pihak ketiga - Tindakan - Rayuan terhadap kebenaran - Perkara sama dibangkitkan dan diputuskan dalam permohonan terdahulu - Sama ada merit permohonan didengar dan diputuskan secara muktamad - Sama ada prosedur sepatutnya adalah rayuan terhadap keputusan - Sama ada perkara permohonan res judicata - Sama ada estopel isu terpakai PROSEDUR SIVIL: Res judicata - Isu-isu, persamaan - Permohonan notis pihak ketiga - Rayuan terhadap kebenaran - Perkara sama dibangkitkan dan diputuskan dalam permohonan terdahulu - Sama ada merit permohonan telah didengar dan diputuskan secara muktamad - Sama ada prosedur sepatutnya adalah rayuan terhadap keputusan - Sama ada perkara permohonan res judicata - Sama ada estopel isu terpakai - Sama ada pengecualian doktrin res judicata dibuktikan
BHUPINDAR SINGH PK
(i) A bank account is not a 'thing' or 'property' that could legally be an instrumentality of offence under s. 3 of the Anti-Money Laundering, Financing of Terrorism and Proceeds of Unlawful Activity Act 2001 and therefore, could not be the subject of forfeiture under s. 56(1)(d); (ii) Neither s. 4B(a) nor (b) of the Common Gaming Houses Act 1953 could be legitimately used to establish the offence of online gambling as the language used in that provision is so plain and clear that it is incapable of conveying any other meaning beyond what it provides. CRIMINAL LAW | WORDS & PHRASES
CRIMINAL LAW: Offences - Money-laundering - Forfeiture of properties - Application for - Allegation that accused persons had committed predicate offence of participating in receiving proceeds from and making payments for unlawful activity of online gambling under s. 4B of Common Gaming Houses Act 1953 ('CGHA') - Whether bank account instrumentalities of offence under s. 3 - Whether could be subject of forfeiture under s. 56(1)(d) of Anti-Money Laundering, Financing of Terrorism and Proceeds of Unlawful Activity Act 2001 - Whether s. 4B of CGHA establishes offence of online gambling - Whether prosecution could rely on s. 4B of CGHA in proving predicate offence of online gambling - Whether property instrumentalities of offence - Whether forfeiture order should be granted CRIMINAL LAW: Offences - Online gambling - Common Gaming Houses Act 1953 ('CGHA'), s. 4B - Whether s. 4B(a) or (b) could be legitimately used to establish offence of online gambling - Whether prosecution could rely on s. 4B of CGHA in proving predicate offence of online gambling WORDS & PHRASES: Anti-Money Laundering, Financing of Terrorism and Proceeds of Unlawful Activity Act 2001 - Sections 3 and 56(1)(d) - 'thing' and 'property' - Whether bank account 'thing' under definition 'instrumentalities' - Whether bank account 'asset' under definition of 'property' - Whether bank account 'legal document or instrument' or 'deposits and other financial resources' - Whether bank account could be subject of forfeiture WORDS & PHRASES: Common Gaming Houses Act 1953 - Section 4B - 'deal' and 'transact' - Whether 'deals with' and 'transacts in' in s. 4B must refer only to acts concerned with business of trading in or servicing machine or instrument used in gaming but not act of gaming - Whether s. 4B(a) or (b) could be legitimately used to establish offence of online gambling
MOHD RADZI ABDUL HAMID JC
The legal burden to prove that the workman is not gainfully employed lay on the workman himself as this would be a fact that is within his knowledge. Once the workman testifies that he is not gainfully employed post-dismissal, the evidential burden to prove otherwise shifts to the employer. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | INDUSTRIAL COURT
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: Judicial review - Application for - Judicial review against award by Industrial Court - Constructive dismissal - Industrial Court ordered applicant be paid back wages - Compensation for backwages deducted by 70% - Factors taken into account - Exercise of discretion in making deductions for post-dismissal earnings INDUSTRIAL COURT: Dismissal - Award - Application for judicial review against award by Industrial Court - Whether workman gainfully employed after dismissal - Legal and evidential burden of proof - Whether burden laid upon workman or employer to prove workman was gainfully employed after dismissal
SU TIANG JOO JC
ARTICLESLNS Article(s)
LEGISLATION HIGHLIGHTSPrincipal Acts
Amending Acts
PU(A)
PU(B)
Legislation Alert Updated
Revoked
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