CASE(S) OF THE WEEK
LEE KAI WUEN & ANOR v. LEE YEE WUEN  7 CLJ 505
COURT OF APPEAL, PUTRAJAYA
MOHAMAD ZABIDIN MOHD DIAH JCA; S NANTHA BALAN JCA; DARRYL GOON SIEW CHYE JCA
[CIVIL APPEAL NO: J-02(IM)(NCC)-1315-09-2020]
26 MAY 2022
In Mareva type of injunction, a real risk of dissipation of assets is an essential ingredient, wherein the injunction purports to prevent a plaintiff from being cheated out of the proceeds of an action, should he be successful, by a defendant transferring his assets abroad or dissipating his assets within the jurisdiction. The need for evidence of a real risk of dissipation lies at the very heart of the jurisdiction and its raison d'etre. There is no exception to the rules, such that this ingredient may be presumed in any identified circumstances. Hence, to hold a real risk of dissipation of assets may be presumed is effectively to negate the need to actually establish that such a risk exists.
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Injunction - Mareva injunction - Allegations of misappropriation by shareholders of monies belonging to company - Shareholders caused customers of company to pay monies due to company into joint accounts belonging to shareholders - Whether there was direct evidence of any risk that shareholders might dispose of or dissipate assets or put assets beyond reach of complainant - Whether there was evidence of actual attempt of dissipation of assets - Whether vital ingredients before Mareva injunction may be issued established
COMPANY LAW: Oppression - Allegations of - Misappropriation by shareholders of monies belonging to company - Shareholders caused customers of company to pay monies due to company into joint accounts belonging to shareholders - Attempt to appoint someone privy to misappropriation as director of company - Whether there was misappropriation of company's funds - Whether tantamount to oppression - Companies Act 2016, s. 346
“Given the breadth and scope of art. 4(1) FC, it is untenable to describe the entirety of judicial power and the jurisdiction of the courts as being confined to the last two lines of art. 121(1) FC, namely that “... the High Courts... shall have such jurisdiction and powers as may be conferred by or under federal law.”
While it may well have been the intent of Parliament vide A704/1988 to seek to restrict or curtail judicial powers, that intent was not achieved. On an objective construction of the FC holistically it is evident that it is untenable if not impossible to read art. 121(1) FC in vacuo when deciding on the source, scope and ambit of judicial power. The only tenable construction that can be accorded to judicial power is that it subsists in more than just art. 121(1) FC, the foremost of which is art. 4(1) FC.
But these constitutional provisions do not and cannot abrogate judicial power in terms of the inherent jurisdiction of the court or the constitutional power of judicial review which is contained in art. 4(1) FC. This is borne out by a simple example. If indeed judicial power is confined to, and limited by, federal law as a literal reading of art. 121(1) FC may suggest, then how is that there subsists at the same time, power in the Judiciary or the courts to strike down that very same federal law if it is inconsistent with the provisions of the FC? It is contrary to any form of coherent legal rationale that it can be said on the one hand that judicial power is circumscribed by federal law, but on the other, hand, that self-same judicial power can strike down that very same federal law within the same Constitution.” – Per Nallini Pathmanathan FCJ in Dhinesh Tanaphll v. Lembaga Pencegahan Jenayah & Ors  5 CLJ 1
Legal Network Series
 1 LNS 682
KUALA IBAI PROPERTY SDN BHD v. CHANG JONG YU
1. In an application for removal of a private caveat on a piece of land under s. 327(1) of the National Land Code 1965, it is not a prerequisite for an aggrieved person to possess any registrable interest to qualify him to apply for the removal of the said caveat. It suffices for the aggrieved party only to show that his legal right or interest had been adversely affected by the entry of the caveat. The fact that the aggrieved party lacks a registrable interest in the land may be relevant when determining his right to lodge a private caveat, but it does not prevent him from removing caveats lodged on the land.
2. A relief seeking removal of a private caveat on a piece of land will be rendered academic when the caveator has withdrawn the caveat following the filing of the action by the aggrieved party. However, the said aggrieved party is still entitled to claim for loss and damages arising from any unlawful caveat on the land, and the aggrieved party must provide sufficient proof of damages warranting the award of compensation for losses suffered.
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Striking out - Locus standi - Action filed for removal of private caveats - Application for removal of caveats filed by party who had entered into joint venture agreement ('JVA') with registered proprietor to develop land - Whether plaintiff was an aggrieved party - Whether JVA confer plaintiff any legal rights and interest over land within purview of s. 327 of National Land Code 1965
LAND LAW: Caveat - Private caveat - Removal - Caveat entered by defendant in his capacity as company's shareholder that owns land - Application for removal of caveats filed by plaintiff who had entered into joint venture agreement with registered proprietor of land - Plaintiff was granted right to develop and sell units built on land - Plaintiff was under duty to apply for subdivision of land - Whether plaintiff was aggrieved party under s. 327(1) of National Land Code 1965 - Whether plaintiff's legal right and interest had been adversely affected by entry of caveat - Whether existence of caveat had caused disruption to progress of project - Whether defendant could maintain caveats on land in his capacity as company's shareholder - Whether entry of caveats on land were wrongful
LAND LAW: Caveat - Removal - Private caveat - Caveats were withdrawn after action was filed - Plaintiff proceeded with loss and damages claim arising from caveats' existence - Whether withdrawal of caveat rendered matter academic - Whether plaintiff still entitled to claim for compensation for losses arising from unlawful entry of caveat pursuant to s. 329 of National Land Code 1965 - Whether plaintiff had led sufficient proof of damages to claim for compensation
- For the plaintiff - Vanaja Nambiar; M/s Vanaja, Allison & Jee
- For the defendant - Lau Kee Sern; M/s Kee Sern, Siu & Huey
 1 LNS 683
TAN HAN KWAN & ORS v. CH'NG KONG SAN & ORS
The word 'alter' under s. 36 of the Companies Act 2016 includes the act of replacing the existing constitution of the company with a new constitution. As such, a company should not be deprived of its statutory power to amend its memorandum and article of association although the minority shareholders have not voted in favour of such amendment or when the memorandum and article of association itself have no provision prohibiting the company from altering or amending the same. Amendment and adoption of the said new constitution are a company's internal affairs and the court should be slow to interfere with such affairs.
COMPANY LAW: Members' rights - Minority shareholders - Replacement of company's constitution - Amendment to memorandum and article of association - Objection by minority shareholders - Whether abolition of company's memorandum and article of association and substitution with new constitution were ultra vires of s. 36 of Companies Act 2016 and bona fide - Whether companies could alter its constitution and replace it with new constitution - Whether company should be deprived of its statutory power to amend its memorandum and article of association - Whether amendment and adoption of new constitution was internal affairs of company
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Injunction - Application for - Injunction to restrain alteration of memorandum and article of association of company - Issues revolve around speculation - Whether court could act to grant injunction based on possibilities and probabilities - Whether there were serious issues to be tried - Whether issues revolving shares and assets could be compensated in damages - Whether balance of convenience lies in favour of dismissing injunction application
WORDS AND PHRASES: 'Alter' - Section 36 of Companies Act 2016 - Alteration of constitution of company - Whether include act of replacing constitution of a company - Whether include substituting an existing constitution with a new constitution of company
- For the plaintiffs - Ooi Chih Jen, Ng Yong Yee & Emily Lee Yen Xin; M/s Chris Lim Su Heng
- For the 1st & 2nd defendants - Brian Foong, Andrew Fernandez, Anson Chee & Carine Cheong; M/s Chooi & Company + Cheang & Ariff
- For the 3rd defendant - Wong Mun Hoe & Esther Goh; M/s Munhoe & Mar
 1 LNS 684
SHIVA KUMAR DAY v. ALLIANZ LIFE INSURANCE MALAYSIA BERHAD & ANOR
Cause of action in respect of an indemnity insurance policy, unless the insurance policy provides otherwise, accrues upon the occurrence of insured peril or date of loss event and not from the date of repudiation of liability by the insurer.
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Striking out - Action - Time barred - Action by insured against insurer arising from repudiation of indemnity of insurance policies - Allegation of fraud - Whether cause of action arises upon occurrence of insured peril or upon date of repudiation of liability by insurer - Whether action was barred by limitation set out under s. 6(1)(a) of Limitation Act 1953 - Whether mere allegation of fraud - Does ipso facto mean there must be a trial - Whether a time-barred claim ought to be struck out
INSURANCE: Policy - Indemnity - Repudiation - Insurer terminated policy - Rejection of permanent disability claim - Whether insured's right to indemnity arises as soon as loss suffered
- For the plaintiff - Harvindar Singh Saran Singh; M/s Harvindar Singh & Co
- For the 1st defendant - Christopher Foo & Chong Juen Quan; M/s Raja, Darryl & Loh
- For the 2nd defendant - Justin Chong Jhan Lam; M/s Justin & Co
 1 LNS 1068
MINES WATERFRONT BUSINESS PARK SDN BHD lwn. QUANTUM MARCH SDN BHD
Sekiranya penyerahan proses pemula dibuat melalui AR berdaftar, plaintif hanya perlu membuktikan pengeposan telah dibuat melalui resit pengeposan pos berdaftar dan tarikh yang tertera di akuan terima tidak sama sekali menjadi titik pengiraan tempoh kemasukan kehadiran. Oleh itu, tempoh 14 hari untuk kemasukan kehadiran bermula daripada tarikh bukti pengeposan tersebut.
PROSEDUR SIVIL: Pengetepian - Penghakiman ingkar - Penghakiman ingkar kehadiran - Defendan menafikan penyerahan writ dan pernyataan tuntutan - Dakwaan bahawa penghakiman telah direkodkan sebelum penamatan tempoh 14 hari untuk defendan memasukkan kehadiran - Tajuk kepada afidavit penyampaian tersilap catit tempat bidangkuasa mahkamah - Writ dan pernyataan tuntutan diserahkan melalui AR berdaftar - Sama ada penghakiman ingkar yang diperolehi adalah teratur - Sama ada kesilapan pada tajuk afidavit telah memprejudiskan defendan - Sama ada penghakiman direkodkan selepas tarikh untuk memasukkan kehadiran telah tamat - Tempoh kemasukan kehadiran - Sama ada telah bermula
PROSEDUR SIVIL: Pengetepian - Penghakiman ingkar - Penghakiman ingkar kehadiran - Pembelaan yang bermerit - Peguam defendan tidak menghujahkan apakah sebenarnya pembelaan bermerit yang didakwa defendan - Defendan membangkitkan perjanjian penyelesaian - Sama ada defendan telah mengaku keberhutangan kepada plaintif
PROSEDUR SIVIL: Penyampaian - Writ dan pernyataan tuntutan - Pengeposan AR berdaftar - Penyerahan ke atas perbadanan - Sama ada resit pengeposan cukup untuk membuktikan penyampaian writ dan pernyataan tuntutan - Sama ada plaintif perlu membuktikan penerimaan AR berdaftar oleh defendan - Sama ada penyerahan writ terhadap perbadanan boleh dilaksanakan melalui pos berdaftar - Sama ada writ dan pernyataan tuntutan boleh diserahkan di alamat selain yang tercatat di dalam perjanjian - Sama ada defendan boleh mempertikaikan alamat-alamat yang didaftarkan di Suruhanjaya Syarikat Malaysia
- Bagi pihak plaintif - Nurul Zaemah Abd Rahman; T/n Daim, Shariff & Som
- Bagi pihak defendan - Koh Mui Tee; T/n Koh & Associates
 1 LNS 1070
DEPENDENCY PLT lwn. GN DIVERSIFIED SDN BHD & YANG LAIN
Penggantungan pelaksanaan penghakiman yang membenarkan suatu tuntutan plaintif boleh dibenarkan sekiranya defendan dapat menunjukkan keadaan yang istimewa. Suatu tuntutan balas defendan yang melebihi tuntutan plaintif merupakan keadaan yang istimewa. Dalam mempertimbangkan tuntutan balas defendan tersebut, mahkamah tidak sepatutnya terus mengambil jumlah yang dinyatakan di dalam tuntutan balas semata-mata tetapi seharusnya menentukan sama ada defendan benar-benar telah menunjukkan melalui bukti-bukti bahawa sememangnya defendan mempunyai tuntutan yang munasabah bagi jumlah yang sedemikian.
PROSEDUR SIVIL: Penggantungan pelaksanaan - Penggantungan sehingga pelupusan rayuan - Keadaan istimewa - Penghakiman diperolehi oleh plaintif menurut A. 81 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 - Budi bicara mahkamah - Sama ada tuntutan balas defendan yang melebihi tuntutan plaintif merupakan suatu keadaan yang istimewa - Sama ada mahkamah boleh terus mengambil jumlah yang telah dinyatakan oleh defendan dalam tuntutan balas semata-mata - Sama ada defendan telah membuktikan tuntutan balasnya munasabah bagi jumlah yang dituntut
- Bagi pihak perayu/plaintif - Sean Tan Tee Li; T/n Terrence & Randy
- Bagi pihak responden/defendan - Engku Aminuddin Engku Ibrahim & Sam How; T/n Engku Aminuddin & Co
CLJ 2022 Volume 7 (Part 3)
An Anton Piller order ('APO') is a draconian order akin to one of the law's two nuclear weapons for which the pre-requisites or requirements set out must be complied with. The test for an APO is that of an extremely strong prima facie case. The duty of the applicant to make a full and frank disclosure of relevant material facts is contained in O. 29 r. 1(2A) of the Rules of Court 2012, and non-compliance of the latter would necessitate the ex parte Anton Piller order to be set aside.
Mohamed Zahid Yon Mohamed Fuad & Anor v. Fat Boys Records Sdn Bhd & Other Appeals  7 CLJ 339 [CA]
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Judgments and orders - Anton Piller order - Setting aside - Application for - Application to set aside ex parte Anton Piller order - Test for Anton Piller order - Whether that of extremely strong prima facie case - Whether there was full and frank disclosure of relevant material facts - Whether Anton Piller order sought a genuine remedy or act of malicious revenge and retaliation - Rules of Court 2012, O. 29 r. 1(2A)(e)
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Setting aside - Application for - Application to set aside ex parte Anton Piller order - Test for Anton Piller order - Whether that of extremely strong prima facie case - Whether there was full and frank disclosure of relevant material facts - Whether Anton Piller order sought a genuine remedy or act of malicious revenge and retaliation - Rules of Court 2012, O. 29 r. 1(2A)(e)
MOHAMAD ZABIDIN MOHD DIAH JCA
S NANTHA BALAN JCA
SEE MEE CHUN JCA
(Civil Appeal Nos: W-02(IM)(NCC)-370-02-2021, W-02(IM)(NCC)-371-02-2021 & W-02(IM)(NCC)-372-02-2021)
- For the appellants - Abdul Rashid Ismail & Gabrielle Su May Ee; M/s Rashid Zulkifli
- For the respondent - Choo Dee Wei & Azzuan Shah Abdul Razak; M/s Choo Dee Wei
(Civil Appeal Nos: W-02(IM)(NCC)-408-02-2021, W-02(IM)(NCC)-409-02-2021 & W-02(IM)(NCC)-410-02-2021)
- For the appellants - Shafrin Halim & Syazwan Halim; M/s Halim & Ismail
- For the respondent - Choo Dee Wei & Azzuan Shah Abdul Razak; M/s Choo Dee Wei
An application for leave to commit a liquidator for abuse of process in the conduct of a litigation involving a wound-up company is not specifically provided for in ss. 486 or 541 of the Companies Act 2016. Those provisions only enable a creditor or contributory to act against a liquidator. Therefore, inherent jurisdiction can be invoked to obtain leave of the winding up court. If it is proven that a liquidator is being sued in his capacity as the party having overall conduct and control of a litigation, the applicants indeed have the locus standi to apply for leave. Allegations that are not properly addressed by the High Court Judge points to a prima facie case or probability of success for the purpose of a leave application, especially when it is difficult to conclude on the undisputed facts that an application is frivolous or vexatious.
Liputan Canggih Sdn Bhd & Ors v. Chong Chuan Long & Another Appeal  7 CLJ 358 [CA]
| COMPANY LAW
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Contempt of court - Committal proceedings - Ex parte application filed at winding-up court - Leave to commit liquidator to prison for contempt of court - Whether intended contempt proceedings against liquidator could be brought within ambit of ss. 486(2) or 541 of Companies Act 2016 - Whether liquidator sued in capacity as party having overall conduct and control of litigation - Whether inherent jurisdiction could be invoked to seek leave - Whether applicants had locus standi to bring action - Probability of success against liquidator - Whether there was breach of principle of natural justice - Whether application frivolous or vexatious
COMPANY LAW: Liquidators - Committal proceedings - Leave to commit liquidator to prison for contempt of court - Ex parte application filed at winding-up court - Whether intended contempt proceedings against liquidator could be brought within ambit of ss. 486(2) or 541 of Companies Act 2016 - Whether liquidator sued in capacity as party having overall conduct and control of litigation - Whether inherent jurisdiction could be invoked to seek leave - Whether applicants had locus standi to bring action - Probability of success against liquidator - Whether there was breach of principle of natural justice - Whether application frivolous or vexatious
YAACOB MD SAM JCA
RAVINTHRAN PARAMAGURU JCA
GHAZALI CHA JCA
Civil Appeal No: B-02(IM)-1180-09-2020)
- For the appellants - Sudharsanan Thillainathan, Tania Kat-Lin Edward & Adrienne Sena; M/s Steven Thiru & Sudhar Partnership
- For the respondent - K Kirubakaran, S Ravenesan & Siti Nur Amirah Aqilah Adzman; M/s S Ravenesan
(Civil Appeal No: B-02(IM)-1284-09-2020)
- For the appellants - K Kirubakaran, S Ravenesan & Siti Nur Amirah Aqilah Adzman; M/s S Ravenesan
- For the respondents - Sudharsanan Thillainathan, Tania Kat-Lin Edward & Adrienne Sena; M/s Steven Thiru & Sudhar Partnership
Notwithstanding the absence of any legislative provision in Malaysia on the power of the High Court to order DNA tests to determine paternity, a High Court Judge has inherent power to order a DNA test in disputed paternity cases. DNA testing ought to be ordered especially if the party claiming to be the father of the child has strong prima facie evidence that he is the biological father of the said child. It would also be in the best interest of a child to know his/her birth father/mother.
JKL v. ABC & Anor  7 CLJ 376 [HC]
| FAMILY LAW
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Joinder - Originating summons and writ action - Originating summons ordered to be heard together with writ action - No direction for originating summons to be converted into writ action - Whether actions arose out of same transaction and shared common questions of fact or law - Whether actions related - Whether there was nexus between actions - Whether originating summons and writ action could be heard together in absence of direction
FAMILY LAW: Paternity - Determination - Application by man claiming to be father of child - Application for child to undergo deoxyribonucleic acid ('DNA') tests to determine paternity - Whether High Court seized with jurisdiction or power to order DNA tests to determine paternity - Whether DNA tests ought to be ordered
- For the plaintiff - Xenia Lok Zou Chieh; M/s Ang & Xen
- For the defendants - Honey Tan Lay Ean & Tay Kit Hoo; M/s Tan Law Practice
(i) The court, in dealing with an application to set aside an order for costs against the defendant for failing to comply with pre-trial directions, could not discharge the order of costs in its entirety, on account of the defendant's conduct which bordered on the contumelious. However, taking into consideration the expression 'any proceedings under this Act' under s. 31(6) of the Government Proceedings Act 1956 ('GPA'), which is not meant to refer to proceedings that are instituted pursuant to the provisions of the GPA, but rather to civil proceedings to which the Government is a party, the court discharged the portion of the order that required the costs to be borne by counsel for the defendants personally; (ii) When the privileging and credentialing of documents sought in a discovery application are found to be relevant, the court ought to direct for it to be provided. It is the role of the court not only to deliver justice in disputes between parties, but also to do so in an expeditious and economical way.
Lim E Tern & Ors v. Pengarah Hospital Tuanku Ja’afar, Seremban & Ors  7 CLJ 391 [HC]
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Costs - Order for costs - Order for costs for failure to comply with pre-trial directions - Setting aside - Application for - Whether order for costs ought to be discharged in its entirety - Government Proceedings Act 1956, s. 31(1), (6)
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Discovery - Application for - Seeking privileging and credentialing documents - Relevancy - Unless order - Whether appropriate in circumstances
- For the plaintiffs - Harmindar Singh Dhillon & Sharannya Sundaramoorthy; M/s HS Dhillon & Co
- For the defendants - Nurhafizza Azizan & Uma Devi Balasubramaniam; SFCs
Where there is an application to intervene in a proceeding, for the purpose of setting aside an order for sale/prohibitory order but the same had already been made and perfected, there is no longer a proceeding for the proposed intervener to intervene in as the court has no jurisdiction to grant intervention and there is no issue left to be determined.
Lim Siew Hoon v. Low Cheng Lee; Sukdev Singh Harcharan Singh (Proposed Intervener)  7 CLJ 402 [HC]
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Intervention - Originating summons - Proposed intervener filed to intervene after proceedings concluded - Whether court had jurisdiction - Whether there was proceeding left for proposed intervener to intervene in - Whether proposed intervener met requirements of O. 15 r. 6(2)(b) of Rules of Court 2012 - Whether proposed intervener had direct legal interest in proceeding
- For the applicant - Eric Chee; M/s Louis Goh & Co
- For the respondent - Michelle Neow; M/s Ros Lee & Co
- For the proposed intervener - Eng Khin Hock; M/s Stephen & Co
A party who has suffered a civil wrong is entitled to claim for (i) the legal charges incurred as special damages incurred to redress the wrong; and (ii) general damages for the distress suffered in the course of undergoing legal proceedings to have the wrong redressed.
Ling Peek Hoe & Anor v. Ding Siew Ching & Ors And Another Case  7 CLJ 412 [HC]
DAMAGES: Assessment - Liability - Finding of liability premised on fraud - Judgment obtained for special, general, punitive and exemplary damages to be assessed - Whether claimants could claim special damages for losses not specifically pleaded - Whether claimants entitled to all legal charges expended on indemnity basis - Whether quantum of legal charges excessive and unforeseeable - Whether there was evidence of payment - Whether special damages claimed adequately proven - Whether amount of damages claimed for fair and reasonable - Whether claimants to prove how much was to be claimed from each defendant
- For the plaintiffs - Edmund Lim Yun; M/s Hong Chew King & Co
- For the 1st defendant - Su Keong Siew; M/s KS Su & Mah
- For the 2nd to 5th defendants - Tan Lee Kiat & Alison Goh; M/s Chieng Lum & Assocs
When one party breaches its obligations, the other party's right to recover any damages and losses sustained may be restricted by a clause limiting liability contained in the terms and conditions agreed to by the contracting parties.
TNT Express Worldwide (M) Sdn Bhd v. Mega Security Devices (M) Sdn Bhd  7 CLJ 490 [HC]
TORT: Negligence - Damages - Claim - Appeal against liability and damages awarded - Failure of courier service to deliver packages to claimant's customer - Intended recipient of package did not receive packages - Packages wrongly sent to another location - Whether courier service provider negligent - Claim for loss of benefit of order and revenue - Sessions Court Judge awarded damages in amount of RM892,092 - Whether sum awarded appropriate
CONTRACT: Terms and conditions - Breach - Failure of courier service to deliver packages to claimant's customer - Intended recipient of package did not receive packages - Packages wrongly sent to another location - Whether there was contract - Whether there was breach of contract - Limitation of liability under terms and conditions of contract
- For the plaintiff - Mubashir Mansor & Raja Nadhil Aqran; M/s Skrine
- For the defendant - Rajivan Nambiar; M/s Reza Rahim & Rajivan
A COMMENTARY: NUCTECH COMPANY LIMITED v. PAN ASIATIC TECHNOLOGIES SDN BHD & ORS; POWERSCAN COMPANY LIMITED (THIRD PARTY) & ANOTHER CASE  1 LNS 398 [Read excerpt]
by Jeong Chun Phuoc*  7 CLJ(A) i
 7 CLJ(A) i
NUCTECH COMPANY LIMITED v. PAN ASIATIC TECHNOLOGIES SDN BHD & ORS; POWERSCAN COMPANY LIMITED (THIRD PARTY) & ANOTHER CASE  1 LNS 398
Jeong Chun Phuoc*
This case was a decided by Azizah Nawawi J in the High Court Malaya, Kuala Lumpur in Suit Nos: 22IP-43-11-2013 & 22IP-24-05-2014 dated 27 January 2016. The case involved two consolidated suits before Azizah Nawawi J. Following the judicial disposition of Lord Denning MR, if I may, I would like to focus on the ratio decidendi in this case which, in my mind, is quite remarkable because it sets out a new direction where three key areas of the law are closely intertwined: intellectual property (IP), contract and indemnity elements. For this reason, this case has set a marvellous precedent for subsequent cases for judicial compliance purposes.
. . .
LOOKS LIKE ME AND SOUNDS LIKE ME, BUT IT'S NOT ME: DEEPFAKES AND AUTHENTICATION OF EVIDENCE [Read excerpt]
by Gita Radhakrishna[i]Mageswary Siva Subramaniam[ii]  1 LNS(A) lxxxii
 1 LNS(A) lxxxii
LOOKS LIKE ME AND SOUNDS LIKE ME, BUT IT'S NOT ME:
DEEPFAKES AND AUTHENTICATION OF EVIDENCE
Mageswary Siva Subramaniam[ii]
The manipulated videos of President Obama, Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton in 2017 brought to light the 'deepfakes' technology and the opportunity for mischief and abuse of evidence. Forgery has always been the bane of evidence. The unprecedented development of Artificial Intelligence and its use in digital application technologies to create fake images, text, audio and video is perturbing as it calls into question the authenticity of any evidence presented in court. With the continuous advancement in technologies, deepfakes have become so sophisticated and refined that even forensic experts have difficulties in deciphering the fake from the real. This paper examines the issue of deepfakes and the challenges in authenticating audio-video evidence for use in trials. The methodology adopted is a doctrinal study of the available literature on the subject and reported cases. It also recommends a set of authenticating procedures for the admissibility of audio-video evidence so as to establish its credibility in court.
. . .
BEST INTERESTS: FAMILY LAW DISPUTES ABOUT COVID-19 VACCINATION+ [Read excerpt]
by Elizabeth Reardon*  1 LNS(A) lxxxiii
 1 LNS(A) lxxxiii
FAMILY LAW DISPUTES ABOUT COVID-19 VACCINATION+
Among the many additional challenges for separated families during the Covid-19 pandemic was whether or not to vaccinate their children. Elizabeth Reardon discusses several cases where parents sought a judicial determination to settle their disagreement.
There is no doubt that the Covid-19 pandemic brought about additional challenges for separated families already struggling with shared decision making and spending time arrangements in relation to their children.
Covid-19 restrictions and state-based laws, which were inconsistent with existing parenting orders, along with parental concerns about containing the spread of infection, led to much uncertainty and in some cases, contravention of parenting orders and escalation of conflict.
Canberrans and families living in the surrounding NSW region faced the same challenges as other 'border residents' all over the country — complying with parenting orders which required them to transport children between residences across state and territory borders when the Government health directives prohibited such movement.
. . .
||In force from
||Employment Act 1955 (Revised 1981)
||1 September 2022
||Employment Act 1955 (Revised 1981)
||1 September 2022 [PU(B) 368/2022]
||Sections 2, 4, 18A, 22, 25, 25A, 33A, 34 - 36, 37, 41A, 42, 44A, 57, 57A, 57B, 60A, 60C, 60F, 60FA, 60K, 60KA, 60L, 60P, 60Q, 69, 69B - 69E, 69F, 70, 73, 77, 81F, 81G, 81H, 82, 84, 86, 87A, 90B, 93, 99A, 101C and 102
||Akta Perkongsian Liabiliti Terhad 2012
||1 Ogos 2022
||Limited Liability Partnerships Act 2012
||1 August 2022
||Akta Syarikat 2016
||1 Ogos 2022