CASE(S) OF THE WEEK
CHUA KAY HOCK & ANOR v. LEE HOON POI [2022] 7 CLJ 669
COURT OF APPEAL, PUTRAJAYA
YAACOB MD SAM JCA; ABU BAKAR JAIS JCA; GUNALAN MUNIANDY JCA
[CIVIL APPEAL NO: J-04(W)-610-12-2018]
08 JULY 2022
Although a bionic prosthesis has a much better functionality, the court, in deciding whether the bionic prosthesis is more suitable than the mechanical prosthesis for an accident victim, must weigh the evidence and relevant circumstances so as to ensure that the claim is justified and the claimant is appropriately compensated; and, allowing a claim for bionic prosthesis together with loss of future earnings would unreasonably set a precedent for claims in similar circumstances. The award for a prosthesis must be reconciled with the overall scheme of compensatory awards.
DAMAGES: Personal injuries - Leg - Amputation of right lower limb above knee level - Appeal against quantum - High Court set aside award for bionic prosthesis by Sessions Judge - Whether bionic prosthesis more suitable - Whether award for loss of future earnings ought to be considered in award for cost of prosthesis - Whether hydraulic leg widely used - Whether High Court Judge correctly applied principles and taken into consideration important and relevant considerations - Whether compensation for mechanical prosthesis justified
JUDICIAL QUOTES
“The 1978 Rules are not, in a sense, binding on the Courts. But they are nevertheless binding on members of the Bar who are obliged to comply with them. And, they are indicative of the fact that any disciplined lawyer such as the counsel for the appellant would not have accepted a brief with dates already fixed for hearing unless he was prepared.
In fact, the appellant having been well aware of the dates fixed for hearing elected to discharge his former solicitors and appoint Messrs. Zaid Ibrahim and Tuan Haji Hisyam Teh as his solicitors and counsel respectively. This is his right to do so but he cannot, after having made that decision, turn around and say that his new lawyers are not ready to proceed with the hearing of the appeals. The new lawyers too, having accepted the brief, are not entitled to say they need more time to prepare knowing fully well that the dates had been fixed well in advance.
Given the circumstances we have outlined, the request for the adjournment and the grounds in support thereof are neither cogent nor reasonable.” – Per Tengku Maimun Tuan Mat CJ, Abang Iskandar Abang Hashim CJSS, Nallini Pathmanathan FCJ, Mary Lim Thiam Suan FCJ, Mohamad Zabidin Mohd Diah FCJ in Dato’ Sri Mohd Najib Hj Abd Razak v. PP & Other Appeals (No 2) [2022] 8 CLJ 378; [2022] 1 LNS 1838
LATEST CASES
Legal Network Series
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[2021] 1 LNS 686
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MUHAMMAD AFIQ ANUAR & ORS v. GANDA SELAT SDN BHD
The existence of special circumstances relating to the enforcement of a winding-up order must be justified on a balance of probabilities in an application for a stay of a winding-up order. By virtue of O. 45 r. 11 of the Rules of Court 2012, matters which occurred prior to the winding-up order would not amount to special circumstances.
COMPANY LAW: Winding up - Stay of order - Application for stay of winding-up order filed by respondent company who is under liquidation - Preliminary objection - Whether leave of court required before respondent company could file stay application - Whether respondent company has locus standi to apply for a stay of winding-up order - Companies Act 2016, ss. 471(1), 492(1)
COMPANY LAW: Winding up - Stay of order - Special circumstances - Stay pending appeal - Whether appeal per se could be a ground for stay - Whether merits of appeal constitute special circumstances to grant stay of execution - Whether contention that stay application will benefit both parties relate to enforcement of winding-up order and constitute special circumstances - Whether matters that occurred prior to winding-up order amounts to special circumstances - Companies Act 2016, s. 492(1) - Rules of Court 2012, O. 45 r. 11
- For the respondent applicant - Zulkepli Omar; M/s Lainah Yaacob & Zulkepli
- For the petitioners - Muhammad Toriq Abd Manaf; M/s Toriq Seth & Partners
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[2021] 1 LNS 781
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WYNN RESORTS (MACAU) S A v. POH YANG HONG
1. In an application by the plaintiff for a charging order pursuant to O. 50 of the Rules of Court 2012 requiring the defendant to show cause why his shares in various companies should not be charged in satisfaction of the judgment obtained by the plaintiff, it is sufficient for the plaintiff to establish the defendant's beneficial interest in the shares by showing the registered ownership of the shares. Omission to explicitly state the plaintiff's belief that the defendant is the beneficial owner of the shares is not fatal and will not prejudice the defendant as the defendant has all the opportunities to contend at the show cause stage that he indeed has no beneficial interest in any of those shares.
2. It is entirely the court's discretion to make a charging order nisi absolute and the burden is on the defendant to show why the charging order should not be made absolute. However, such discretion must be exercised properly, giving due weight to the facts of the case and ensuring that justice is accorded to both parties.
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Execution - Charging order - Shares in companies - Charging order requiring defendant to show cause why his shares in various companies should not be charged in satisfaction of judgment obtained by plaintiff - Whether plaintiff had established defendant's registered ownership of shares - Whether registration of legal ownership implies attendant beneficial interest - Whether plaintiff was at liberty to file a fresh application for charging order providing information of beneficial ownership of defendant on shares - Rules of Court 2012, O. 50
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Judgments and orders - Charging order - Application to discharge and vary ex-parte charging order under O. 50 r. 7 of Rules of Court 2012 - Charging order requiring defendant to show cause why his shares in various companies should not be charged in satisfaction of judgment obtained by plaintiff - Whether burden is on defendant to show why charging order nisi should not be made absolute - Whether defendant was able to show cause that he indeed has no beneficial interest in any of shares
- For the plaintiff - Richard W G Lee & Jolin C I Yew; M/s Jeff Leong, Poon & Wong
- For the defendant - Dahrick Sivam & Ng Ken Ming; M/s Albar & Partners
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[2020] 1 LNS 1072
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SUNGEI KAHANG PALM OIL SDN BHD & ANOR v. YKL ENGINEERING SDN BHD
1. An invention can only be validly treated as a patentable invention if it is new or novel and has never been disclosed, available and accessible to the members of the industry, trade or public within the terms of s. 14(2)(a) of the Patents Act 1983. A single member of the public would be sufficient to amount to disclosure so long as that member is free in law and equity to use that information or prototype.
2. Anticipation is the key issue where newness or novelty is challenged. The claimed invention must be shown to have been anticipated in a single document and not to be gathered from several documents. To determine whether the patent has been anticipated by an earlier disclosure, whether through publication, orally, use or any other way, it would be necessary to compare that publication, oral disclosure, use or any other way with the patent's claims.
3. The first task that falls on any court hearing any allegation of infringement of a patent and/or a challenge on its validity is the construction of the patent itself. Until the court appreciates that scope, the issue of invalidity cannot be properly determined. While the court may turn to the experts for assistance and their views on the technical or scientific terms or phrases found in the patent or of unusual or special meanings that are to be ascribed to such particular terms or phrases, ultimately, the construction of the patent is, in law, that of the court. The court, in fact, need not follow the view or opinion given; it is not bound to such opinion.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: Patent - Infringement - Patentability - Construction of patent - Inventive step - Novelty - Plaintiff alleged defendant infringed patent of machine used as fruit bunch splitter - Whether every invention is patentable - Whether there was novelty in plaintiff's machine - Whether court was bound to follow view or opinion given by experts - Whether there was anticipation of prior art - Whether there was common general knowledge in art - Whether machine was available and accessible to members of industry, trade or public - Whether there was disclosure of prototype to public - Whether there was inventive step in plaintiff's machine - Patents Act 1983, ss. 11, 12, 14(2)(a), 15
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: Copyright - Infringement - Designs - Plaintiff alleged defendant infringed copyright of machine used as fruit bunch splitter - Whether there was any copyright in design drawings of fruit bunch splitter - Whether existence of prior art gives right for copyrights - Copyright Act 1987, ss. 7(1)(c), 7(2)
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Pleadings - Defence - Matters to be pleaded - Defence against claim for infringement of patent - Whether defence of anticipation by prior art under s. 14 of Patents Act 1983 must be pleaded before any evidence may be led - Whether existence of disclosure to public prior to filing date of patent must be pleaded - Rules of Court 2012, O. 18 r. 8
- For the appellants - Ambiga Sreenevasan, Janini Rajeswaran, Ken St James, Desmond Louis, Sarah Ho & Jonathan Gerard; M/s Michael Chai Ken
- For the respondent - Teo Bong Kwang, Ng Yueng May & Eugene Ee; M/s Wong Jin Nee & Teo
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[2020] 1 LNS 1203
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PP lwn. LEGENTHERAJ ASOGAN
1. Tiada keperluan untuk analisis cap jari dijalankan oleh pihak polis terhadap tertuduh apabila tertuduh seorang sahaja telah ditahan di rumah bersama-sama dadah berbahaya. Justeru, keperluan untuk pihak pendakwaan membuktikan penglibatan tertuduh dengan menunjukkan terdapat kesan DNA atau cap jari tertuduh pada barang-barang kes yang dirampas daripada tertuduh semasa kejadian turut tidak hadir.
2. Kelakuan tertuduh yang ketakutan, gelisah dan berpeluh semasa ditahan membolehkan mahkamah membuat inferens munasabah bahawa tertuduh mempunyai pengetahuan tentang dadah berbahaya yang dirampas daripada tertuduh. Inferens tersebut boleh dipatahkan dengan penjelasan yang memuaskan daripada tertuduh berkenaan kelakuannya sepertimana yang dikehendaki bawah s. 9 Akta Keterangan 1950.
UNDANG-UNDANG JENAYAH: Dadah berbahaya - Pengedaran - Milikan - Dadah dijumpai dalam poket kemeja dan poket seluar tertuduh dan di dalam sebuah bilik rumah - Sama ada dadah berada dalam kawalan, jagaan dan pengetahuan tertuduh - Sama ada pihak pendakwaan telah menyisihkan orang lain yang mempunyai kawalan, jagaan dan pengetahuan ke atas dadah - Sama ada anggapan bawah s. 37(d) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 terpakai - Sama ada terdapat keperluan untuk analisis cap jari dijalankan apabila tertuduh seorang sahaja ditahan di dalam rumah
PROSEDUR JENAYAH: Pembelaan - Penafian - Pertuduhan pengedaran dan pemilikan dadah berbahaya - Dadah dijumpai dalam poket kemeja dan poket seluar tertuduh dan di dalam sebuah bilik rumah - Tertuduh menafikan memiliki dadah - Tertuduh mendakwa telah ditahan di luar rumah di mana dadah dijumpai - Sama ada penafian tertuduh mengenai kaitan tertuduh dengan rumah di mana dadah dijumpai adalah munasabah - Sama ada kegagalan memanggil ejen rumah telah memutuskan rantaian keterangan - Sama ada dadah telah ditemui secara kebetulan - Sama ada anggapan bertentangan bawah s. 114(g) Akta Keterangan 1950 terpakai terhadap kes pendakwaan - Sama ada pembelaan telah berjaya mematahkan anggapan milikan dan pengetahuan ke atas dadah berbahaya bawah s. 37(d) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 - Sama ada pembelaan tertuduh adalah penafian semata-mata
KETERANGAN: Saksi - Kebolehpercayaan - Cabaran bawah ss. 145 dan 155(c) Akta Keterangan 1950 - Keterangan pegawai serbuan - Sama ada terdapat percanggahan material dalam keterangan pegawai serbuan dengan laporan polisnya - Sama ada saksi telah diberi peluang untuk memberikan penjelasan mengenai percanggahan dalam keterangannya - Sama ada keterangan saksi boleh dipercayai
KETERANGAN: Kelakuan - Kebolehterimaan - Tertuduh kelihatan ketakutan, gelisah dan berpeluh semasa ditahan - Pertuduhan mengenai penyalahgunaan dadah berbahaya - Sama ada mahkamah boleh membuat inferens munasabah bahawa tertuduh mempunyai pengetahuan tentang dadah berbahaya yang dirampas daripadanya - Sama ada tertuduh telah memberikan penjelasan yang memuaskan hati mengenai kelakuannya - Akta Keterangan 1950, s. 9
- Bagi pihak pendakwaan - TPR Mohd Raimi Mohd Ramli, Timbalan Pendakwa Raya; Pejabat Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri Selangor
- Bagi pihak tertuduh - Fadhli Sutris & Muhaimin Aris; T/n Ashraff Al-Hirzan & Associates
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[2020] 1 LNS 1172
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DSARA SENTRAL SDN BHD lwn. TRIBUNAL TUNTUTAN PEMBELI RUMAH & SATU LAGI
Berdasarkan peraturan 11(3) Peraturan-Peraturan Pemajuan Perumahan (Kawalan dan Perlesenan) 1989, pengawal perumahan mempunyai kuasa untuk melanjutkan tempoh masa penyerahan milikan kosong dalam suatu perjanjian jual beli rumah. Namun begitu, perlanjutan masa tersebut hanya akan mengikat pembeli setelah terma mengenai tempoh masa penyerahan milikan kosong diubah atau dipinda oleh kedua-dua pihak yang menyatakan tempoh akan dilanjutkan sedemikian.
UNDANG-UNDANG TANAH: Pemaju perumahan - Milikan kosong - Tuntutan gantirugi ditetapkan - Pengawal perumahan meluluskan permohonan lanjutan masa pemaju untuk penyerahan milikan kosong - Pembeli tidak mengetahui berkenaan perlanjutan masa yang dipohon oleh pemaju - Terma berkenaan penyerahan milikan kosong tidak dipinda selepas kelulusan lanjutan masa diperoleh daripada pengawal perumahan - Sama ada pembeli terikat dengan lanjutan masa yang diberikan oleh pengawal perumahan - Sama ada pembeli berhak untuk menuntut gantirugi kelewatan penyerahan milikan kosong - Sama ada pemaju dihalang daripada membangkitkan isu mengenai kelulusan lanjutan tempoh masa
UNDANG-UNDANG PENTADBIRAN: Semakan kehakiman - Certiorari - Permohonan untuk membatalkan awad Tribunal Tuntutan Pembeli Rumah ('tribunal') - Tribunal membenarkan tuntutan pembeli rumah untuk gantirugi ditetapkan berikutan kelewatan penyerahan milikan kosong - Pemaju mendakwa telah mendapat lanjutan masa daripada pengawal perumahan dan pembeli seharusnya merayu kepada Menteri Perumahan - Pembeli tidak mengetahui berkenaan perlanjutan masa yang dipohon oleh pemaju - Sama ada relevan untuk tribunal mempertimbangkan ketiadaan rayuan atau semakan kehakiman terhadap kelulusan lanjutan masa oleh pembeli
- Bagi pihak pemohon - Tan Yan Hong; T/n Tan Chong Lii & Co
- Bagi pihak responden kedua - Ahmad Muslin Rozlan; T/n Ling & Associates
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CLJ 2022 Volume 7 (Part 4)
In Mareva type of injunction, a real risk of dissipation of assets is an essential ingredient, wherein the injunction purports to prevent a plaintiff from being cheated out of the proceeds of an action, should he be successful, by a defendant transferring his assets abroad or dissipating his assets within the jurisdiction. The need for evidence of a real risk of dissipation lies at the very heart of the jurisdiction and its raison d'etre. There is no exception to the rules, such that this ingredient may be presumed in any identified circumstances. Hence, to hold a real risk of dissipation of assets may be presumed is effectively to negate the need to actually establish that such a risk exists.
Lee Kai Wuen & Anor v. Lee Yee Wuen [2022] 7 CLJ 505 [CA]
CIVIL PROCEDURE | COMPANY LAW
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Injunction - Mareva injunction - Allegations of misappropriation by shareholders of monies belonging to company - Shareholders caused customers of company to pay monies due to company into joint accounts belonging to shareholders - Whether there was direct evidence of any risk that shareholders might dispose of or dissipate assets or put assets beyond reach of complainant - Whether there was evidence of actual attempt of dissipation of assets - Whether vital ingredients before Mareva injunction may be issued established
COMPANY LAW: Oppression - Allegations of - Misappropriation by shareholders of monies belonging to company - Shareholders caused customers of company to pay monies due to company into joint accounts belonging to shareholders - Attempt to appoint someone privy to misappropriation as director of company - Whether there was misappropriation of company's funds - Whether tantamount to oppression - Companies Act 2016, s. 346
MOHAMAD ZABIDIN MOHD DIAH JCA
S NANTHA BALAN JCA
DARRYL GOON SIEW CHYE JCA
- For the appellants - Chua Kim Hong Rudeen & Wong Kum Heng; M/s Rudeen Chua & Co
- For the respondent - Foo Joon Liang & Lee Xin Div; M/s Gan Partnership
The planning permission granted to the developer for the proposed development of a piece of land, situated 76 metres above sea level with approximately 43% of the area having a gradient exceeding 25 degrees, thus falling under the category of 'hill land' under the Land Conservation Act 1960, was confirmed under the State Planning Committee ('SPC') Guidelines as a 'projek istimewa'. There was thus no requirement for the planning permission to be referred to the SPC for approval. The structure plan is a mere 'statement of policies' and not a piece of legislation that is legally binding on all parties and thus, the general prohibition against development on hill land in the structure plan was not absolute. Its principles need not be slavishly followed by the local authority when dealing with an application for planning permission. Therefore, the Penang State Appeal Board ('Appeal Board'), in setting aside the planning permission granted to the developer, had acted subjectively, arbitrarily and unreasonably.
Perbadanan Pengurusan Sunrise Garden Kondominium v. Sunway City (Penang) Sdn Bhd & Ors And Other Appeals [2022] 7 CLJ 535 [CA]
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: Judicial review - Certiorari - Application to quash decision of Penang State Appeal Board ('Appeal Board') to set aside planning permission for proposed development - Land located higher than 76 metres above sea level and approximately 43% of area having gradient exceeding 25 degrees - Whether proposed development complied with State Planning Committee ('SPC') Guidelines - Whether fell within definition of 'projek istimewa' under SPC Guidelines - Whether approval of SPC required - Whether Appeal Board misinterpreted policy in SPC Guidelines - Whether exceeded jurisdiction - Town and Country Planning Act 1976, ss. 22(2A), (4) & 23(1)(b)
YAACOB MD SAM JCA
AB KARIM AB JALIL JCA
LAU BEE LAN JCA
- For the appellants - Gurdial Singh Nijar, Jesicca Ram Binwani, Abraham Au Thian Hui, Ramitra Ramarao & Meenakshi Raman; M/s Kanesh Sundrum & Co
- For the 1st respondent/applicant - Cyrus Das, Christina Siew & Wang Kang Le; M/s Lim Kean Siew & Co
- For the 2nd respondent - Karin Lim & M Murgam; M/s Presgrave & Matthews
- For the 3rd respondent - Charanjit Singh Mahinder Singh & Naizatul Zima Tajudin; SLAs Pulau Pinang
Damages are assessed on a once-and-for-all basis. The court, with the assistance of experts, will have to look into the future and evaluate the claimant's needs arising at that time. The experts will have to opine, keeping in mind the likely possibilities and not fanciful possibilities, regarding the prognosis and future disabilities and needs of the claimant for the rest of his/her life. Once damages are assessed, the claimant could not return to court to seek more damages for their disabilities and needs.
Hasniyati Hassan & Anor v. Kerajaan Malaysia [2022] 7 CLJ 565 [HC]
TORT
TORT: Negligence - Medical negligence - Damages - Assessment - Mother delivered child premature - Mother suffered from post-operative severe bleeding - Womb and other reproductive systems surgically removed - Child suffered above elbow auto-amputation - Claim for general, future general, special, aggravated and pre-trial damages - Whether claim ought to be allowed - Just and reasonable amounts to be awarded
- For the plaintiffs - KB Karthi & Ravin Veloo; M/s Vello & Assocs
- For the 4th defendant - Rahazlan Affandi Abdul Rahim; SFC
The tax payable becomes due and payable as soon as the notice of assessment is served on the party assessed pursuant to the Income Tax Act 1967, irrespective of whether the party appeals against the assessment. The Inland Revenue Board is statutorily entitled to recover the sum assessed by way of civil proceedings as a debt due to the Government. The application by the party assessed to stay the civil proceeding for the recovery of the amount assessed ought not to be allowed unless 'rare and compelling circumstances' are established.
Kerajaan Malaysia v. Golden Citrus Sdn Bhd & Ors [2022] 7 CLJ 631 [HC]
REVENUE LAW | CIVIL PROCEDURE
REVENUE LAW: Income tax - Additional assessment - Appeal by company to Special Commissioners of Income Tax ('SCIT') - Inland Revenue Board ('Revenue') filed civil suit pending appeal - Company sought stay of proceedings pending outcome of appeal to SCIT - Whether there was 'rare and compelling circumstances' to stay proceedings - Whether proceeding could be held back pending outcome of another proceeding - Whether Revenue statutorily entitled to file separate civil claim for tax payable as debt due - Whether company obligated to pay assessed tax irrespective of appeal against assessment - Income Tax Act 1967, ss. 103(1) & 106(3)
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Stay - Stay of proceedings - Appeal against additional assessment by company - Inland Revenue Board filed civil suit pending appeal - Company sought stay of proceedings pending outcome of appeal to Special Commissioners of Income Tax - Whether there was 'rare and compelling circumstances' to stay proceedings - Whether proceeding could be held back pending outcome of another proceeding - Whether suit could be determined on current law and legal principles
- For the plaintiff - Nurul Nazmin Roslan; Lembaga Hasil Dalam Negeri
- For the defendants - Tinoshiny Arumugam; M/s Athimulan & Co
Medical personnel owe a duty of care to ensure a patient gets an expeditious treatment for injury suffered, either to cure it or, at the very least, to mitigate any loss which might be suffered due to a delay in the treatment. In this case, a botched circumcision and failed attempt to re-attach the parts, failure to undertake a proper procedure and subsequent delay in the transfer of the patient to another hospital for an expeditious surgery showed breach of duty of care by the hospital staff and the medical personnel. The patient, who suffered emotional and physical implications, was thus entitled to special, general, exemplary and punitive damages as a result of the negligence.
Muhamad Amir Lokman Amirnuddin (Seorang Budak Dan Mendakwa Melalui Ibu Dan Sahabat Wakilnya Nor Hamsiah Ahmad Lathin) v. Haslina Hashim & Ors [2022] 7 CLJ 641 [HC]
TORT
TORT: Negligence - Medical negligence - Botched circumcision carried out by employee of hospital - Patient transferred to another hospital for surgery after examination and completion of formalities - Whether delay in transfer and subsequent surgery extinguished hope for successful surgery - Whether medical personnel breached duty of care to provide expeditious treatment - Whether losses suffered by patient was direct result of negligence by medical personnel
TORT: Vicarious liability - Liability of Government - Medical negligence - Botched circumcision and subsequent delay in transfer to another hospital for surgery - Whether delay extinguished hope for successful surgery - Whether medical personnel breached duty of care to provide expeditious treatment - Whether losses suffered by patient was direct result of negligence by medical personnel - Whether Government vicariously liable for negligence of medical personnel
- For the plaintif - M/s Mohamad Zainuddin & Co
- For the defendants - Senior Federal Counsel
In drafting a charge under s. 3(1) of the Kidnapping Act 1961, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to state with clarity which of the acts constituting the act of kidnapping under the provision ie, whether it was abduction, wrongful confinement or wrongful restraint, that the prosecution wishes to rely on in proving its case against the accused. The failure to state which of those acts would result in the charge being defective and a nullity. Where there is such omission in the charge, it is not open to the prosecution to choose to prove any of those acts in the course of the trial.
PP v. Muhammad Shahmizal Azizan & Ors [2022] 7 CLJ 649 [HC]
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: Charge - Defective charge - Accused persons charged for kidnapping - Common intention - Charge failed to state which of acts constituting act of kidnapping under s. 3(1) of Kidnapping Act 1961 that prosecution intended to rely on in proving case against accused persons - Whether abduction, wrongful confinement or wrongful restraint - Whether charge defective and nullity - Whether curable under ss. 156 and 422 of Criminal Procedure Code - Whether open to prosecution to choose to prove any of acts in course of trial
- For the prosecution - Yasinnisa Begam Seeni Mohideen & Rais Imran Hamid; DPPs
- For the 1st, 2nd & 3rd accused - Saiful Ambar Abdullah Ambar; M/s Ambar & Azah
- For the 4th accused - Anbanathan; M/s Anba
- For the 5th accused - Muhammad Arif Shaharuddin; M/s Mohd Irwan Mohd Mubarak
- For the 6th accused - Benjamin Tan; M/s Lim Tan & Co
ARTICLES
LNS Article(s)
THE APPLICATION OF SECTIONS 173(g) AND 254 OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE [Read excerpt]
by Mohd Taufik bin Mohd @ Mohd Yusoff* [2022] 1 LNS(A) lxxxiv
[2022] 1 LNS(A) lxxxiv
MALAYSIA
THE APPLICATION OF SECTIONS 173(g) AND 254 OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
by
Mohd Taufik bin Mohd @ Mohd Yusoff*
[1] The underlying reason this article is written is to highlight important grounds that the courts should resort to in dealing with the two sections. Both sections deal with the issue of discharge or acquittal of an accused person.
SECTION 173(g) OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
[2] Let us start off with section 173(g) of the Criminal Procedure Code ('CPC') . Section 173(g) is one of the components or part of the procedure in summary trials in the subordinate court. Section 173(g) reads as follows:
173. Procedure in summary trials
The following procedure shall be observed by Magistrates in summary trials:
...
. . .
A BRAVE NEW SYSTEM? ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE OPT-OUT ORGAN DONATION SYSTEM IN MALAYSIA* [Read excerpt]
by Sofiya Imran** [2022] 1 LNS(A) lxxxv
[2022] 1 LNS(A) lxxxv
MALAYSIA
A BRAVE NEW SYSTEM?
ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE OPT-OUT ORGAN DONATION SYSTEM IN MALAYSIA*
by
Sofiya Imran**
AN OVERVIEW OF THE ORGAN CRISIS IN MALAYSIA
Much like most controversial healthcare matters, the subject of organ donation and transplantation is besieged with a myriad of questions that are medical, legal, ethical and moral in nature. In certain jurisdictions, like Malaysia, where religion and culture are inextricably intertwined with state policies and legislation, an assessment of organ donation and transplantation would not be complete without proper consideration of the crucial role played by religious and cultural norms and practices. However, before this article delves into the intricacies of these issues, it is worth noting the worldwide shortage of organs at the outset. It goes without saying that this is a tremendous problem of global proportions, and, as such, countries all over the world are desperately trying to combat this crisis via the implementation of their respective organ donation systems. So far, only a handful of countries-Spain[1] and Croatia[2] included-have been successful in their quest to increase the number of available organs. Unfortunately, Malaysia has yet to join these ranks[3] and it would seem that, as a nation, we have much to do before that becomes a reality.
. . .
LEGISLATION HIGHLIGHTS
Principal Acts
Amending Acts
PU(A)
PU(B)
Legislation Alert
Updated
| Act/Principal No. |
Title |
Amended by |
In force from |
Section amended |
| AKTA 50 |
Akta Perubatan 1971 |
PU(A) 266/2022 |
23 Ogos 2022 |
Jadual Kedua |
| ACT 50 |
Medical Act 1971 |
PU(A) 266/2022 |
23 August 2022 |
Second Schedule |
| ACT 265 |
Employment Act 1955 (Revised 1981) |
PU(A) 262/2022 |
1 September 2022 |
First Schedule |
| ACT 265 |
Employment Act 1955 (Revised 1981) |
ACT A1651 |
1 September 2022 [PU(B) 368/2022] |
Sections 2, 4, 18A, 22, 25, 25A, 33A, 34 - 36, 37, 41A, 42, 44A, 57, 57A, 57B, 60A, 60C, 60F, 60FA, 60K, 60KA, 60L, 60P, 60Q, 69, 69B - 69E, 69F, 70, 73, 77, 81F, 81G, 81H, 82, 84, 86, 87A, 90B, 93, 99A, 101C and 102 |
| AKTA 743 |
Akta Perkongsian Liabiliti Terhad 2012 |
PU(A) 232/2022 |
1 Ogos 2022 |
Jadual Pertama |
Revoked
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