CASE(S) OF THE WEEK
PEMUNGUT DUTI SETEM v. LEE KOY ENG & A REVIEW APPLICATION  8 CLJ 863
FEDERAL COURT, PUTRAJAYA
ROHANA YUSUF PCA; HASNAH MOHAMMED HASHIM FCJ; MARY LIM FCJ
[CIVIL APPEAL NOS: 01(f)-9-07-2021(B) & 08(R)-2-02-2022(B)]
07 JULY 2022
An appeal under s. 39 of the Stamp Act 1949 is invoked by the person paying the stamp duty and not by the Collector of Stamp Duty. Although the notice of appeal is lodged at the High Court and categorised as an appeal, s. 39 provides the appealing party the right to require the Collector to state and sign a case, setting forth the question upon which the opinion of the High Court is required and the decision made by the Collector. The High Court is not required to hear the evidence and make findings on factual evidence heard; its sole function in a case stated is to answer the question(s) posed.
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Appeal - Case stated - Collector of Stamp Duty ('Collector') imposed ad valorem stamp duty on instruments of transfer - Collector dismissed review - Appeal to High Court - Function of High Court in case stated - Whether High Court required to hear evidence and make findings on factual evidence - Whether only to answer question(s) posed - Stamp Act 1949, ss. 36(1),38A & 39
LAND LAW: Transfer - Instruments - Instruments of transfer required to be executed in order to affect transfer of properties owned by deceased - Collector of Stamp Duty ('Collector') imposed ad valorem stamp duty on instruments of transfer - Collector dismissed review - Case stated - High Court allowed appeal and decision affirmed by Court of Appeal - Collector granted leave to appeal at Federal Court - Whether Federal Court seized with jurisdiction - Stamp Act 1949, ss. 36(1),38A & 39
“This court accepts the defendants’ submission that a mere licensee of a TOL has no legitimate expectation for a renewal of the TOL by the land office upon the expiry of the term and that the licensee has no right to claim compensation for any structure or building erected on the TOL land upon the expiry of the TOL, as held by the various decided authorities cited by the defendants. However, none of the decided authorities has held that even if the express terms of the TOL stipulates for compensation upon its expiry, no compensation would still be recoverable. On the contrary, Goods J in Papoo v. Veeriah (supra) observed to the effect that where the express terms of the TOL provides for compensation in the event of termination and the State Government is a party thereto, the TOL holder would have the right to sue the State Government for such compensation pursuant to the express term.” – per Tee Geok Hock JC in Hartalega Sdn Bhd & Anor v. Kerajaan Negeri Selangor & Ors  7 CLJ 735
Legal Network Series
 1 LNS 965
JENEIFER VUN YI SOO v. MARK WONG CHEN YEE; EDDY CHONG @ MOHD EDDY ABDULLAH CHONG (THIRD PARTY)
The description of third parties against whom a petitioner alleges adultery in a petition is referred to as co-respondent, and if the adultery charge is made by a respondent in answer to a petition, it is called party cited. When a respondent claims in his or her answer to a petition that the petitioner committed adultery and seeks relief to condemn the third party with whom the petitioner is accused of adultery, as well as damages in respect of the adultery, then the respondent must plead the alleged adultery in answer to the petition, citing the third party and then make a prayer or claim for such relief from the third party.
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Striking out - Third party notice - Matrimonial proceedings - Application by third party to set aside order granting leave to issue third-party notice and third-party notice itself - Third party notice applied by respondent - Respondent alleged that petitioner has adulterous relationship with third party - Respondent failed to make any claim against third party for damages in respect of alleged adultery and named third party as a party cited in answer to petition - Whether third party proceeding commenced by respondent was wrong in law - Whether allowing third party notice to stand would lead to chaos in further proceedings of cause in petition - Whether order granting leave to issue third party notice and third party notice ought to be set aside
FAMILY LAW: Divorce - Adultery - Application by husband to make a party whom adultery is alleged as third party - Procedure for respondent to claim for relief to condemn third party with whom the petitioner is accused of adultery - Whether respondent should make claim against third party for damages in respect of alleged adultery in answer to petition - Whether respondent must name and make third party as a party cited in answer to petition - Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976, s. 58
- For the petitoner - Jenny Lim; M/s Jenny Lim Lee & Wong
- For the respondent - Lee Hui Meng; M/s WV & Partners
- For the third party - Joan Goh; M/s Goh & Associates
 1 LNS 966
JENNIFER CHIN NYAT YING v. AMBROSE OBON
1. It is not mandatory for the conciliatory body to give their recommendations in issuing a certificate under s. 106 of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976. Thus, the absence of recommendations by members of the conciliatory body does not render the said certificate improper, invalid, null and void.
2. A husband has the primary obligation to maintain the children. In ascertaining maintenance of children, the husband must make full and frank disclosure of his earnings and assets and failing which the court is entitled to draw an adverse inference thereto that had he made full and frank disclosure of his earnings and assets, it would show that he has the financial capacity to meet the claim for the maintenance of the children.
FAMILY LAW: Divorce - Irretrievable breakdown - Dissolution of marriage - Allegation that respondent husband ('RH') had behaved in such a way that petitioner wife cannot reasonably be expected to live with RH - RH disputed certificate issued by conciliatory body not being complete and proper - Whether there were any affection, trust and love between parties to marriage - Whether marriage has irretrievably broken down - Whether marriage which has been broken down should be dissolved - Whether members of conciliatory body must insert recommendations in certificate under s. 106 of Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976
FAMILY LAW: Divorce - Adultery - Respondent husband ('RH') alleged petitioner wife ('PW') committed adultery after leaving matrimonial home - RH did not attempt to make alleged adulterer as co-respondent in proceedings - Whether there was sufficient evidence to establish that PW committed adultery - Whether allegation of RH was scandalous and wicked
FAMILY LAW: Children - Maintenance - Schooling children - Respondent husband ('RH') borrowed money to pay business losses and education of children - RH not consistent in his payment for education, maintenance upkeep and support of children - Whether petitioner wife ('PW') earnings had been challenged - Whether RH could avoid his obligations to provide maintenance for children until they complete their higher education and training - Whether court is entitled to draw adverse inference against RH on his financial capacity when RH failed to make full and frank disclosure of his earnings and assets
FAMILY LAW: Children - Custody - Petitioner wife ('PW') had been taking care of day-to-day needs of children even after leaving matrimonial home - Whether children were financially dependent on parents' support, care and maintenance - Whether mere fact that respondent husband ('RH') in higher working class than PW automatically rendered RH in a better position to have custody, care and control of children
FAMILY LAW: Matrimonial assets - Division of - Both parties contributed towards repayment of housing loan of property which became their matrimonial home - Matrimonial house was sold and proceeds were used to buy another house - Balance of net proceeds from sale of matrimonial house not paid to petitioner wife ('PW') - Money contributed by PW for land purchase and land registered under respondent husband's name ('RH') with understanding that RH would hold land for PW's benefit - Whether court could make exact extent of contribution of each parties when both parties had contributed towards repayment of housing loan - Whether parties have agreed to share equally proceeds of sale of house out of half share of one party
- For the wife petitioner - Paul Chin; M/s Paul Chin & Company
- For the husband respondent - Marcel Jude; M/s Marcel Jude & Co
 1 LNS 968
VIJAYAN VASUDEWAN v. ABIRANI SITHAMBARAM
If a petitioner husband initiates a contempt proceeding against the respondent wife for breach of terms of a court order relating to granting access to children and it is proven beyond reasonable doubt that the respondent wife breached such terms of the court order by refusing to give access to the petitioner husband while the children are in the custody and care of the respondent wife, then any punishment involving a prison term would not be in the best interest of the children and such punishment may have an adverse impact on the children.
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Contempt of court - Order of committal - Mitigation - Ascertaining proper punishment - Breach of court order - Family court granted access without supervision to petitioner husband ('PH') concerning minor children - Children were under custody and care of respondent wife ('RW') - RW refused to allow PH to have access to children - Whether RW in breach of terms of access granted to PH beyond reasonable doubt - Whether breach of court order was merely unintentional - Whether any punishment involving prison term would be in children's best interest - Whether RW should be ordered to pay fine for each day of her refusal to allow access to PH
- For the applicant - Amy Yeo & Lew Shi Ern; M/s Amy Yeo & Associates
- For the respondent - Lalitha Nagamuthu; M/s Lalitha & Co
 1 LNS 1032
MOHAMAD SHOFFI JIKAN lwn. PP
Bagi kesalahan bawah s. 15 Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952, hakim bicara mempunyai budi bicara untuk menjatuhkan hukuman denda atau pemenjaraan atau kedua-duanya sekali ke atas tertuduh setelah menimbangkan dengan adil dan saksama keadaan dan fakta dalam sesuatu kes itu. Hukuman denda tidak seharusnya diketepikan oleh hakim bicara dalam pertimbangan kehakimannya sebelum menjatuhkan suatu hukuman terutama apabila tertuduh merupakan pesalah pertama dan tidak mempunyai rekod jenayah lampau.
PROSEDUR JENAYAH: Hukuman - Prinsip penghukuman - Kesalahan penyalahgunaan dadah untuk kegunaan diri sendiri bawah s. 15(1)(a) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 ('ADB') - Sama ada hukuman denda adalah sesuai dan wajar - Sama ada hukuman pemenjaraan seharusnya dielakkan untuk pesalah pertama dan pesalah yang tidak mempunyai rekod sabitan lampau - Sama ada sumbangan tertuduh kepada masyarakat wajar dipertimbangkan - Sama ada hukuman denda dapat memberi peluang kedua kepada tertuduh untuk menjadi lebih bertanggungjawab dan tidak terlibat dalam penyalahgunaan dadah - Sama ada kepentingan awam menghendaki tertuduh dijatuhkan hukuman denda berbanding hukuman pemenjaraan
- Bagi pihak perayu - Shah Rizal Abdul Manan & Nik Muammer Hurrie Mohamad Shukri; T/n Shah & Hurrie
- Bagi pihak responden - TPR Mohd Raimi Mohd Ramly, Timbalan Pendakwa Raya; Pejabat Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri Selangor
 1 LNS 1033
NITHIYAN NAGARAJAN lwn. TIMBALAN MENTERI DALAM NEGERI MALAYSIA & YANG LAIN
Peraturan 8A Peraturan-Peraturan Pencegahan Jenayah (Tatacara Lembaga Penasihat) (Pindaan) 2015 memberi kuasa kepada lembaga penasihat untuk mengeluarkan sapina kepada mana-mana saksi yang diperlukan oleh orang yang ditahan untuk pendengaran representasinya di hadapan lembaga penasihat. Lembaga penasihat hendaklah memberikan peluang yang secukupnya kepada orang yang ditahan untuk membela diri dengan memanggil saksi-saksi material yang diminta oleh orang yang ditahan tersebut. Kegagalan lembaga penasihat mengeluarkan sapina kepada saksi-saksi material yang dipohon boleh menjejaskan pembelaan dan representasi orang yang ditahan semasa pendengaran di hadapan lembaga penasihat.
PENAHANAN PENCEGAHAN: Perintah tahanan - Habeas corpus - Perintah tahanan dikeluarkan bawah s. 19A(1) Akta Pencegahan Jenayah 1959 - Kegagalan lembaga penasihat mengeluarkan sapina kepada saksi-saksi penting yang dipohon oleh pemohon - Responden gagal mengemukakan rakaman percakapan pemohon walaupun dipohon oleh pemohon - Sama ada lembaga penasihat boleh menentukan saksi-saksi yang boleh dipanggil atau sebaliknya - Sama ada kehendak prosedur bawah peraturan 8A Peraturan-Peraturan Pencegahan Jenayah (Tatacara Lembaga Penasihat) (Pindaan) 2015 ('Peraturan-Peraturan') gagal dipatuhi - Sama ada berlaku percanggahan kepada perkara 151(1)(a) dan (b) Perlembagaan Persekutuan dan peraturan 3 Peraturan-Peraturan - Sama ada pembelaan dan representasi pemohon telah terjejas - Sama ada representasi pemohon menjadi tidak sempurna dan defektif
PENAHANAN PENCEGAHAN: Perintah tahanan - Habeas corpus - Perintah tahanan dikeluarkan bawah s. 19A(1) Akta Pencegahan Jenayah 1959 ('APJ') - Kelewatan 20 hari untuk pegawai inkuiri mengemukakan laporan lengkap penyiasatan kes kepada lembaga pencegahan jenayah - Rakaman percakapan pemohon tidak dibekalkan setelah dipohon - Sama ada berlaku kelewatan yang tidak munasabah - Sama ada terdapat ketidakpatuhan prosedur bawah s. 4A APJ
- Bagi pihak pemohon - Naizatul Zamrina Karizaman; T/n K L Chee & Co
- Bagi pihak responden-responden - Zulkpli Abdullah, Peguam Kanan Persekutuan
CLJ 2022 Volume 8 (Part 5)
Parliament must take the necessary measure to ensure that any amendment to the Federal Constitution ('FC') must not result in a new Constitution, especially with regard to fundamental provision; likewise, the court is bound by the enacted laws and must strive to give effect to the intention of Parliament in enacting the laws. Hence, to declare the word 'father' in s. 1(b) Part II of Second Schedule of the FC to include 'mother' would mean to rewrite the FC and the courts must forbid itself from such an interpretation of the law.
Mahisha Sulaiha Abdul Majeed v. Ketua Pengarah Pendaftaran & Ors And Another Appeal  8 CLJ 697 [CA]
| STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
| WORDS & PHRASES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Citizenship - Citizenship by operation of law - Children born overseas to Malaysian citizen mothers and non-citizen fathers - Article 14(1)(b) read with s. 1(b) of Part II Second Schedule of Federal Constitution ('FC') - Whether word 'father' in s. 1(b) refers only to father - Whether could also mean 'mother' or 'parents' - Whether interpreting 'father' to be read as 'mother' amounts to rewriting law - Whether there was conflict between art. 14(1)(b) read with s. 1(b) of Part II and art. 8(2) - Whether mothers entitled to protection and rights accorded under art. 8(2) of FC - Whether children entitled to Malaysian citizenship by operation of law
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Constitution - Federal Constitution ('FC') - Article 14(1)(b) read with s. 1(b) of Part II Second Schedule of FC and art. 8(2) of FC - Whether art. 8(2) applies to all provisions in FC - Whether word 'gender' in art. 8(2) excluded its application to provisions on citizenship in Part III of FC - Whether there was conflict between art. 14(1)(b) read with s. 1(b) of Part II and art. 8(2) - Whether art. 8(2) to be read to give primacy over art. 14(1)(b) read with s. 1(b) of Part II, Second Schedule of FC
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: Construction of statute - Interpretation - Article 14(1)(b) read with s. 1(b) of Part II Second Schedule of FC and art. 8(2) Federal Constitution ('FC') - Whether art. 8(2) on equal standing with art. 14(1)(b) read with s. 1(b) of Part II Second Schedule - Whether there is conflict between Part III on Citizenship and Part II on Fundamental Liberties
WORDS & PHRASES: 'father' - Article 14(1)(b) read with s. 1(b) of Part II Second Schedule of Federal Constitution - Whether word 'father' in s. 1(b) refers only to father - Whether could be read as 'mother' or to include mother - Whether interpreting 'father' to be read as 'mother' amounts to rewriting law
KAMALUDIN MD SAID JCA
AZIZAH NAWAWI JCA
S NANTHA BALAN JCA
(Civil Appeal No. W-01(NCvC)(A)-531-09-2021)
- For the appellants - Liew Horng Bin; SFC
- For the respondents - Gurdial Singh Nijar, Ngeow Chow Ying, Gan Pei Fern, Joshua Rishi Andran, Abraham Au Tian Hui, Lok Suk Hwa, Denishia Rajendran, Surenthiran Raj & Nik Nur Adawiyah; M/s Joshua Aaron Keet
(Civil Appeal No. W-01(A)-273-06-2020)
- For the appellant - Cyrus V Das, Raymond Mah Mun Kitt, Jasmine Wong Kah Man & Eric Toh Kah Yung; M/s Mah Weng Kwai & Assocs
- For the respodents - Ahmad Hanir Hambaly & Mohammad Sallehhuddin Md Ali; SFCs
- For Suruhanjaya Hak Asasi Manusia (SUHAKAM) - Tay Kit Hoo
- For Bar Council Malaysia - Vilasini Vijandran
Dalam prosiding rujukan tanah, pendapat bertulis pengapit hanya untuk tatapan dan pertimbangan Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi ('HMT') sahaja. Pihak-pihak dalam prosiding rujukan tanah tidak diberi akses terhadap pendapat pengapit tersebut. Sebaliknya, pihak-pihak hanya memiliki akses terhadap apa-apa yang direkodkan oleh HMT dalam rekod prosiding. Jika rayuan dikemukakan, hanya hakim di peringkat rayuan sahaja yang dapat melihat serta menilai pendapat pengapit tersebut. Pendapat pengapit, jika diperlukan di peringkat rayuan hendaklah diserahkan secara pentadbiran daripada Mahkamah Tinggi kepada Mahkamah Rayuan dan seterusnya ke Mahkamah Persekutuan.
Persatuan Pemandu-pemandu Perempuan Malaysia lwn. Pentadbir Tanah Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur  8 CLJ 799 [CA]
UNDANG-UNDANG TANAH: Pengambilan tanah - Pampasan - Pengambilan tanah untuk pembinaan lebuh raya - Bantahan terhadap pampasan - Lebar jarak undur yang ditetapkan untuk pembinaan lebuh raya - Sama ada dipatuhi - Sama ada terdapat kesan mudarat pada bangunan atas tanah - Sama ada jarak undur diluluskan oleh Lembaga Lebuhraya Malaysia - Peraturan-peraturan Lembaga Lebuhraya Malaysia (Jarak Undur Lebuh Raya) 2007 - Akta Lembaga Lebuh Raya Malaysia (Pemerbadanan) 1980, s. 11
UNDANG-UNDANG TANAH: Pengambilan tanah - Prosiding rujukan - Pendapat pengapit - Permohonan agar dibekalkan pendapat bertulis pengapit - Sama ada pihak-pihak dalam prosiding rujukan tanah boleh diberi akses terhadap pendapat pengapit - Sama ada pendapat pengapit untuk tatapan dan pertimbangan Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi sahaja - Sama ada pendapat pengapit sebahagian rekod prosiding - Akta Pengambilan Tanah 1960, s. 40C
YAACOB MD SAM HMR
AHMAD NASFY YASIN HMR
CHE MOHD RUZIMA GHAZALI HMR
- Bagi pihak perayu - Kemkumar Lopez & David Lazaroo; T/n Kamarudin & Partners
- Bagi pihak responden - Natassa Zaini & Nor Azlin Mohd Yusof; Peguam Kanan Persekutuan
The law on stay of execution of a monetary judgment is trite, in that, the court may exercise its discretion to grant a stay of execution of the judgment debt if the applicant (the judgment debtor) could show 'special circumstances' relating to the enforcement of the judgment pending appeal. It is an accepted 'special circumstance' if the appeal were to succeed, the appeal would nevertheless be nugatory if the successful appellant would be deprived of the result of the successful appeal that would have set aside the payment of the judgment debt or so much of it.
Renew Capital Sdn Bhd & Ors v. ADM Ventures (M) Sdn Bhd & Anor And Another Appeal  8 CLJ 817 [CA]
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Stay of execution - Application for - Monetary judgment - Judgment debt - Stay of execution of payment of judgment debt unconditionally - Whether special circumstances exist - Whether there were factors justifying conditional stay of either whole or part of judgment sum pending disposal of appeal
LEE SWEE SENG JCA
HADHARIAH SYED ISMAIL JCA
SUPANG LIAN JCA
- For the appellants - Gopal Sri Ram, James Ee Kah Fuk, S Preakas, Malar Loganathan, Yasmin Soh & Manpil Singh; M/s K F Ee & Co
- For the respondents - Prem Ramachandran, David Mathews & Roobini Stephanie Sittampalam; M/s Kumar Partnership
(i) An affidavit in support of an application must verify the facts on which a claim is based; and (ii) a summary judgment application is not to be decided on whether the defence or affidavits raise a triable issue but on whether, taking into account all the facts and circumstances of the case, there are triable issues. If a defendant succeeds in raising even one triable issue, then it is not a fit and proper case for the granting of a summary judgment.
Export-Import Bank Of Malaysia Bhd v. Brahim’s Overseas Ventures Sdn Bhd & Ors  8 CLJ 844 [HC]
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Summary judgment - Application for - Recovery of term loan facility - Whether claim merely recovery of term loan facility - Whether matter far more complex and intricate - Whether details sufficiently pleaded in statement of claim - Whether there were triable issues to be determined at full trial - Whether there were issues to be explored and investigated further - Whether clear-cut case - Whether application supported by affidavit verifying facts of claim - Whether safe to grant judgment summarily - Rules of Court 2012, O. 14
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Affidavits - Affidavit in support - Application for summary judgment - Recovery of term loan facility - Whether all material facts of claim deposed to and verified - Whether basic conditions and prerequisites satisfied - Whether mandatory requirement under O. 14 r. 2(1) of Rules of Court 2012 complied with
- For the plaintiff - Alan Wong & Kavyaasrini S Mahendran; M/s Zain Megat & Murad
- For the defendants - Cecil Abraham, Gurubachan Singh Johal & Qeemnor Zahreen Zazanee; M/s Nashir Johal & Co
CAPITAL REDUCTION UNDER COMPANIES ACT 2016* [Read excerpt]
by Nurul Fatihah Azhar**  1 LNS(A) xcv
 1 LNS(A) xcv
CAPITAL REDUCTION UNDER COMPANIES ACT 2016*
Nurul Fatihah Azhar**
A reduction of capital occurs where a company reduces the amount of its share capital. Under the Malaysian Companies Act 2016 ('Act'), the Act provides two methods for companies to execute its scheme of capital reduction. This is an addition to the previous Companies Act 1965 wherein it only provides a mechanism for capital reduction by way of confirmation before the Court. Section 115 of the Act states that the reduction of capital can be by way of confirmation of a special resolution at the High Court or a special resolution supported by a solvency statement.
In this article, we will discuss the objectives of capital reduction, the method of executing the scheme of capital reduction pursuant to the Act and further discuss the requirement of fairness and equity for the confirmation of the scheme at the High Court by referring to two English cases namely the case of Ex Parte Westburn Sugar Refineries Ltd  AC 625 ('Westburn') and In Re Holders Investment Trust Ltd  1 WLR 583 ('Holders Investment Trust').
. . .
THE INHERENT JURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEAL* [Read excerpt]
by Brenda Loh Ling Li**  1 LNS(A) xcvi
 1 LNS(A) xcvi
THE INHERENT JURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEAL*
Brenda Loh Ling Li**
In Ishak Hj Shaari v. PP, the Court of Appeal is faced with an important question of law: does the Court of Appeal, as the apex court for matters originating from the subordinate courts, has the inherent jurisdiction or powers to review its own decision? The majority, Low Hop Bing JCA and Zaharah Ibrahim JCA (as she then was) in Ishak Hj Shaari, took a conservative and restrictive approach and opined that such inherent power to review could not be derived from Article 121 of the Federal Constitution; and that for the Court of Appeal to have such power to review, it has to be conferred by statute. However, no statute confers such a power to the Court of Appeal. Therefore, by the majority, the Court of Appeal ruled that it has no jurisdiction to review its previous decision and set aside the same.
However, Justice Hishamudin Yunus, in his dissenting judgment, boldly took the stance that the Federal Court and the Court of Appeal have the inherent jurisdiction to review their previous decisions under exceptional circumstances to prevent injustice or abuse of the court process.
In this article, we will dissect Justice Hishamudin Yunus's dissenting judgment and see its implications and effect in today's legal landscape.
. . .
||In force from
||Malaysian Border Security Agency (Dissolution) Act 2022
||Not Yet Inforce
||Geographical Indications Act 2022
||18 March 2022 [PU(B) 169/2022]
||Geographical Indications Act 2000 [ACT 602]
||Factories and Machinery (Repeal) Act 2022
||Not Yet In Force
||Malaysian Space Board Act 2022
||4 August 2022 [PU(B) 359/2022] - s 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 41, 42, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64 and 72
||Finance Act 2021
||The Income Tax Act 1967 [Act 53] see s 3; the Real Property Gains Tax Act 1976 [Act 169] see s 29; the Stamp Act 1949 [Act 378] see s 36; the Petroleum (Income Tax) Act 1967 [Act 543] see s 45; the Labuan Business Activity Tax Act 1990 [Act 445] see s 52; the Promotion of Investments Act 1986 [Act 327] see s 59; the Finance Act 2012 [Act 742] see s 64 and the Finance Act 2018 [Act 812] see s 66
||In force from
||Offenders Compulsory Attendance Act 1954 (Revised 1991)
||30 September 2022 [PU(B) 461/2022]
||Sections 2,3, 4, 4A, 5, 5A, 6A and 8
||Criminal Procedure Code (Revised 1999)
||1 October 2022 [PU(B) 452/2022]
||Courts of Judicature Act 1964 (Revised 1972)
||1 October 2022 [PU(B) 451/2022]
||Sections 28, 51, 52, 52A, 53, 55 and 68
||Perintah Duti Eksais 2022
||1 November 2022
||Excise Duties Order 2022
||1 November 2022