CASE(S) OF THE WEEK
SIVANESAN ACHALINGAM v. PATHMANATHAN KUPPUSAMY;
MAJLIS PEGUAM (INTERVENER) [2023] 1 CLJ 870
COURT OF APPEAL, PUTRAJAYA
YAACOB MD SAM JCA; RAVINTHRAN PARAMAGURU JCA; HASHIM HAMZAH JCA
[CIVIL APPEAL NO: W-02(A)-561-03-2021]
01 DECEMBER 2022
(i) The proper filing of Forms A and B will determine whether the representative of either party has the locus standi to appear before the court, in this case, the Industrial Court, as that party's representative. A failure to do so would mean that the solicitor is not representing the aggrieved party and is therefore not obligated to inform the latter of the trial dates of the case; (ii) Although it is trite that the standard of proof to establish misconduct is beyond reasonable doubt, a disciplinary proceeding is not subject to the rigid and strict adversarial procedures in criminal trials.
LEGAL PROFESSION: Disciplinary proceedings - Complaint against solicitor - Allegation of misconduct and breach of duty - Appeal against Disciplinary Board's decision to impose fine on solicitor - Whether solicitor had locus standi to appear as aggrieved party's representative - Burden of proof - Whether Disciplinary Committee or Disciplinary Board applied wrong burden of proof in disciplinary proceedings - Whether appellate intervention warranted
JUDICIAL QUOTES
"The structure of the legal detentive power in s. 3 of the Dangerous Drugs (Special Preventive Measures) Act 1985 is expressed to be sequential in nature. The inference to be drawn from the provisions of s. 3 is clear. Parliament acknowledges the drastic power given to restrict the liberty of a subject without having to bring him to a court and has put in place safeguards by expressly providing that this power or arrest is placed in the hands of a police officer with the rank of at least that of an inspector, and authority for each incremental period of detention having to be sought from a correspondingly higher authority up till that of the Minister. Each sequential progression must be scrupulously complied with by those entrusted with such power and the exercise of this power within the framework of the preventive detention laws in the DDSPMA is objectively justiciable.
In the instant case, whilst the element of having associated or is being involved in trafficking in dangerous drugs activities together with a substantial body of persons is present for the applicant's further detention for a further 14 days pursuant to s. 3(2)(c) of the DDSPMA, however, this element for purposes of his arrest, as well as his subsequent detention for more than 24 hours, followed by a further 48 hours was noticeably absent. It follows that his arrest and his subsequent detention is unlawful." – per Su Tiang Joo JC in Vegnesh Ramnaidu v. Ketua Polis Negara, Malaysia & Anor [2022] 10 CLJ 981
LATEST CASES
Legal Network Series
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[2022] 1 LNS 38
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PEMBINAAN MUTHIAH & SONS (M) SDN BHD & ORS v. SWEE PREMIX SDN BHD & ANOTHER CASE
1. Matters concerning expert evidence are issues of facts which ought to be determined by the court at trial. Hence, summary judgment is not a proper procedure where the outcome of a claim depends on expert opinion.
2. The cause of action founded on fraud and misrepresentation though not pleaded perfectly, could still be made out when the pleading is read as a whole.
3. When issues in the summary judgment application and striking out of the counterclaim are identical, the fate of the summary judgment application will determine the fate of the striking out application of the counterclaim, particularly when the counterclaim arose as a direct result of the plaintiff's claim's defence.
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Summary judgment - Triable issues - Claim for goods supplied - Issue of misrepresentation - Deviation in specification of goods supplied - Defendant filed counterclaim for loss and damage arising from defence of misrepresentation - Whether issues raised were triable and could only be determined by way of oral evidence at trial - Whether it was sufficient to consider extent of deviation of goods based on affidavits alone - Whether outcome of claim depends on expert opinion - Whether court could delve into merits and go into sufficiency or adequacy of evidence at interlocutory stage - Whether there were enough circumstances surrounding case that called for further investigation at a trial - Whether defendant's counterclaim effectively amounts to a defence of set-off - Whether unconditional leave to defence should be granted
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Striking out - Counterclaim - Defence of set-off - Claim for loss and damage as a result of misrepresentation - Whether counterclaim ought to be properly considered - Whether counterclaim was clearly plausible - Whether failure to specifically plead fraud and misrepresentation was fatal to counterclaim - Whether defendant could amend counterclaim to add particulars of fraud and misrepresentation - Whether counterclaim was plainly unsustainable
- For the plaintiff - Dinesh Praveen Nair & Alice Kang Jia Yi; M/s Dinesh Praveen Nair
- For the defendant - Fu Swee Theeng & Lee Hui Juan; M/s Gan Partnership
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[2022] 1 LNS 39
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HASSAN JAMALUDIN & ANOR v. SARIDAH ASHAARI & ORS & ANOTHER APPEAL
Allotment of shares, although illegal in the sense that it violates s. 67 of the Companies Act 1965 ('CA'), remains unaffected and the company is the only party at liberty to claim for recovery of any depletion of assets as a result of such a violation.
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Striking out - Illegality - Locus standi - Limitation - Action to recover original shares allotted - Whether claim grounded in contract or tort was time-barred - Whether plaintiff could rely on their own illegality to mount a claim - Whether plaintiff has locus standi to pursue a claim for damage suffered by other party - Whether there was acquiescence on part of plaintiff for its inaction
COMPANY LAW: Shares - Allotment of shares - Validity - Allegation that underlying transaction for allotment of shares in breach of s. 67 of Companies Act 1965 - Allegation that shares were not allotted at market value - Whether underlying transaction remained unaffected although allotment of shares was illegal - Whether allotments were ipso facto rendered null and void - Whether company could pursue a claim for recovery of any depletion of its assets
- For the appellant - Malik Imtiaz Ahmed Ghulam Sarwar, Wong Ming Yen & Mohamad Faisal Jaafar; M/s Zahari Affendi & Partners
- For the respondents - Krishna Dallumah & Yong Yong Hui; M/s Krishna Dallumah & Indran
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[2022] 1 LNS 44
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MAGNIFICIENT EMPIRE SDN BHD v. MPI GENERALI INSURANS BERHAD
Section 29 of the Contracts Act 1950 does not prohibit a condition precedent in an insurance policy that refers a dispute to arbitration before bringing an insurance claim in court of law. Hence, allowing an insured to proceed with action in court of law without complying or satisfying the condition precedent for the reference of dispute to arbitration would be tantamount to allowing the said insured to renege on its agreement. Such an action commenced in court without compliance with the condition precedent should be struck out.
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Striking out - Action - Insurance claim - Application hinges upon terms of insurance policy and arbitration clause - Whether claim fall within ambit of coverage under insurance policy - Whether action could be decided summarily - Whether conditions precedents for making claim fulfilled - Whether interpretation of arbitration clause and insurance policy require evidence - Whether there was material factual dispute - Whether plaintiff could be allowed to renege on its agreement - Whether action was bound to fail
INSURANCE: Claims - Condition precedent - Reference to arbitration - Application of arbitration clause in insurance policy - Validity of condition precedent - Whether condition precedent on reference of dispute to arbitration was void under s. 29 of Contracts Act 1950
- For the appellant - Joshua Kevin, Damien Chan & Jeff Ng; M/s Kevin & Co
- For the respondent - Pee Kui Yee; M/s Azim, Tunku Farik & Wong
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[2022] 1 LNS 717
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JEMMINGS SDN BHD lwn. PEMBINAAN JAYA ZIRA SDN BHD
Apabila pembelaan defendan adalah berkaitan dengan jumlah yang plaintif layak terima dan apabila plaintif sendiri tidak mengemukakan jumlah sebenar yang layak diterima olehnya, maka jumlah sebenar terhutang akan terus menjadi pertikaian dan perlu ditentukan dengan menilai keterangan-keterangan termasuk keterangan saksi dan dokumentari melalui perbicaraan penuh.
PROSEDUR SIVIL: Penghakiman terus - Kontrak binaan - Penamatan kontrak - Tuntutan oleh kontraktor utama terhadap majikan untuk mencabar penamatan kontrak dan menuntut bayaran bagi kerja-kerja yang didakwa disempurnakan - Kontrak menyatakan pembayaran secara 'back-to-back' atau 'paid-when-paid' - Sama ada klausa-klausa perjanjian perlu diberi tafsiran yang sewajarnya melalui perbicaraan - Sama ada jumlah terhutang dipertikaikan dan wajar dinilai dengan keterangan saksi dan dokumentari - Sama ada tindakan-tindakan plaintif dan defendan yang membawa kepada penamatan perjanjian wajar dipertimbangkan melalui keterangan saksi
- Bagi pihak plaintif - Zainal Abidin Mustaffa; T/n Zainal & Mariani
- Bagi pihak defendan - Amelda Din; T/n Amelda Fuad Abi & Aidil
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[2021] 1 LNS 1553
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MUHAMAD IRFAN KAMARUDDIN lwn. AHMAD TAYMAYLLAH HASHIM & SATU LAGI
Ganti rugi bagi kos pembelian kasut khas adalah wajar dibenarkan apabila pihak yang menuntut mengalami kependekan kaki akibat kecederaan pada lututnya walaupun laporan pakar perubatan tidak mencadangkan penggunaan kasut khas. Kesakitan yang dialami oleh pihak yang menuntut akibat kependekan kaki tersebut merupakan faktor untuk dipertimbangkan dalam pemberian ganti rugi bagi kos pembelian kasut khas.
GANTIRUGI: Kecederaan diri - Kecacatan kekal - Kecederaan dan kecacatan pada lutut - Laporan perubatan menyatakan kecacatan semakin berkurangan - Sama ada perayu akan kekal mengalami kerumitan dalam aktiviti harian walaupun kecacatannya telah berkurangan - Sama ada usia muda perayu wajar dipertimbangkan
GANTIRUGI: Ganti rugi khas - Kos pembedahan - Kos pembelian kasut khas - Kecederaan lutut kekal - Kecederaan yang dialami mengakibatkan kependekan kaki sebanyak 1 cm - Laporan pakar perubatan tidak mencadangkan penggunaan kasut khas - Sama ada mahkamah wajar membenarkan tuntutan kos pembelian kasut khas walaupun tidak dicadangkan oleh pakar perubatan
- Bagi pihak perayu - Noor Azizah Abdullah; T/n Azhar & Fazuny
- Bagi pihak responden - Amalina Abdul Ghani @ Hashim; T/n V P Nathan & Partners
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CLJ 2023 Volume 1 (Part 5)
A non-delegable duty of care, a no fault strict liability tort, must be imposed only in the most exceptional circumstances. Routine excavation works carried out by homeowners through independent contractors could not be described as an extraordinarily hazardous activity, thereby, the homeowner could not be held to owe a non-delegable duty of care to a public utilities company for the negligence of the independent contractors. As a matter of policy, to hold that routine residential construction works are subject to non-delegable duty would expose homeowners to an indeterminate liability for the tortious acts of their independent contractors, whose manner of work are beyond their control.
Hemraj & Co Sdn Bhd v. Tenaga Nasional Bhd [2023] 1 CLJ 651 [FC]
TORT
TORT: Negligence - Liability - Non-delegable duty of care - Claim by public utility company for damage caused by third-party contractors hired by homeowners - Whether works carried out extraordinarily hazardous activity - Whether routine residential construction works - Whether homeowner liable for negligence of third-party contractors - Whether non-delegable duty applied only in limited and exceptional circumstances - Whether risk of damage could be avoided if precautionary measures taken
TORT: Damages - Liability - Negligence - Non-delegable duty of care - Claim by public utility company ('TNB') for damage caused by third-party contractors hired by homeowners - Whether homeowner liable for negligence of third-party contractors - Whether licenses issued to consultants and contractors - Whether duty of homeowners to obtain approval from TNB - Whether s. 37(12)(a) of Electricity Supply Act 1990 prohibits persons who carry out works in vicinity of electrical installations without TNB's authority - Whether failure to obtain approval attracts penalty under s. 37(12)(b)
ABDUL RAHMAN SEBLI FCJ
ZABARIAH MOHD YUSOF FCJ
HASNAH MOHAMMED HASHIM FCJ
- For the appellant - Manuel David Morais, Pavitra Pillai, Norliza Rasool Khan & Deyvinah Ganesalingam; M/s Liza Khan Chambers
- For the respondent - Balvinder Singh Kenth & Delveena Kaur Sidhu; M/s Kenth Partnership
The court has the discretion to make an order for the production or inspection of documents or things if they are necessary or desirable for any investigation, inquiry, trial or other proceedings. The settled principle attached to an application for discovery under s. 51 of the Criminal Procedure Code is that a roving and fishing inquiry for evidence is not permissible; a catch-all cast cannot be cast.
Dato’ Sri Mohd Najib Hj Abd Razak v. PP & Another Appeal [2023] 1 CLJ 672 [CA]
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: Disclosure of information - Production of documents, materials and items - Application for - Applicant, former Prime Minister of Malaysia, charged with four charges of gratification and 21 charges of money laundering - Whether documents, materials and items sought necessary and desirable for trial - Whether relevant to issues for adjudication - Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 51 & 51A
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: Witness - Calling for certain witnesses to testify during prosecution's case - Application for - Applicant, former Prime Minister of Malaysia, charged with four charges of gratification and 21 charges of money laundering - Whether calling of witnesses' material to prosecution's case - Criminal Procedure Code, s. 425
KAMALUDIN MD SAID JCA
AHMAD NASFY YASIN JCA
NORDIN HASSAN JCA
- For the appellant - Muhammad Shafee Abdullah, Tania Scivetti, Effa Azuin Aidrul Hisham & Alaistair Brandah Norman; M/s Shafee & Co
- For the respondent - Gopal Sri Ram, Ahmad Akram Gharib, Mohamad Mustafa P Kunyalam, Hazmida Haris Lee & Fariza Amira Azman; DPPs
Undang-undang subsidiari mestilah selari dengan Akta induk dan perlu beroperasi dalam konteks Akta induk itu sendiri. Undang-undang subsidiari tidak boleh melangkaui atau melampaui peruntukan Akta induk yang dibuat bawahnya. Selain itu, peruntukan dalam Akta induk yang memberikan kuasa kepada mana-mana pihak berkuasa untuk menggubal undang-undang subsidiari mesti ditafsir secara ketat, terutama sekali apabila undang-undang subsidiari tersebut mengenakan apa-apa sekatan.
Nursyafawati Kasim lwn. Majlis Perbandaran Kota Bharu Bandar Raya Islam [2023] 1 CLJ 697 [CA]
UNDANG-UNDANG PENTADBIRAN
UNDANG-UNDANG PENTADBIRAN: Semakan kehakiman - Rayuan - Semakan kehakiman terhadap keputusan pihak berkuasa tempatan - Tayar kereta pemohon dikunci pihak berkuasa tempatan - Pemohon ditawarkan kompaun untuk membuka kunci tayar - Sama ada kereta pemohon diberhentikan di jalan dan menyebabkan bahaya, galangan atau kesusahan yang tidak berpatutan pada pengguna jalan atau lalu lintas - Sama ada Perintah 8 dan 17 Perintah Pengangkutan Jalan (Letak Kereta Bermeter) (Majlis Perbandaran Kota Bharu) 2000 ultra vires s. 72(7) Akta Pengangkutan Jalan 1987 - Sama ada pihak berkuasa tempatan mempunyai kuasa mengapit roda kereta untuk kesalahan meletak kenderaan di kawasan tempat letak kereta dalam keadaan caj pembayaran tamat tempoh
AB KARIM AB JALIL HMR
SUPANG LIAN HMR
HASHIM HAMZAH HMR
- Bagi pihak perayu - Hisham Fauzi & Majdah Muhammad; T/n Nasri, Majdah & Nurliza
- Bagi pihak responden - Mohd Marwaliz Mahmud & Shaharuddin Mohamed; T/n Shaharuddin Hidayu & Marwaliz
In a murder case, intention, being a mental element, could be proven even with an absence of direct evidence from witnesses, by recourse to circumstantial evidence and inference from surrounding circumstances and the acts or conduct of the person that caused the injuries that led to the deceased's death.
Salem Brayon v. PP [2023] 1 CLJ 739 [CA]
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: Appeal - Appeal against conviction and sentence - Appellant charged with murder - Appellant inflicted deceased with series of merciless beatings and pushed deceased to concrete wall, causing deceased's head and wall to collide - Deceased died because of head injury due to blunt object trauma - Whether appellant had intention to commit murder - Whether defence bare denial and afterthought
LEE SWEE SENG JCA
SUPANG LIAN JCA
GUNALAN MUNIANDY JCA
- For the appellant - Stephen Augustine Lateng; M/s Lateng Advocs
- For the respondent - Eyu Ghim Siang; AG's Chambers
(i) Section 30 of the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 ('CIPAA') shall only be invoked if money is due or payable by the principal to the party against whom the adjudication decision is made at the time of the receipt of the request under s. 30(1) of the same . The principal's failure to adduce sufficient evidence to discharge the evidential burden to prove that there is no money due or payable to the said party, and the absence of proof of payment as requested under s. 30(2) of the CIPAA, would leave the principal no choice but to be compelled to make direct payment of the adjudicated amount to the subcontractor according to an adjudication decision by the adjudicator in the adjudication proceedings; and (ii) The words 'adjudicated amount' in s. 30(1) and (3) of CIPAA does not include interest on the adjudicated amount and adjudication costs. If Parliament had intended for a principal to pay not merely the adjudicated amount, but interest and costs as well, nothing would be easier than to expressly provide as such.
Antah Schindler Sdn Bhd v. Maju Holdings Sdn Bhd [2023] 1 CLJ 754 [HC]
CONSTRUCTION LAW
CONSTRUCTION LAW: Adjudication decision - Enforcement - Application for - Application for principal of project to make direct payment to subcontractor according to adjudication decision - Whether conditions under s. 30 of Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 ('CIPAA') satisfied - Principal's failure to issue written notice to main contractor requesting proof of payment to subcontractor under s. 30(2) of CIPAA - Whether principal compelled to make direct payment to subcontractor - Whether there was money due or payable by principal to main contractor on date of request - Whether interest on adjudicated amount and adjudication costs as per adjudication decision form part of sum to be paid directly to subcontractor
- For the plaintiff - Deepak Mahadevan & Faeza Suraya Roselan; M/s Azmi Fadzly Maha & Sim
- For the defendant - Sachpreetraj Singh Sohanpal & Pavithra Loganathan; M/s Raj & Sach
(i) In an application for judicial review against the Attorney General/Public Prosecutor's ('AG/PP') decision not to commence criminal prosecution, in proving the threshold locus standi, the applicants must satisfy the 'adversely affected' test within the meaning of O. 53 r. 2(4) of the Rules of Court 2012. For that purpose, the applicants could demonstrate to the court the application was a public interest litigation; and (ii) In challenging the prosecutorial power of the AG/PP under art. 145(3) of the Federal Constitution, the applicants must rebut the strong presumption of legality by adducing sufficient prima facie evidence.
Sivakumar Sockalingam & Anor v. Peguam Negara, Malaysia [2023] 1 CLJ 768 [HC]
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: Judicial review - Leave - Application for - Judicial review against decision of Attorney General/Public Prosecutor's ('AG/PP') decision not to commence criminal prosecution - Whether applicants had locus standi - Whether applicants 'adversely affected' by decision - Whether applicants adduced compelling prima facie evidence to rebut presumption of legality - Whether mala fide proven on part of AG/PP
WAN AHMAD FARID WAN SALLEH J
- For the applicants - Gunaseelan S Thambinathan & Keshvinjeet Singh Sidhu; M/s Gunaseelan & Assocs
- For the respondent - Ahmad Hanir Hambaly & Atiqah Zainal Abidin; FCs
The execution of a judgment by a successor bank pursuant to a vesting order, does not require substitution of the plaintiff; by virtue of the vesting order, the interests of the predecessor bank are transmitted to the successor bank that the successor bank is very much a party to any proceedings. However, the execution process must be commenced expeditiously pursuant to the provisions of the Rules of Court 2012. Delay, if any, ought to be reasonably explained.
Small Medium Enterprise Development Bank Malaysia Bhd v. NSE Polymer Sdn Bhd & Ors [2023] 1 CLJ 776 [HC]
CIVIL PROCEDURE
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Execution - Writ of execution - Application for leave - Grounds for application - Change in party entitled to execute judgment - Whether plaintiff's successor required to file application under limb (b) of O. 46 r. 2(1) of Rules of Court 2012 before filing application under limb (a) - Whether opposed to expeditious administration of justice - Whether both limbs could be invoked in one application - Delay in execution of judgment - Whether proffered reasonable grounds for delay - Whether plaintiff's successor relinquished right to execute judgment by way of agreement
- For the plaintiff - Fawza Sabila Faudzi; M/s Sidek Teoh Wong & Dennis
- For the 3rd defendant - Yong Ke-Qin; M/s Akram Hizri Azad & Azmir
The law relating to the setting aside of a default judgment is well settled; a defence on the merits must be disclosed before the court could consider an application to set aside a default judgment, more so, where there is proof that the judgment has been obtained regularly. The party seeking to set aside the default judgment herein, which was shown to have been regularly obtained, were not only less than forthright, but was also delayed for a near-decade-long without satisfactory explanation in their application, warranting dismissal of such application.
Universiti Sains Malaysia v. Ku Zilati Ku Shaari & Ors And Another Case [2023] 1 CLJ 790 [HC]
CIVIL PROCEDURE
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Judgments and orders - Judgment in default - Application to set aside - Whether judgment regularly obtained - Whether writ and statement of claim properly served at right address - Whether service proven - Whether there was defence on merit warranting setting aside of default judgment - Whether cogent reasons given for delay beyond 30-day rule under O. 42 r. 13 of Rules of Court 2012 - Whether delay reasonable
- For the plaintiff - S Kartikumar; M/s Ghazi & Lim
- For the 1st defendant - Mustaqim Huzaini; M/s Ram Reza & Muhammad
No action or proceeding shall be proceeded with or commenced against a company, which had been placed under creditors voluntary liquidation, without leave from court.
Utusan Melayu (Malaysia) Bhd (Dalam Penggulungan Sukarela Pemiutang) v. Menteri Sumber Manusia & Ors And Other Applications [2023] 1 CLJ 804 [HC]
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: Judicial review - Certiorari - Application for - Challenge against decision of Minister of Human Resources ('Minister') - Liquidated company ceased operation, leading to termination of employees - Former employees of company lodged representation to Director-General of Industrial Relations - Representation referred to Minister - Minister referred matter to Industrial Court - Whether leave of winding-up court required before former employees could commence action against company at Industrial Court
- For the applicant - Rajvinder Singh & Afdhilani Jusoh; M/s Dennis Nik & Wong
- For the 1st respondent - Aisyaf Falina Abdullah, Mohd Izhanuddin Alias & Rohaiza Hamzah; SFCs
- For other respondents - Tengku Azlina Tengku Ismail; M/s Tengku Azlina, Azlan Shah & Azman
ARTICLES
CLJ Article(s)
IS IT TAXING OR INADEQUATE COMPENSATION THAT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL? [Read excerpt]
by TUN ABDUL HAMID MOHAMAD* [2023] 1 CLJ(A) i
[2023] 1 CLJ(A) i
MALAYSIA
IS IT TAXING OR INADEQUATE COMPENSATION THAT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL?
by
TUN ABDUL HAMID MOHAMAD*
On 9 December 2022, a five-member bench of the Federal Court led by Chief Justice Tun Tengku Maimun Tuan Mat held that art. 13(2) of the Constitution. But, where as I humbly submit, it may or may not, depending on the way the assessment is made, there is no necessity and no justification to strike down the section. That is besides the other grounds I have forwarded above.
Now, think of the consequences. I cannot think of a way of reversing it. IRB cannot issue a fresh assessment in another case even against a different landowner hoping to get a chance to reopen the issue, because the law enabling a similar assessment has been struck down as unconstitutional.
Is this another example of abuse of judicial review? See "Should the Industrial Court not be allowed to be what it was intended to be?" (4 March 2008). Is this another example of the Judiciary encroaching the powers of Parliament? - see "Not for judges to rewrite the Constitution (12 06 2017), "No judge is a Parliament" (30 March 2018); "Who is encroaching whose jurisdiction, Parliament or courts?" (16 December 2019), "Bapa" juga bermaksud "Ibu": Hakim mengambil alih kuasa Parlimen dan Majlis Raja-Raja" (23 September 2021).
Another point I wish to make is that, in a case where the validity of a law is challenged on the ground that it is unconstitutional, the Attorney General should intervene. It should not be left to the party sued, to defend it. The effect is far-reaching, not just between the two parties in that particular case. Valid grounds may be missed resulting in permanent consequences, as in this case.
. . .
LNS Article(s)
DATO' V KANAGALINGAM v. DAVID SAMUELS & ORS — REVISITED* [Read excerpt]
by Kong Xin Qing[i] Ezzamel Zarif bin Ahmed Zaharani[ii] [2023] 1 LNS(A) vii
[2023] 1 LNS(A) vii
MALAYSIA
DATO' V KANAGALINGAM v. DAVID SAMUELS & ORS — REVISITED*
by
Kong Xin Qing[i]
Ezzamel Zarif bin Ahmed Zaharani[ii]
INTRODUCTION
The judgment of Justice Hishamudin Yunus in Kanagalingam[1] was unprecedented and sent shock waves to the legal fraternity, as the learned judge courageously chose to adopt the decision of the Court of Appeal[2] (Ayer Molek COA) over that of the Federal Court[3] (Ayer Molek FC) in the case of Ayer Molek. He held that the Federal Court's panel in Ayer Molek FC was constitutionally incompetent, having violated both the Federal Constitution and the statutory provisions of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 ('CJA'). Therefore, no valid judgment could be rendered by a panel that was unconstitutionally and unlawfully constituted.
Justice Hishamudin's decision fundamentally raises two important questions of law, namely, the concept of stare decisis and quorum failure. In this article, his decision in Kanagalingam will be reviewed in light of these two legal principles.
. . .
THE USE OF CHATGPT-3 IN THE ARBITRATION INDUSTRY IN MALAYSIA: LEGAL AND ANALYTICAL OVERVIEW [Read excerpt]
by Mohamad Fateh Labanieh[i] Hussein Alaa Al-Azzawi[ii] [2023] 1 LNS(A) viii
[2023] 1 LNS(A) viii
MALAYSIA
THE USE OF CHATGPT-3 IN THE ARBITRATION INDUSTRY IN MALAYSIA:
LEGAL AND ANALYTICAL OVERVIEW
by
Mohamad Fateh Labanieh[i]
Hussein Alaa Al-Azzawi[ii]
ABSTRACT
Arbitration is the most widespread mechanism for resolving disputes in the modern and Islamic eras. The current global tendency calls for an increase in the integration of disruptive technology, such as artificial intelligence (AI), into arbitration. This article uses doctrinal legal research methodology to examine the use of Generative Pre-trained Transformer 3 (ChatGPT-3). To achieve that, primary and secondary sources of data are used. The collected data was analytically and critically analysed using the content analysis method. It is found that AI technologies, such as ChatGPT-3 would bring added value to arbitration if they are appropriately employed. However, from a legal perspective, arbitration laws are not mature enough to absorb AI technologies, such as ChatGPT-3. Finally, this article recommends that designing or developing an AI application similar to ChatGPT-3 by the Malaysian relevant authority in general and AIAC in specific would be a coherent milestone for the arbitration industry in Malaysia to be among the well-known international arbitration industry; it would attract more disputes to AIAC.
. . .
LEGISLATION HIGHLIGHTS
Principal Acts
Amending Acts
PU(A)
PU(B)
Legislation Alert
Updated
| Act/Principal No. |
Title |
Amended by |
In force from |
Section amended |
| AKTA 791 |
Akta Cukai Pelancongan 2017 |
AKTA A1673 |
1 Januari 2023 [PU(B) 644/2022] |
Seksyen 66, 69A, 69B dan 70 |
| ACT 791 |
Tourism Tax Act 2017 |
ACT A1673 |
1 January 2023 [PU(B) 644/2022] |
Sections 66, 69A, 69B and 70 |
| AKTA 807 |
Akta Cukai Perkhidmatan 2018 |
AKTA A1672 |
1 Januari 2023 [PU(B) 643/2022] |
Seksyen 26A, 38A, 56A, 56D, 56E, 90A dan 90B |
| ACT 807 |
Service Tax Act 2018 |
ACT A1672 |
1 January 2023 [PU(B) 643/2022] |
Sections 26A, 38A, 56A, 56D, 56E, 90A and 90B |
| AKTA 806 |
Akta Cukai Jualan 2018 |
AKTA A1671 |
1 Januari 2023 [PU(B) 641/2022] |
Seksyen 11A - 11D, 19, 57A, 91, 106, 106A, 106B dan Jadual |
Revoked
| Act/Principal No. |
Title |
Revoked by |
In force from |
| PU(A) 370/2022 |
Perintah Menteri-Menteri Kerajaan Persekutuan 2022 |
PU(A) 27/2023 |
Lihat perenggan 1(2) |
| PU(A) 370/2022 |
Ministers of the Federal Government Order 2022 |
PU(A) 27/2023 |
See paragraph 1(2) of this Order |
| PU(A) 373/2022 |
Perintah Kawalan Harga Dan Antipencatutan (Penentuan Harga Maksimum) (No. 15) 2022 |
PU(A) 5/2023 |
8 Januari 2023 hingga 7 Februari 2023 |
| PU(A) 373/2022 |
Price Control and Anti-Profiteering (Determination of Maximum Price) (No. 15) Order 2022 |
PU(A) 5/2023 |
8 January 2023 to 7 February 2023 |
| PU(A) 286/2022 |
Perintah Pengangkutan Jalan (Larangan Penggunaan Jalan) (Jalan Persekutuan) (No. 15) 2022 |
PU(A) 378/2022 |
15 Disember 2022 |
|
