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“Having considered the matter carefully, we think that it would be an error to read into s. 29(fa), words which do not appear in that section and to construe the section restrictively or at any rate, in such a way as to preclude a party from applying to strike out a case based on, inter alia, s. 52 of the Industrial Relations Act 1967. Parliament, in its wisdom, has left open the circumstances or the occasions on which the Industrial Court may exercise its power under s. 29(fa) to strike out a case. As such, we are of the view that in the circumstances of the present case, it was wholly appropriate for the Institute to have applied under s. 29(fa) of the Act.”

“We cannot agree with the claimant’s contention and the High Court’s ruling that Kathiravelu’s case (Kathiravelu Ganesan) applies and that the Institute ought to have filed for judicial review to quash the reference under s. 20(3) of the Act. ... It is essential to keep in mind that when s. 29 of the Act was amended and (fa) was inserted, Parliament is deemed to know the law, particularly the ruling of the Supreme Court in Kathiravelu’s case. The effect of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Kathiravelu’s case is that, a reference to the Industrial Court which was based on a workman’s representation under s. 20(1) of the Act and made beyond the time prescribed by that section, may be dealt with by the Industrial Court itself, whereas any other challenge to the Industrial Court’s threshold jurisdiction must be taken up by way of judicial review, and not by way of any preliminary objection in the Industrial Court.”

“Thus, the position that we take is that, depending on the facts and circumstances, where the evidence is clear and the issue can be dealt with summarily, it is open for a party to take the route via s. 29 of the Act to have the case struck out based on a jurisdictional objection under s. 52 of the Act.” - Per S. Nantha Balan JCA in Institut Integriti Malaysia v. Roziah Harun & Anor [2024] CLJU 1817

“In this appeal, both learned counsel for the appellant and DPP had relied on the “rarest of the rare” doctrine. According to the appellant’s learned counsel, the Court of Appeal should substitute the death sentence (High Court) with 30 years imprisonment because this case was not the “rarest of the rare”. The appellant cannot be whipped pursuant to s. 289(c) of the CPC because he is now more than 50 years old. Learned DPP sought to persuade us to maintain the death sentence (High Court) by submitting that this case was one of the “rarest of the rare”.”

“Our research has not disclosed any judgment of the Federal Court regarding the application of the “rarest of the rare” doctrine. The “rarest of the rare” doctrine is now firmly established in India. With respect, we are not in favour of adopting the “rarest of the rare” doctrine in Malaysia.”

“Our reasons are as follows: (i) in s. 302 of the PC read with ss. 34 and 39 of the AMDP, Parliament has conferred a wide discretion on our courts to mete out the following punishment on a person who has committed a murder offence under s. 302 of the PC: (a) death penalty; or (b) imprisonment for a term of not less than 30 years but not exceeding 40 years and whipping of not less than 12 strokes (wide judicial discretion (s. 302 of the PC)); (ii) our Legislature did not impose any restriction or condition to curtail the wide judicial discretion (s. 302 of the PC). In other words, the wide judicial discretion (s. 302 of the PC) is unfettered. If we have applied the “rarest of the rare” doctrine, this will be tantamount to an unlawful curtailment of the wide judicial discretion (s. 302 of the PC);” - Per Wong Kian Kheong JCA in Robin Radjaini Saih v. PP [2024] 9 CLJ 224

“In any event, the applicant had narrowly failed the Property Law module on two out of three attempts at the module, resulting in a 'compensated pass' under reg. 8.7 for the University of London Undergraduate Laws 2018-2019 Regulations (encl. 12, pp. 68 to 69).”

“Thus, this court is of the view that it is well within the respondent's authority to equate a 'compensated pass' to a 'fail' under the 1995 Guidelines. (New Guidelines on Qualifications and Requirements to Qualify to Sit for the Malaysian Certificate in Legal Practice (CLP) Examination (for Law Degrees from the United Kingdom)).”

“It is not disputed that prevailing academic judgment in this context rests with the respondent itself, being the statutory body empowered to uphold the requisite standard for admission into the Malaysian Bar.”

“Therefore, the respondent's non-acceptance of a 'compensated pass' does not amount to a challenge to the University of London's grading structure or its decision to award a 'compensated pass'.”

“Instead, for the purposes of regulating qualifications for admission as an advocate and solicitor to the Malaysian Bar, the respondent is empowered to determine if the 'compensated pass' grade aligns with its requirements that there be a 'pass' and not a form of a handicapped pass.” - Per Ahmad Kamal Md Shahid J in Suresh Kumar Achuthan Krishnan v. Lembaga Kelayakan Profesion Undang-Undang, Malaysia [2024] 7 CLJ 445

“Grandparents undoubtedly hold a distinctive and valuable place within the family dynamics. Their wisdom, experience, and unconditional love often enrich the lives of their grandchildren in profound ways. However, it was crucial to acknowledge that their role is not intended to supplant that of parents but rather to complement and bolster it. They may step in as caregivers, particularly in situations where parents are unavailable due to work commitments, illness, or other responsibilities. Their support can be invaluable in easing the burdens of modern family life and providing a safe and nurturing environment for grandchildren to thrive.”

“However, maintaining a delicate balance in the grandparent-grandchild relationship is essential. While grandparents may offer valuable guidance and advice, it is crucial to respect the autonomy of the parents and their authority in decision-making regarding their children, particularly in situations where parents and grandparents are at odds.” - Per Evrol Mariette Peters J in HOM v. HOP [2024] 8 CLJ 35

“There was no substantial affiliation between the learned Arbitrator and LTH’s counsel which would give rise to the learned Arbitrator having an interest towards the outcome of the Award. The conversation between the learned Arbitrator and LTH's counsel was purely casual which was not even intended to be secretive.”

“I agree with learned counsel for LTH that a reasonable and fair minded person, knowing that LTH’s counsel never worked for the learned Arbitrator and only chambered in the learned Arbitrator’s past firm some seventeen (17) years ago would not think that there would be a conflict of interest between parties. Indeed, the Plaintiff has not demonstrated that there was a real likelihood of bias by the learned Arbitrator in this case.” – Per Ong Chee Kwan J in Lingkaran Hartaniaga Sdn Bhd v. Lembaga Tabung Haji [2024] CLJU 1093