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PP v. SYED SADDIQ SYED ABDUL RAHMAN
FEDERAL COURT, PUTRAJAYA
ABU BAKAR JAIS PCA
CHE MOHD RUZIMA GHAZALI FCJ
COLLIN LAWRENCE SEQUERAH FCJ
[CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS: 05(LB)-102-06-2025(W), 05(LB)-103-06-2025(W) & 05(LB)-104-06-2025(W)]
13 JULY 2026

(i) A procedural bank withdrawal cannot be equated to an 'expenditure'. Expanding the constitutional/contractual definition of 'expenses', to include a mere 'withdrawal', rewrites the language of the governing instrument without legal basis. Consequently, a failure to obtain prior approval for a bank withdrawal does not, by itself, satisfy the elements or constitute an act of criminal breach of trust; (ii) An accused cannot be convicted of abetment, under s. 109 of the Penal Code ('PC'), if the act of the alleged principal offender is not proven to be criminally wrong or unlawful in the first place. Where the prosecution fails to establish that the primary actor committed the underlying offence, the charge of abetment against the secondary actor must fail; (iii) Funds donated or raised specifically for a designated candidate's political campaign transfer beneficial ownership to that candidate upon collection. Because the candidate is the beneficial owner of those funds, transferring or utilising them for that campaign does not constitute dishonest misappropriation of third-party property, even if held or transited through an intermediary's account; (iv) Where the predicate offence under s. 403 of the PC fails due to a lack of proof of unlawful origin or criminal property, the consequential money laundering charges under s. 4(1)(b) of the Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Terrorism Financing, Anti-Restricted Activity Financing and Proceeds of Unlawful Activities Act 2001 cannot stand, as the funds transferred do not constitute 'proceeds of unlawful activities'.

PHANG LI KOON v. PP
COURT OF APPEAL, PUTRAJAYA
AZMAN ABDULLAH JCA
NOORIN BADARUDDIN JCA
MOHD RADZI ABDUL HAMID JCA
[CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS: P-05-221-05-2024 & P-05-223-05-2024]
24 JUNE 2026

(i) The constitutional protection against double jeopardy and the statutory plea of autrefois acquit, enshrined in art. 7(2) of the Federal Constitution and s. 302 of the Criminal Procedure Code, do not create a blanket immunity against subsequent prosecutions merely because the new charges stem from the same historical investigation or a broadly related factual background. The prohibition applies strictly to a second prosecution for the same offence; (ii) For the doctrine of issue estoppel to apply in a criminal matter, the precise factual or legal issue raised in the subsequent proceeding must have been distinctly raised, adjudicated, and necessarily determined by the trial court in the earlier proceeding. A discharge and acquittal resulting purely from the prosecution's withdrawal of charges prior to the close of its case, without any judicial adjudication or findings on the specific factual allegations of the subsequent charges, does not satisfy this requirement. Consequently, neither issue estoppel nor res judicata can operate to bar the fresh charges in the absence of a prior determination of those specific issues.