This was an appeal against the decision of the Court of Appeal ruling that the High Court had gone against the weight of evidence in acquitting and discharging the appellant at the end of the prosecution's case on a charge under s. 4(1) of the Sedition Act 1948, and that the appellant ought to enter a defence in respect of the charge which had been preferred against him thus. Before the justices of the apex court herein, the appellant effectively argued _ following the prosecution's application to have the appeal dismissed in limine on grounds that the Court of Appeal's order did not amount to a 'decision' in law and therefore non-appealable _ that barring him from appealing would violate his constitutional right to equality before the law, as the order would be a final order and an appeal to the Federal Court would avail the public prosecutor if the Court of Appeal's decision had gone the other way round. Upon the averments thus put forth by the parties, two primary questions arose for determination by the court, viz: (i) whether the appellant was barred from appealing against the decision of the Court of Appeal; and (ii) whether the appellant's constitutional right under art. 8(1) of the Federal Constitution had been violated in the circumstances of the case by virtue of the definition of "decision" in s. 3 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 ('CJA').

Held (allowing prosecution's application; dismissing appellant's appeal)

Per Suriyadi Halim Omar FCJ delivering the judgment of the court:

(1) Section 3 of the CJA defines 'decision' to mean judgment, sentence or order, but does not include any ruling made in the course of a trial or hearing of any cause or matter which does not finally dispose of the rights of the parties. In order for a decision to be final, the defence must first be heard, and after a maximum evaluation of the total evidence, a decision eventually be made. It is at that conclusive stage, when the fate of the appellant is known, that the right of appeal is triggered. (paras 17 & 19)

(2) The term 'decision' in s. 3 CJA reveals that its definition does not extend to the types of judgments or orders which can be termed as interlocutory. Hence, if a judgment or order is not final, in the sense that it does not finally dispose of the rights of the parties in the trial, it would not fall within the definition of the word 'decision' and thus not appealable. With the facts as they were before us, we would agree with the prosecution that there was no finality in the decision of the Court of Appeal herein. The order of the Court of Appeal not being appealable, the appeal filed by the appellant was hence incompetent. (paras 20-21 & 25)

(3) The appellant is not disadvantaged by the alleged unequal treatment produced by the word 'decision' under s. 3 CJA. Under the said section, the appellant is not prevented from filing an appeal at the end of the trial, and to include in the petition of appeal of any dissatisfaction with any ruling made in the course of the trial. Such preclusion of appeals mid-stream would lead to inevitable speedy disposal of cases resulting in an increase in the efficiency of court's administration, and without the appellant's right of appeal being compromised in any way. (para 24)

(4) The promulgation of art. 8 of the Federal Constitution is a written expression of our acceptance that all persons are equal before the law and entitled to the equal protection of the law. However, the equality provision is not absolute and may not be uniformly applied to all persons in all circumstances everywhere. Equal treatment under the law does not imply that all people should be treated alike. (Datuk Haji Harun bin Haji Idris v. PP (foll)). (paras 26-28)

(5) The court was unable to agree with the appellant that the question posed by him is novel, or that his rights under art. 8 of the Federal Constitution had been violated. With the meaning of 'decision' being unambiguous and the appellant having failed to find his supposed right under art. 8 violated, the court therefore allowed the prosecution's application and dismissed the appellant's appeal. (para 29)

Bahasa Malaysia Translation Of Headnotes

Ini adalah rayuan terhadap keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan yang memutuskan bahawa Mahkamah Tinggi telah menyanggahi aliran keterangan apabila melepas dan membebaskan perayu atas pertuduhan di bawah s. 4(1) Akta Hasutan 1948 di akhir kes pendakwaan, dan bahawa perayu perlu mengemukakan pembelaan terhadap pertuduhan yang dihadapinya itu. Di hadapan hakim-hakim mahkamah tertinggi di sini, perayu secara berkesannya berhujah _ ekoran permohonan pendakwaan supaya rayuan ditolak in limine kerana perintah Mahkamah Rayuan tersebut bukan suatu 'keputusan' di sisi undang-undang dan oleh itu tidak boleh dirayu _ bahawa menghalangnya dari merayu akan melanggar hak keperlembagaan beliau untuk dilayan secara samarata, memandangkan perintah berkenaan akan menjadi muktamad dan rayuan terhadapnya akan terbuka untuk Pendakwa Raya, sekiranya keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan tersebut berpihak kepada beliau dan tidak kepada Pendakwa Raya. Berdasarkan kepada hujah-hujah yang dikemukakan oleh pihak-pihak, dua persoalan penting telah berbangkit untuk pemutusan mahkamah, iaitu: (i) sama ada perayu dihalang dari merayu terhadap keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan; dan (ii) sama ada hak keperlembagaan perayu di bawah fasal 8(1) Perlembagaan Persekutuan telah dalam halkeadaan kes dilanggari mengambilkira definisi "keputusan" di dalam s. 3 Akta Mahkamah Kehakiman 1964 ('AMK').

Diputuskan (membenarkan permohonan pendakwaan; menolak rayuan perayu)

Oleh Suriyadi Halim Omar HMP menyampaikan penghakiman mahkamah:

(1) Seksyen 3 AMK mentakrifkan 'keputusan' sebagai bermaksud penghakiman, hukuman atau perintah, tetapi tidak termasuk apa-apa perintah yang dibuat semasa perbicaraan atau pendengaran sesuatu perkara yang tidak melupuskan secara muktamad hak-hak pihak yang bertikai. Untuk keputusan menjadi muktamad, pembelaan hendaklah terlebih dahulu didengar, dan keputusan dicapai selepas penilaian maksima dibuat terhadap keseluruhan keterangan. Hanyalah di peringkat konklusif tersebut, bilamana nasib perayu sudah diketahui, bahawa hak untuk merayu berbangkit.

(2) Perkataan 'keputusan' dalam s. 3 AMK menunjukkan bahawa pentakrifannya tidak meliputi penghakiman atau perintah yang bersifat interlokutori. Oleh itu, jika sesuatu penghakiman atau perintah tidak muktamad, dalam ertikata bahawa ia tidak melupuskan secara muktamad hak pihak-pihak dalam perbicaraan, maka ia tidak terjatuh ke dalam takrif 'keputusan' dan kerana itu tidak boleh dirayui. Berdasarkan fakta seperti yang wujud di hadapan kami, kami bersetuju dengan pihak pendakwaan bahawa tidak ada kemuktamadan pada keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan di sini. Memandangkan perintah Mahkamah Rayuan tersebut tidak boleh dirayui, maka rayuan yang difailkan oleh perayu adalah tidak berkompeten.

(3) Perayu tidak mengalami kekurangan disebabkan oleh layanan tidak sama seperti yang didakwa berbangkit dari perkataan 'keputusan' di bawah s. 3 AMK. Di bawah seksyen tersebut, perayu tidak dihalang dari memfailkan rayuan di akhir perbicaraan, dan memasukkan dalam petisyen rayuan sebarang ketidakpuasan terhadap keputusan yang dibuat di sepanjang perbicaraan. Menolak rayuan di tengah jalan sebegini tentunya mempercepatkan pelupusan kes, yang sekaligus meningkatkan keberkesanan pentadbiran mahkamah tanpa sekali-kali menjejaskan hak merayu perayu.

(4) Penggubalan fasal 8 Perlembagaan Persekutuan adalah satu ekspresi bertulis mengenai penerimaan kita bahawa semua orang adalah setara di sisi undang-undang dan berhak kepada perlindungan undang-undang yang setara. Apapun peruntukan kesamarataan ini bukanlah mutlak dan tidak terpakai secara samarata kepada semua orang dalam semua halkeadaan di semua tempat. Layanan samarata di sisi undang-undang tidak bermaksud bahawa semua orang akan dilayan dengan serupa.

(5) Mahkamah tidak dapat bersetuju dengan perayu bahawa soalan yang dikemukakan olehnya adalah sesuatu yang baharu, atau bahawa haknya di bawah fasal 8 Perlembagaan Persekutuan telah terjejas. Dengan maksud 'keputusan' sebegitu jelas dan dengan kegagalan perayu menemui hak di bawah fasal 8 yang dikatakannya telah dilanggari, maka mahkamah membenarkan permohonan pendakwaan dan menolak rayuan perayu.

Case(s) referred to:

Abdul Ghani Ali & Ors v. PP & Another Appeal [2001] 3 CLJ 769 FC (refd)

Amand v. Home Secretary and Minister of Defence of Royal Netherlands Government [1943] AC 147 (refd)

Dato' Seri Anwar Ibrahim v. PP [2010] 9 CLJ 625 FC (refd)

Dato' Seri Anwar Ibrahim v. PP [2011] 2 CLJ 845 CA (refd)

Datuk Haji Harun Haji Idris v. PP [1976] 1 LNS 19 FC (foll)

Lee Kwan Woh v. PP [2009] 5 CLJ 631 FC (refd)

Lim Hung Wang & Ors v. PP [2011] 7 CLJ 318 HC (refd)

Malaysia British Assurance Berhad v. Chung Choi Yoke [2004] 1 LNS 92 HC (refd)

Maleb Su v. PP & Another Case [1984] 1 CLJ 378; [1984] 2 CLJ (Rep) 232 HC (refd)

PP v. Mohd Fazil Awaludin [2009] 2 CLJ 862 HC (refd)

PP v. Letchumanan Suppiah [2009] 5 CLJ 652 FC (refd)

PP v. Khong Teng Khen & Anor [1976] 1 LNS 100 FC (refd)

Regina v. Collins [1970] 1 QB 710 (refd)

Rex v. Bryant and Dickson [1946] 3 Cr App R 146 (refd)

Saad Abas & Anor v. PP [1998] 4 CLJ 575 CA (refd)

Seaman v. Burley [1896] 2 QB 344 (refd)

Legislation referred to:

Criminal Procedure Code, s. 418A(1)

Courts of Judicature Act 1964, ss. 3, 86, 87(1)

Federal Constitution, arts. 8(1), (5), 121(2), 128(3), 153, 160(2)

Sedition Act 1948, ss. 3(1)(f), 4(1)

Other source(s) referred to:

Bindra's, Interpretation of Statutes, p 395

Janab's, Key to Criminal Procedure Evidence Advocacy and Professional Ethics, p 46

Counsel:

For the appellant - Karpal Singh (Jagdeep Singh Deo, Gobind Singh Deo, Sangeet Kaur Deo, Ramkarpal Singh & RSN Rayer with him); M/s Karpal Singh & Co

For the respondent - Noorin Badaruddin (Azlina Rasdi with her); AG's Chambers

[Appeal from Court of Appeal, Putrajaya; Criminal Appeal No: W-05-233-2010]

Reported by Wan Sharif Wan Ahmad