The appellant, who retired as partner of a legal firm ('the firm') he founded together with the first respondent and another person, was concerned about the value of his share in the firm on the date of his retirement. The firm informed the appellant that based on its audited accounts and after considering certain billings he had made, he owed the firm RM320,096 which he had to pay within a year of his retirement. The appellant felt that the firm had not properly valued his share. He felt the valuations done by the firm had only taken into account the firm's goodwill but not its assets. He filed an action against the respondents in the High Court seeking various declarations and orders concerning the value of his share. He maintained that the firm's assets belonged to him and the first respondent exclusively and that the second and third respondents who were subsequent partners of the firm had to pay for their use. The firm tendered in evidence three valuation reports prepared by two companies of auditors it had commissioned at different times to value the firm. Those reports were disputed by a fourth valuation report commissioned by the appellant stating that the three earlier reports merely valued the firm's goodwill without taking into account the value of its assets. The trial judge rejected the appellant's contention holding that the valuations commissioned by the firm had used the 'surplus-profit' method of valuation which took into account both the goodwill and the assets of the firm and thus represented the value of the firm as a whole. The judge also rejected the contention that the firm's assets belonged exclusively to the appellant and the first respondent. He, however, allowed the appellant's claim to a 5% absolute share in the firm's net profits but only for the one year after his date of retirement. The respondents' counterclaim for RM62,000, being the amount expended on a car acquired by the appellant, was allowed. The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal against the dismissal of his claims including the decision to restrict his entitlement to the profits for only one year post-retirement whilst the respondents cross-appealed against the decision granting him the 5% absolute share of the net profits. The Court of Appeal unanimously dismissed the appellant's appeal and allowed the cross-appeal. The appellant was granted leave to appeal to the Federal Court.

Held (unanimously dismissing the appeal with costs):

(1) Having reviewed the whole of the evidence and having taken into account all the valuation reports concerned, this court agreed with the reasoning given by the Court of Appeal. The findings of facts on the valuation of the firm based on the 'surplus-profit' method by the trial judge as endorsed by the Court of Appeal were not in error and did not merit appellate intervention. (paras 50 & 51)

(2) The trial judge made a finding of fact in rejecting the appellant's claim that the firm's assets belonged to the appellant and the first respondent exclusively. From the facts of the case, it was indisputable the firm's assets belonged to all the partners of the firm. There was more than sufficient evidence before the trial judge for him to have made such a finding. Such finding of fact did not warrant any appellate intervention. (para 43)

(3) The appellant by accepting the recommendations of the AA Report dated 3 October 1986 without qualification, was estopped from denying that he was bound by what he had agreed to. (paras 44 & 45)

Case(s) referred to:

Boustead Trading (1985) Sdn Bhd v. Arab Malaysia Merchant Bank Berhad [1995] 4 CLJ 283 FC (refd)

Gan Yook Chin & Anor v. Lee Ing Chin & Ors [2004] 4 CLJ 309 FC (refd)

For the appellant - N Chandran (S Jeya Palan & Rajan A Applasamy with him); M/s Maxwell Kenion Cowdy & Jones

For the respondents - Porres P Royan (T Sudhar with him); M/s Shook Lin & Bok

[Editor's note: For the Court of Appeal judgment, please see Mohamed Ismail Mohamed Shariff v. Zain Azahari Zainal Abidin & Ors [2010] 5 CLJ 153]

Reported by Ashok Kumar

Tertuduh, berumur lebih kurang 18 tahun, telah dituduh dengan kesalahan menunggang sebuah motorsikal dengan gopoh atau cuai sehingga boleh menyebabkan bencana kepada orang lain di bawah s. 279 Kanun Keseksaan ('Kanun'), tetapi telah dibebas dan dilepaskan oleh Majistret di akhir kes pendakwaan atas alasan tiada kes prima facie telah dibuktikan terhadap beliau. Di rayuan, Mahkamah Tinggi telah mengakas keputusan Majistret, dan sekaligus memerintahkan supaya tertuduh dipanggil untuk membela diri. Dalam (sambung) perbicaraan di hadapan Majistret di sini, tertuduh, dalam pembelaannya, secara intinya menghujahkan bahawa tiada kesalahan di bawah s. 279 Kanun telah dilakukan oleh beliau, disebabkan tempat kejadian, iaitu lebuh raya DUKE, pada waktu material masih belum dibuka kepada orang ramai dan kerana itu bukanlah satu "jalan awam" seperti yang dinyatakan dalam s. 279. Tidak dinafikan bahawa lebuh raya DUKE pada waktu itu masih belum dirasmikan pembukaannya, namun, ia telah digunakan oleh orang ramai di mana penghadang-penghadang jalannya telah dialihkan. Fakta seterusnya menunjukkan bahawa sebelum ditahan, tertuduh dilihat telah menunggang motorsikalnya dengan aksi 'wheelie', iaitu dengan mengangkat roda hadapan secara berulang kali. Di hadapan Majistret, persoalan penting yang berbangkit adalah: (i) sama ada di akhir kes pembelaan suatu kes di luar keraguan munasabah seperti pertuduhan telah dibuktikan oleh pendakwaan; (ii) jika begitu, apakah hukuman wajar yang harus dijatuhkan terhadap tertuduh; dan (iii) sama ada kegagalan tertuduh memanggil pihak pentadbir DUKE untuk memberi keterangan mengenai status lebuh raya telah memudaratkan kesnya.

Diputuskan (mensabitkan tertuduh dan menjatuhkan hukuman sekadarnya):

(1) Berdasarkan keterangan SP1, SP3, SP4 dan SD2, jalan di lebuh raya DUKE pada waktu material telah boleh dilalui oleh orang ramai. Penghadang jalannya telah dialihkan dan lampu jalan juga terpasang terang di waktu malam. Jelas sekali bahawa orang awam, termasuk tertuduh, telah mengambil peluang menggunakan jalan tersebut walaupun ia masih belum dirasmikan pembukaannya. (perenggan 38 & 39)

(2) Mengambilkira antara lain autoriti Harrison v. Hill dan Teo Siong Khoon v. PP, serta definisi "jalan" di dalam Kamus Oxford, jalan di lebuh raya DUKE di mana tertuduh menunggang motorsikalnya pada masa kejadian adalah satu jalan awam, kerana ia menghubungkan satu tempat ke tempat yang lain dan jalan tersebut boleh digunakan oleh orang ramai untuk lalu di atasnya. Mahkamah juga mengambilkira bahawa jarak masa antara tarikh kejadian dan tarikh lebuh raya DUKE dirasmikan hanyalah tiga minggu sahaja. Selain itu, kegagalan pihak pembelaan memanggil pegawai atau pihak pentadbir DUKE bagi membuktikan jalan tersebut masih belum siap dan tidak boleh digunakan oleh orang awam adalah fatal. (perenggan 40 & 44)

(3) Cara tunggangan aksi 'wheelie' yang dilakukan oleh tertuduh boleh termasuk dalam cara memandu secara gopoh atau cuai yang mana boleh membahayakan atau menyebabkan cedera atau bencana kepada orang lain yang menggunakan jalan tersebut pada masa berkenaan. Walaupun ada keterangan yang menunjukkan tunggangan tertuduh tidak laju, namun menunggang motorsikal dengan aksi mengangkat roda hadapan dan hanya sebuah roda di belakang adalah tunggangan tidak selamat, tidak berhemah, boleh mendatangkan bahaya dan boleh menyebabkan cedera atau bencana kepada diri sendiri atau orang lain. (perenggan 48)

(4) Mengambilkira kepentingan awam, umur muda tertuduh, keseriusan kesalahan yang dilakukan dan bahawa tertuduh adalah pesalah pertama, hukuman sebulan penjara dari tarikh jatuh hukum dan denda RM1,000 jika tidak bayar dua minggu penjara terhadap tertuduh adalah sesuai dan wajar.
(perenggan 54-56)

Kes-kes yang dirujuk:

Harrison v. Hill [1932] SC (J) 13 (dirujuk)

Lai Kim Hon & Ors v. PP [1980] 1 LNS 197 FC (dirujuk)

PP v. Datuk Hj Harun Idris [1997] 1 MLJ 15 (dirujuk)

PP v. Wan Khairil Wan Isa [2007] 9 CLJ 557 HC (dirujuk)

Teo Siong Khoon v. PP [1995] 2 SLR 107 (dirujuk)

Perundangan yang dirujuk:

Evidence Act 1950, s. 157

Penal Code, s. 279

Road Transport Act 1987, s. 2

Street, Drainage & Building Act 1974, s. 3

Sumber-sumber yang dirujuk:

NS Bindra's Interpretation Of Statutes, 8th edn, ms 432 & 433

Bagi pihak pendakwaan - Ooi Chean Ling; TPR

Bagi pihak tertuduh - Mohd Imran Adam; T/n Zufaidi & Assocs

Dilaporkan oleh Wan Sharif Ahmad